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 This is an ethnographic study of the voice as a resource for forming 
devout Hindu selves in contemporary Bali, Indonesia. Through case studies of 
three forms of Hindu chant, I show how vocal performance has been taken 
up—by the state, by religious authorities, and by vocalists themselves—as a 
tool of ethical reform and a technology of ethical striving. I argue that the voice 
has become a privileged medium for imagining and inhabiting new 
subjectivities in Bali.  
 I contextualize my study of voice within a broader investigation of 
religion as both a disciplining force and an enabling resource in the lives of 
Balinese Hindus. Bringing ethnographic attention to a variety of practices 
through which Balinese Hindus interact with the world they call niskala, the 
world of invisible deities, and spirits—including ritual exchange, prayer, and 
the study and performance of religious texts, among others—I show how 
human-niskala relationships are constituted through, and structured by, 
hegemonic institutions and discourses, while at the same time, they create 
spaces of possibility for individuals to engage in creative forms of self-making 
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and world-making. By examining how these relationships are imagined and 
manifested across different spheres of religious authority, I shed light on the 
ethical pluralism of religious life in contemporary Bali.  
 This study focuses on religious pedagogies of voice as a particularly 
productive site for investigating the coming-into-being of new kinds of selves.  
Because of its connection to language, and, by extension, to texts, the voice 
has been deployed as both an object and a tool in state-sponsored projects of 
religious reform in Bali, which emphasize interiority as the core of religious 
selfhood and foreground texts as the proper source of religious knowledge 
and moral guidance. Religious forms of vocal performance and training are 
also an important space in which sensory and affective dispositions are 
formed. Highlighting the sonic and bodily materiality of vocal expression, as 
well as its linguistic and textual aspects, I argue that the semiotic, sensory, 
and affective affordances of vocal performance and training play an important 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 This is an ethnographic study of the voice as a resource for forming devout Hindu 
selves in contemporary Bali, Indonesia. Through case studies of three forms of Hindu 
chant, I show how vocal performance has been taken up—by the state, by religious 
authorities, and by vocalists themselves—as a tool of ethical reform and a technology of 
ethical striving. I situate my study of voice within a broader inquiry into the ethical 
dimensions of religious life in contemporary Bali. Connecting singing to a broader set of 
mediatory practices that bind the lives of Balinese Hindus to the niskala world—the 
world of invisible deities and spirits—I argue that the voice has become a privileged 
medium for imagining and inhabiting new subjectivities in Bali.      
 On the broadest level, this dissertation is a critical investigation of religion as both 
a disciplining force and an enabling resource in the lives of Balinese Hindus. I show how 
human-niskala relationships are constituted through, and structured by, hegemonic 
institutions and discourses, while at the same time, they create spaces of possibility for 
individuals to engage in creative forms of self-making and world-making. Bringing 
ethnographic attention to a range of practices through which Balinese Hindus interact 
with invisible beings—including ritual exchange, prayer, and the study and performance 
of religious texts, among others—I argue that the semiotic, sensory, and affective 
affordances of these practices play an important role in shaping the kinds of ethical 
selves that are imagined and cultivated in Bali today. By examining how these 
interactions are conceptualized and practiced across different spheres of religious 
  2 
authority, this study emphasizes the ethical pluralism of religious life in contemporary 
Bali.  
 More narrowly, this study focuses on religious pedagogies of voice as a 
particularly productive site for investigating the coming-into-being of new kinds of 
selves. Because of its connection to language, and, by extension, to texts, the voice has 
been deployed as both an object and a tool in state-sponsored projects of religious 
reform in Bali, which emphasize interiority as the core of religious selfhood and 
foreground texts as the proper source of religious knowledge and moral guidance. The 
voice is also a potent medium for circulating affect, and religious forms of vocal training 
are an important space in which sensory and affective dispositions are formed. I show 
how forms of vocal training being practiced in contemporary Bali enable the production 
of “feeling subjects” (Schwenkel 2013) who are committed to various forms of religious 
identification and ethical striving.  
 
Balinese Hinduism as Assemblage 
 For the purposes of this dissertation I understand Balinese Hinduism to be the 
assemblage of discourses, institutions, technologies, and practices that organize human 
relationships with the world that Balinese call niskala (invisible, immaterial), the world of 
deities and spirits. What I call Balinese “religion,” then, comprises the ways people 
imagine and describe the invisible world, the ritual practices through which people 
interact with invisible beings, the moral values and commitments that guide those 
practices, as well as the institutions that structure religious knowledge and practice.  
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 In characterizing Balinese Hinduism as an “assemblage” my intention is to do two 
things. On the one hand, I mean to emphasize the heterogeneity of Balinese religious 
beliefs and practices, which are drawn from a range of sources and encompass a 
diversity of views about god, the world, and what it means to live a good life. On the 
other hand, this term also aims to reflect the fact that my interlocutors, by and large, 
understood this heterogeneous assemblage to be a singular entity: a single religion, 
which all (or nearly all) Balinese people share.1 While there are some Balinese Hindus 
who define their religion narrowly to include, for example, only those practices and 
beliefs that have a basis in religious texts, most of the people I spent time with had a 
more inclusive understanding, viewing the varied ritual traditions of individual villages, 
the formal doctrine taught in schools, and, in some cases, even the practices of 
international devotional movements all as facets of their religious identity as Balinese 
Hindus. Thus, while I have found it useful to distinguish between different spheres of 
religious discourse and practice within Balinese Hinduism, my interlocutors typically did 
not do so.  
 Over the course of this study, I focus on three primary sources of religious 
knowledge and authority: custom (adat), the state, and New Religious Movements, 
specifically the International Society for Krishna Consciousness or ISKCON. These 
three spheres of religious authority are represented in my ethnography as distinct 
“moral spaces” (Mattingly 2014b), discursive and social contexts wherein certain ethical 
projects and ideals are foregrounded while others are marginalized. These include the 
                                                        
1 Although there are Christians and Muslims who identify as Balinese, most of the people with whom I 
interacted assumed that being Balinese is synonymous with being Hindu.  
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domestic space of the home, the communal space of the village, the public space of 
schooling and the media, and the enclave-like space of the ISKCON ashram. As people 
move between these different moral spaces, they encounter competing visions of what 
it means to live a devout religious life, and they are called upon to identify with different 
sets of values and ideals. Following Jarrett Zigon, I call this heterogeneous and uneasily 
coexisting set of values and demands a “moral assemblage” (2010).2 In addition to 
foregrounding different moral concerns, these different moral spaces also foreground 
different semiotic ideologies, and different embodied and sensory dispositions. It is my 
contention that these material factors play a key role in enabling the forms of ethical life 
that take shape within and across these spaces. 
 Taken together, the three spheres of religious authority that I examine here do 
not reflect the full range of Balinese religiosity,3 and, since my focus is on religious 
values, they certainly do not reflect the full range of Balinese ethical thought and 
practice.4 Yet each of these spheres promotes a distinct vision of how to live ethically as 
a Balinese Hindu, and each is also a site for distinctive forms of vocal performance 
through which that ideal ethical subjectivity is circulated, cultivated, and inhabited. 
                                                        
2 I should note that whereas Zigon draws a distinction between morality and ethics, I use the two words 
interchangeably.  
3 It is not possible for a single ethnography to do justice to Bali’s religious diversity. I approach Balinese 
adat through the perspective of a single family. My study of ISKCON in Bali is likewise confined to a 
single community. Notably absent from my ethnography is any representation of Balinese Muslims or 
Christians, or highland Balinese communities (Bali Aga). 
4 This study of ethical life in Bali is heavily slanted toward otherworldly ethical matters concerning how 
people ought to interact with invisible beings. The ethical dimensions of human relationships, which are of 
course central to ethical life in Bali, are only explored insofar as they relate to matters of religion and 
divine moral judgment.   
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Comparing these three spheres thus allows me to explore a variety of ways in which 
vocal practice and ethical subjectivity intersect in contemporary Bali.  
 
A History of Religious Pluralism in Bali 
 The religious and moral assemblage that I describe here developed in response 
to a series of changes in Bali’s political and economic landscape over the course of the 
past century. A host of internal and external forces—including Balinese caste conflict, 
Dutch colonial rule, Indonesian nationalism, tourism, and political Islam, to name just a 
few—have all contributed to creating the heterogeneous religious assemblage that we 
find in Bali today. It is important to stress from the outset, however, that Balinese 
Hinduism has never been a monolithic entity. Indeed, scholars generally agree that it 
was only during the colonial period that Balinese people began to conceive of 
themselves as an ethnic group united by common social and religious customs (adat) 
(Picard 1999: 29-31). Furthermore, although certain basic features of adat are widely 
shared throughout the island, Balinese ritual customs vary significantly from one village 
to another, and this diversity is enshrined in Balinese aphorisms, such as desa kala 
patra and desa mawacara, both of which point to the variation in custom between 
different villages. Heterogeneity has thus been a part of Balinese religious life since long 
before the colonial encounter.  
 That being said, colonial rule and post-colonial nation-building did bring about 
important changes in Balinese religious discourse and practice. Bali was under Dutch 
colonial rule from 1906 until 1942. This period saw the emergence of a western-
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educated elite who published journals in which they reflected upon, and debated about, 
Balinese religious customs. In these publications, adat—a term introduced to Bali by the 
Dutch—was adopted as an umbrella concept for Balinese traditions and customs. In this 
way, Bali’s traditional social order was objectified as a unique and coherent sphere of 
activity, which could be distinguished from other spheres, such as colonial 
administration (Picard 1999: 30-31). One distinction that became particularly 
contentious during this period was that between adat and agama (religion). As Balinese 
elites found themselves increasingly in contact with Christians and Muslims, they felt the 
need to define and articulate their own religious identity. While some posited agama and 
adat as one and the same, others sought to separate the two by isolating a core set of 
fundamental unchanging beliefs and practices from the broader patchwork of varied 
local customs (ibid.: 32).  
 The effort to define Balinese religion became more urgent after Bali was 
incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, as the Indonesian state began 
taking steps to limit the forms of religious identity and expression that its citizens would 
be permitted to engage in. Indonesia has always maintained a policy of religious 
pluralism. However, due to pressure from powerful Islamic political groups, only a 
limited number of faiths have been granted official recognition (Ramstedt 2004a:3–9). In 
1952 it was decided that in order to qualify as a religion in the eyes of the Indonesian 
state, a belief system must possess a singular god, a prophet, and an international 
following, as well as a sacred scripture. This meant that only those faiths that closely 
aligned with the basic model of Islam were to be granted official recognition, a group 
  7 
which initially included only Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism (Ramstedt 2004a: 3-
9).  When the newly independent government made adherence to a recognized faith a 
requirement for all citizens, the Balinese were placed in the residual category, orang 
yang belum beragama (people who do not yet have a religion) and slated for 
missionization (9–10).   
 This exclusion galvanized incipient religious reform efforts in Bali, and several 
local religious organizations began working together to construct a new version of 
Balinese Hinduism that would satisfy the requirements for inclusion as an official religion 
(Bakker 1993: 225-227). In 1958, the leaders of these organizations drafted a joint 
petition demanding government recognition of Balinese Hinduism. The petition argued 
that the many Balinese deities were all manifestations of the singular god Sang Hyang 
Widhi Wasa, that Indian and Old Javanese sacred texts were the sacred scripture of 
Balinese Hinduism, that the Vedic rsi and Old Javanese poets who authored these texts 
were its prophets, and that the many Balinese rituals were local variations on five basic 
forms of religious worship (panca yadnya). The petition also introduced the Puja 
Trisandhya, a daily Hindu prayer hitherto unknown in Bali, which is reminiscent of the 
Muslim salat (Ramstedt 2004a: 11-12, Rudyansjah 1987: 72-73, 80-81). These reforms 
were received favorably in Jakarta, and in 1959 a Section of Hindu-Balinese Affairs 
(Bagian Urusan Hindu Bali) was established within the Indonesian Ministry of Religion 
(Ramstedt 2004a: 12). Balinese Hinduism received full recognition in 1963 when this 
body was renamed the Office of the Hindu Balinese Religion (Biro Urusan Agama Hindu 
Bali) (ibid.: 14).  
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 Following state recognition, the grass roots effort to bring Balinese religiosity into 
line with state demands evolved into a top-down program of religious reform overseen 
by the state. I call this ongoing project the Hindu Reform.5 In 1959 the organizations that 
had worked to achieve state recognition joined together to form a new organization 
called the Parisada Dharma Hindu Bali, which was to serve as the primary religious 
authority of the Balinese Hindu community (Bakker 230-231). This semi-governmental 
organization consisted of a council of priests (paruman sulinggih), a council of experts 
(paruman welaka), and an executive committee, and was to have branches at the local, 
regional, and provincial level. During the 1960s the Parisada oversaw a range of 
programs aimed at circulating and promoting a standardized, authoritative version of 
Hindu doctrine and practice. These included publishing texts on reformist Hindu doctrine 
to be circulated to the public and used in Hindu religious classes, which were made a 
compulsory part of the Indonesian public school curriculum in 1964 (Landmann 2012: 
212).6 The Parisada also began publishing a journal.7 In 1961 it founded a Hindu 
theological institute (Institute Hindu Dharma, later renamed Institute Hindu Dharma 
Negeri, IHDN), which would offer courses for priests as well as training for religious 
teachers (ibid.). In addition to being active in the spheres of publishing and education, 
the Parisada also made modest efforts to modify Balinese religious practice, 
                                                        
5 This is purely an analytic term. My interlocutors in Bali typically do not differentiate the reformist 
discourses and practices instituted by the state from those aspects of religion that are overseen by adat 
institutions; instead they see both as components of a singular “Hindu” religion.   
6 Hindu class is only mandatory for Hindu students. Muslims, Christians, and others are required to take 
courses in their own faith tradition. The curricula for all religious courses are overseen by the state. For a 
detailed account of the development of religious education in Bali, see Landmann 2012.   
7 The journal, originally called Kala Wrtta Hindu Dharma, ceased publication after a couple of years but 
later reemerged with the new title Warta Hindu Dharma (Bakker 240).  
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standardizing existing rituals, introducing new forms of ritual and prayer, and 
constructing temples that exemplified a monotheistic, delocalized approach to Hindu 
worship (Bakker 1993: 232-37, Geertz 1973a, Schulte Nordholt 1991).  
 The version of Hindu doctrine that solidified during this period represented a 
significant departure from the orthopraxic spirit of traditional Balinese religiosity (Geertz 
1973a: 175-77). This doctrine was first codified and presented in the Parisada’s 1967 
publication Upadeça Tentang Ajaran-Ajaran Agama Hindu (Clarification Regarding the 
Teachings of the Hindu Religion) (Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978). Drawing much 
of its core content from an earlier text written by Pandit Shastri ([1955?]), an alleged 
member of the Arya Samaj Hindu reform movement in India, who taught religious 
courses in Bali in the 1950s, the Upadeça is written as a dialog between a religious 
teacher and his student. As Michel Picard has observed in a recent paper, it follows a 
format similar to a catechism, in which dotrine is presented through a series of 
questions and answers (Picard 2015: 7-9).8 The first half of the text outlines the “five 
beliefs” (panca sraddha) of Hinduism, which define the moral purpose of life on earth to 
be the pursuit of liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth through virtuous action.9 
The second half of the text deals primarily with Balinese religious traditions, attempting 
to make sense of these within a reformist Hindu framework drawn primarily from Indian 
sources. According to John Bowen, religious manuals used in the Gayo highlands of 
                                                        
8 Picard notes that the catechism originated with the birth of Protestantism in the 16th century and was 
later adopted by leaders in the Theosophical Society as way of presenting the core beliefs of Buddhism 
and Hinduism (2015: 7-9). 
9 The Five Beliefs are belief in god, the divine soul (atma), the law of action and consequence (hukum 
karma phala), reincarnation (punarbhawa), and liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth (moksa).  
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Aceh in the early 20th Century followed the same teacher-student dialog structure found 
in the Upadeça, suggesting that the Parisada’s text may have been modeled on 
Indonesian Muslim sources (1993: 43-44).10 In foregrounding belief as the defining 
feature of the Hindu religion, the Parisada’s version of Hindu doctrine is reminiscent of 
the Protestant Reformation, as well as a host of subsequent religious reform 
movements, which—often in the wake of colonial conquest—similarly adopted a 
dematerialized spirituality, purified of magical and fetishistic beliefs, in an effort to 
reconcile religion with modernity (Keane 2007: 78).11  
 Although Hinduism in Indonesia was ostensibly a national and not an ethnic 
religion, in the early 1960s it remained mostly confined to Balinese. In the mid-1960s 
this began to change, due to dramatic shifts in Indonesia’s political climate. In the wake 
of an alleged coup attempt on September 30th, 1965, conservative military and Muslim 
organizations joined forces to eliminate the Indonesian Communist party. They initiated 
a spree of violence that would claim the lives of hundreds of thousands of suspected 
communists across the archipelago. People lacking a clear religious affiliation were 
especially vulnerable to being accused of having communist sympathies. Religious 
identity thus became a matter of life and death. This prompted many groups with 
syncretistic or animistic beliefs to embrace Hinduism as their official religion (Ramstedt 
2004a: 15).12 As the Indonesian Hindu community became more diverse, the Parisada 
                                                        
10 Bowen also notes that many of these texts were not composed in Indonesia but were instead 
“translations or adaptations of Arabic works. . .printed in Mecca or Cairo for distribution in Southeast 
Asia,” which suggests a broader transnational trend (1993: 43).   
11 Keane specifically mentions the Arya Samaj, the reform movement with which Pandit Shastri was 
associated, as an example of this pattern (2007: 78). For examples from Buddhism and Islam, see 
Gombrich and Obeyesekere 1988 and Eickelman 2000, respectively.  
12 For more on conversion to Hinduism in 1960s Indonesia see Ramstedt 2004b and Hefner 2004.   
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also dropped its association with Bali, changing its name in 1964 from Parisada Dharma 
Hindu Bali to Parisada Hindu Dharma, and then to Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia in 
1989. In 1991 its main office was moved from Denpasar to Indonesia’s capital city, 
Jakarta (Bakker: 238).  
 In the decades following the killings of 1965-66 the Parisada gained increasing 
control over public religious discourse in Bali. In 1967 General Suharto rose to power 
initiating three decades of authoritarian rule, which became known as the New Order 
period (Orde Baru) (1967-1998). From the 1960s to the 1980s the Suharto regime 
worked to marginalize the role of religion in political life, and in public life more 
generally, except in limited state-managed forms.13 In 1975 the government introduced 
what became known as the SARA doctrine, which limited media discussion of issues 
the regime saw as divisive, including religion (Hoesterey 2016: 38-39).14 In 1978 the 
regime banned all international religious organizations from sponsoring religious 
organizations in Indonesia, and in 1983 it took the further step of requiring all social, 
cultural, political, and religious institutions to recognize the state ideology of Pancasila 
as their sole ideological principle (asas tunggal) (Ramstedt 2004a: 19).15 The Parisada, 
which became officially affiliated with Suharto’s Golkar party in 1968, played an 
                                                        
13 Scholars writing on this period have described how the Suharto regime favored “culture” as a non-
threating form of difference while tending to downplay religion as a basis for solidarity and affiliation. For 
more on the religious and cultural policy during first decades of New Order see Acciaioli 1985, Pemberton 
1994, Kipp 1993.  
14 The acronym SARA stands for suku, agama, ras, antar golongan (ethnicity, religion, race, class). The 
associated policy served to limit public discussion of these issues.  
15 The Pancasila or Five Principles are the core tenets of Indonesian state philosophy, which were 
outlined in the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. They include belief in the Almighty God, a just and 
civilized society, the unity of the Indonesian nation, democratic government, and social justice for all 
Indonesians.    
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important role in implementing the state’s agenda for the Indonesian Hindu community 
(Bakker 1993: 242, Landmann 2012: 173). New Order policies of censorship and media 
suppression favored the Parisada, granting it significant authority over how Hinduism 
was represented in local print and mass media.16 This period of consolidation has had 
an enduring influence on religious discourse in Bali.  
 Political shifts during the late New Order and post-New Order periods brought 
increased opportunities for the public expression of religious identity. Within Indonesia’s 
Hindu community, this created an opening for a more diverse range of religious ideas 
and viewpoints to circulate publicly. One example of this was the founding in 1995 of 
Pustaka Hindu Raditya, a Hindu-themed journal that openly criticized the Parisada.17 
Another development, which is relevant to this dissertation, is that the ISKCON 
movement, which had been banned during the New Order, was given legal recognition 
as a sampradaya (Hindu religious study group).  
 One of the most significant consequences of increasing freedom of religious 
expression in Indonesia was that symbols of Islamic identity gained a much larger 
presence in public life.18 After the fall of Suharto in particular, Islamic imagery and 
                                                        
16 It is difficult to determine the extent to which unorthodox Hindu discourses may have circulated in the 
media during the New Order period. Bakker’s book provides the most detailed history of modern Hindu 
discourse and scholarship in Bali. While the intellectuals he discusses did hold differing religious views, 
all of them had ties to the Parisada, thus his book does not provide evidence that there were any religious 
scholars without ties to the Parisada who were publishing during this period. That being said, two 
international devotional movements (Sai Baba and ISKCON) did manage to establish followings in 
Indonesia during the New Order (Howe 2001: 165, 184). One devotee told me that her father had joined 
ISKCON after reading a pamphlet that the group had circulated in Bali. For more on the Parisada’s 
control over the media during the New Order period see Fox 2011.   
17 See for example the September-October 1996 issue of Pustaka Hindu Raditya, which includes several 
articles on the theme Harapan dan Kritik untuk Parisada (Hopes and Critiques for the Parisada).  
18 As Suharto’s power began to wane in the late 1980s, he sought to broaden his base by courting the 
support of Islamic political groups that he had previously sought to suppress. A Muslim himself, he 
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voices became increasingly prominent in the national media and influential in 
Indonesian politics.19 These shifts have caused Balinese Hindus to become more 
sensitive to their status as a marginal religious minority within the Indonesian nation. A 
variety of factors, including the Bali bombing of 2002, the economic instability of the 
tourism industry, and the growing numbers Indonesian Muslims migrating to the island 
for work, have raised public concerns about the loss of Bali’s religious and cultural 
identity and fomented anti-Islamic sentiment in Bali (International Crisis Group 2003).20 
These anxieties received additional fuel from the discourse of Ajeg Bali, a slogan that 
was first popularized in 2003 and has since been used to galvanize support for a range 
of political projects and campaigns by claiming that Bali’s unique Hindu culture is under 
threat and promising to protect it (Reuter 2008).21 Ajeg Bali signaled the emergence of a 
politicized Hindu identity and discourse in Bali, which was not in evidence during the 
New Order.22  
                                                        
engaged in public displays of piety and also implemented policies that increased opportunities for the 
public expression of Muslim identity (Ramstedt 2004: 19-20). 
19 One example of this were the debates around, and eventual passage of, an anti-pornography bill, 
Rancangan Undang-undang Anti-pornografi dan Pornoaksi in 2008. Another, more recent example, were 
the massive protests against, and conviction of, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, a 
Chinese Christian former governor of Jakarta, who was accused in 2016 of committing blasphemy. At 
their height, these protests, organized by members of the FPI (Front Pembela Islam, or Islamic Defenders 
Front) were estimated to have drawn crowds of up to 200,000 people. 
20 On October 12, 2002, two bombs exploded at a nightclub in the tourist center of Legian in southern Bali 
and another smaller bombing took place at the US Consulate in Denpasar. The attack, which killed 202 
people, was attributed to members of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist group.  
21 This slogan, which can be roughly translated as ‘Bali standing strong,’ was first circulated by the Bali 
Post Media Group, which owns two newspapers, a television station, and a radio station in Bali, and 
which is believed to have coined the phrase. Although the Bali Post Media Group has demonstrated 
significant bias in favor of the PDI-P party, the slogan Ajeg Bali was not, at least at the time of my 
fieldwork, associated with one particular political party. For more on Ajeg Bali see Allen and Palermo 
2005, and Atmadja 2010.  
22 One example of this that I encountered frequently during my fieldwork was politicians delivering dharma 
wacana (sermons) at religious ceremonies and events.   
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 Although the post-authoritarian period has brought increased freedom of religious 
expression, much of public discourse about Balinese Hinduism still aligns with the core 
doctrine that was codified and promoted under Sukarno and Suharto. For example, the 
terminology and teachings that circulate in the school curriculum today are strikingly 
similar to those outlined in the Upadeça in 1967 (Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978). 
Of the several dozen religious books I purchased during my fieldwork, a handful are 
translations or interpretations of Indian Hindu writings, some of which diverge from the 
Parisada’s version of Hinduism.23 Most, however, closely align with the state’s religious 
orthodoxy. Although periodicals like Pustaka Hindu Raditya (now known as Majalah 
Raditya), Sarad, and Media Hindu do offer critical perspectives on Balinese adat, and 
on the Parisada’s operations and policies, their authors rarely contest the tenets of 
official Hindu doctrine. The period of authoritarian rule, which gave the Parisada a 
virtual monopoly over public religious discourse in Bali, seems to have cast a long 
shadow over Bali’s religious public sphere.    
 While the Parisada has played a powerful role in shaping how Hinduism is 
represented in local print and mass media, its influence on Balinese religious practice 
has been less far-reaching. Bali was spared from the coercive policies applied to other 
religious minorities under the New Order (see Acciaioli 1985). Rather than being forcibly 
suppressed, diverse forms of customary worship were allowed to persist alongside new, 
state-sanctioned forms of religiosity.24 This was likely due in part to the fact that Bali’s 
                                                        
23 Indonesian translations of the Bhagavad Gita were widely available during my fieldwork. Texts about 
Sai Baba were also fairly common. 
24 Since its inception, the Parisada has pursued two somewhat contradictory aims. On the one hand, it 
has worked to adapt Balinese religiosity to satisfy the demands of the state, which required that religion 
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spectacular religious rituals were understood to be a lucrative tourist attraction (Picard 
1996, Vickers 1987). Another contributing factor was that, even during the New Order, 
desa adat were recognized as autonomous governing entities, not part of the state 
apparatus, which meant that the state had limited ability to impose its authority in 
matters related to adat (Warren 1993). This remains true to this day, though policies 
implemented during the post-authoritarian period have altered the status of the desa 
adat somewhat. Following the collapse of the New Order, Bali’s provincial government 
took advantage of regional autonomy policies to pass new laws pertaining to adat 
organizations. While these laws granted increased authority to desa adat, they also 
included moves to solidify the Hindu identity of Balinese adat. For example, the laws 
officially changed the name desa adat to desa pakraman, thereby replacing an Arabic 
word with a Sanskrit one. These and other efforts to officially ‘Hinduize’ Balinese adat 
would seem to limit the independence of desa adat by placing them more squarely 
under the authority of the Parisada.25 The founding of a Desa Pakraman Council 
(Majelis Desa Pakraman or MDP) in 2004 seems to signify a further move toward 
centralizing authority over Balinese adat. These changes notwithstanding, there 
continues to be an unresolved tension between state, religious, and customary authority 
in Bali.  
                                                        
be dissociated from ethnicity (Kipp 1993). On the other hand, it has sought to preserve Bali’s unique 
sacred traditions, which are seen as the core of Balinese ethnic identity. 
25 One example of this process of Hinduization are the state-sponsored Lomba Desa Pakraman 
(Customary Village Competitions). The Parisada participates in evaluating these competitions and the 
criteria include such things as “implementation of the Tri Sandhya,” suggesting that part of the purpose of 
the competition is to encourage the population to participate in state-sanctioned forms of religiosity. Far 
from being simply symbolic, these competitions involve substantial cash prizes (in the tens of millions of 
rupiah). For more on the Lomba Desa Pakraman, see Dharmayuda 2001. For more on recent efforts to 
define Balinese adat as “Hindu,” see Shaublin 2013.   
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 In recent decades, Balinese adat has been problematized in a new way. If earlier 
generations of religious reformers were primarily concerned with establishing the 
legitimacy of Balinese Hinduism as a religion, today the Parisada and other reformist 
Hindu institutions have also begun to emphasize the ways that religion should 
contribute to developing a prosperous and productive workforce.26 Bali’s adat 
institutions have long been subject to public criticism for the burden of time and 
resources they impose on their members, a demand which requires Balinese workers to 
take frequent time off from paid employment. Amidst public anxieties about Indonesia’s 
integration into the ASEAN Economic Community (Masyarakat Ekonomi ASEAN or 
MEA) and widespread calls to improve the quality and competitiveness of Indonesia’s 
laborers, some commentators have come to see the demands of adat as an obstacle to 
progress and economic prosperity, making it virtually impossible for Balinese to 
compete in an increasingly diversified workforce.27 Many of my interlocutors expressed 
concern that the Balinese are becoming penonton di pulau sendiri (onlookers on their 
own island), standing by and watching as Muslims and other migrant groups seize the 
economic opportunities. Shifting economic realities have thus given new salience and 
                                                        
26 The term Sumber Daya Manusia (SDM), which literally means ‘human resources,’ and refers to labor 
productivity and competitiveness, has become increasingly common in reformist discourse. To give just 
one example, an article on the Parisada’s website (originally published in the March 2010 issue of Warta 
Hindu Dharma) entitled “Etos Kerja Hindu dan Kualitas SDM” (“Hindu Work Ethic and the Quality of 
Human Resources”) begins with an Indonesian translation of a passage from the Atarvaveda, the first line 
of which reads “God only loves hard-working people.” http://phdi.or.id/artikel/etos-kerja-hindu-dan-
kualitas-sdm.  
27 While the desa adat is most commonly represented in these debates as an obstacle to developing a 
competitive labor force, Balinese traditions are also sometimes discussed as sources of “creativity” 
(kreatifitas) or “local wisdom” (kearifan lokal) that might put Balinese laborers at an advantage. For an 
account of how religion is being taken up as a resource in producing productive laborers during a time of 
neoliberal reform in Indonesia, see Rudnyckyj 2010.  
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appeal to reformist demands that Balinese Hindus should reduce the amount of time 
and resources they spend on ritual. This may be a contributing factor in the growing 
appeal of spiritual movements like Sai Baba and ISKCON, as I discuss in Chapter 5. 
 
Navigating Moral Spaces in Bali 
 As a result of these various political and economic shifts, most Balinese people 
now engage with at least two competing conceptions of what it means to be Balinese 
Hindu: one rooted in the institutions and practices of Balinese adat and another rooted 
in state religious doctrine. ISKCON offers yet another contrasting vision of what 
Balinese religion could or should be. These competing versions of Balinese Hinduism 
furnish a diversity of answers to the question of how, exactly, human-niskala relations 
are to be imagined, monitored, and maintained; they foreground different ethical values 
and ideals; and they are mediated and experienced through different material practices.  
 For these different versions of Balinese Hinduism to hold together in people’s 
minds and be made livable as a single religion requires effort; individuals and 
institutions must work to coordinate the competing logics of these different religious 
spheres (Robbins 2004: 5). One simple but effective tool in this effort is simply the name 
Agama Hindu (the Hindu religion), which operates as a conceptual umbrella for a 
diversity of practices and discourses. The Parisada has been instrumental in promoting 
the idea that Balinese adat is “Hindu” in character, and thus that although religion and 
custom are conceptually distinct, they are continuous in practice. The pervasive belief in 
the continuity between agama and adat—promoted by the Parisada—mitigates against 
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the perception that Hinduism comprises multiple variants or sects. Furthermore, in 
promoting Sanskrit texts like the Bhagavad Gita as the proper basis for Balinese 
religious practice and belief, the Parisada has also (perhaps unwittingly) created an 
opening for movements like ISKCON to represent themselves as part of Balinese 
religion.  
 Another factor mitigating against the perception that Balinese religion is divided 
into multiple variants is the fact that both adat ritual and state religious education are 
mandatory, or at least virtually so, given that an individual can only avoid engaging with 
them at significant social cost. This means that many Balinese Hindus must move 
between “modern” and “traditional” religious spheres in their daily lives.28 Thus, 
professors at the National Hindu Theological Institute must return to their home villages 
to participate in adat rituals; meanwhile, children and youth who live in their desa adat 
attend public schools where they are taught reformist Hindu doctrine, and both children 
and adults consume television and radio programs where this doctrine is represented as 
the basis for ‘their’ religion. The fact that people tend to move between these spheres, 
rather than confining themselves to one or the other, mitigates against the formation of 
two distinct sects. Moreover, since temple congregations tend to be formed on the basis 
of locality and kinship, Balinese Hindus have limited opportunities to form religious 
congregations around a shared affinity for a more modernist or traditionalist approach to 
                                                        
28 While Indonesian Islam has often described as having “modernist” and “traditionalist” variants, my 
interlocutors in Bali did not speak of their religion as being divided in this way (Bowen 1993, Geertz 
1960). Instead of a binary opposition between modernists and traditionalists, they saw a spectrum of 
variation in which some individuals or villages were more traditional and others more modernized. 
Ultimately, they saw all Balinese as united by a singular religion that allows for a diversity of approaches. 
That being said, while they saw Balinese Hinduism as unified, despite its diversity, they commonly saw it 
as distinct and separate from the varieties of Hinduism practiced by other Indonesian ethnic groups.   
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worship.29 Instead, they confront, and must find a way of grappling with, the demands of 
both customary and state religious authorities as they move through different social and 
moral spaces. This applies as well to people who are adherents of New Religious 
Movements, who typically navigate three distinct spheres of religious authority. 
 A third factor holding this religious assemblage together is the work people do to 
separate competing religious discourses, confining them to different social spaces so 
that they do not come into direct confrontation with one another. For example, as I 
discuss in Chapter 3, certain unorthodox ways of representing the niskala world are 
kept out of public discourse about Balinese Hinduism. Meanwhile, friends of mine who 
were sympathetic to reformist claims about the excess and wastefulness of Balinese 
rituals described how they refrained from expressing these views in the communal and 
domestic contexts where such rituals are actually carried out. Likewise, Balinese 
ISKCON devotees stressed the need to “tolerate” adat practices (i.e. to participate in 
them despite personal moral objections) while spending time in their home 
communities. Unlike the Urapmin described by Joel Robbins, whose efforts to negotiate 
the competing cultural logics of Christianity and their indigenous social system cause 
them to experience “moral torment,” the moral tensions that Balinese Hindus experience 
as they navigate these different moral spaces are of a much subtler, less painful, nature 
(Robbins 2004). These practices of separation, which help ensure that competing 
versions of Hinduism are able to coexist without coming into conflict, also help make 
                                                        
29 Certain desa adat may take a more modernized approach to ritual than others, depending on the desa 
leadership. However, this does not serve as a mechanism for attracting new, like-minded members to the 
desa’s temple congregations. The membership at large must follow what the leadership decides and 
cannot simply opt to worship elsewhere. 
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Hinduism conceivable and livable as a heterogeneous, but still unifying, religious 
identity.  
 
Religious Agency and Ethical Pluralism  
 In studying the complex assemblage that is contemporary Balinese Hinduism, I 
am particularly interested in what David Kloos (2017) has called “religious agency,” the 
socially mediated capacity to act with, against, and in light of religious customs, 
discourses, and values. I tend to refer to these capacities as ‘spaces of possibility,’ 
rather than simply ‘agency,’ in order to emphasize the fact that agency is always 
situated within and mediated through specific social formations and material practices. 
In highlighting religious agency in Bali, I am writing both with and against two opposing 
tendencies in the literature on Balinese religion and culture: an earlier tendency to 
emphasize stasis and the socially reproductive character of Balinese cultural practices 
(Bateson 1981, Mead and Bateson 1942, Geertz 1973b and 1973c) and a more recent 
tendency to recover Balinese agency in the form of resistance to the hegemonic power 
of the colonial or post-colonial state (Parker 2003, Warren 1993, Wiener 1995). This 
study seeks to build on this work by bringing attention to the variety of forms that 
agency can take with respect to religious and customary authority. As members of adat 
communities, Balinese Hindus must dedicate substantial time and resources to fulfill 
ritual obligations, obligations that are increasingly represented as a beban (burden) that 
restricts individuals’ ability to participate fully in other aspects of social life, such as paid 
labor. In light of this, we might see adat as a structure that limits individuals’ agency. As 
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I seek to show, however, the adat sphere also enables particular forms of self-making 
and world-making and can thus be thought of as a space of possibility and freedom. 
Similarly, the Hindu Reform has sought to impose its version of Hinduism over various 
aspects of Balinese religious life and to limit the kinds of religious activities that Balinese 
people are able to engage in, but it has also afforded opportunities for individuals to 
have greater autonomy vis-à-vis religious practice. Religious agency, then, is not simply 
about being liberated from social constraints or oppressive structures. As Kloos writes, it 
is “neither isolated from, nor a form of resistance against” religious authority (2017: 6, 
see also Mahmood 2005). Instead, it is about individuals’ capacity to reflect upon, and 
make choices about, the demands that their religion makes of them, and to be morally 
responsible for those choices.30  
 Following Kloos, I locate religious agency within people’s efforts to live ethically 
within a particular heterogeneous and dynamic religious tradition. In doing so, I build 
upon a larger body of anthropological scholarship that has argued that ethnographic 
research into ethical practices provides an opportunity for a critical rethinking of agency 
and power (Faubion 2011, Laidlaw 2002, Lambek 2000, Mahmood 2001, Mattingly 
2014a and 2014b). Rather than foregrounding the socially sanctioned rules and 
                                                        
30 While Bruno Latour equates agency with pure causality, I follow James Laidlaw (2010) in seeing 
agency as “an aspect of the relational processes whereby stretches, phases, or stages of people’s 
ongoing conduct are interpreted as acts for which distinct agents (of varying shape and size) are 
accountable.” Crucially, the “agent” is understood by Laidlaw to extend “both into and beyond the 
individual by means of mediating entities,” and thus it is not equated with individual autonomy or 
intentionality. However, in positing responsibility as a necessary feature of agency, Laidlaw rules out the 
possibility that objects may possess agency independently of accountable actors, such as individual 
persons, groups, or institutions. Laidlaw claims that this narrower conception of agency is better able to 
account for the inherently ethical nature of attributions of agency in social life.  
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obligations that guide and constrain action, the ethical turn in anthropology has focused 
attention on individual and collective efforts to live, and to cultivate oneself, in relation to 
particular notions of the good. Drawing on the ethical writings of Michel Foucault, this 
work emphasizes the importance of reflection and freedom in shaping social life while at 
the same time recognizing that people’s self-forming activity, and the ideas of the good 
that motivate it, are always socially mediated, meaning that ethics is inextricably bound 
up with the workings of power (Foucault 1997).31 Pushing beyond frameworks that 
define agency in terms of (what the scholar assumes to be) agents’ interests, these 
scholars find agency within the processes by which people make and remake 
themselves in light of shared norms, values, and ideals.  
 Scholars have converged around the idea that an anthropology of ethics should 
focus ethnographic attention on complex processes of self-making that involve both 
subjectivation and the government of the self, on the one hand, and reflection and 
freedom vis-à-vis ethical norms and ideals, on the other. However, debates have 
emerged over whether the primary focus of ethnographic inquiry into ethical self-making 
should be the processes by which people assimilate shared norms and values that they 
find in their social surroundings (a pedagogical or third-person approach), or how 
individuals grapple with the unique moral challenges that they encounter in their lives (a 
narrative or first-person approach).32 Since much of my own interest is in how the voice 
                                                        
31 For an overview of Foucault’s ethics, see especially the lecture on “Technologies of the Self” and the 
interviews entitled “On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress” and “The Ethics of the 
Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom” (Foucault 1997: 223-301).  
32 I am drawing here from Mattingly’s framing of the debate (2014a, 2014b). A third-person approach is 
exemplified in the work of scholars such as James Faubion (2011), James Laidlaw (2014), Saba 
Mahmood (2005), and, I would add, Ben Piekut (2011: 140-176). Mattingly herself advocates a first-
person approach.  
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is deployed as a means of producing certain kinds of ethical subjects, a significant 
portion of my ethnography falls into what would be called a pedagogical (or disciplinary) 
approach to ethics. However, I am also deeply sympathetic to Cheryl Mattingly’s 
proposal for a first-person virtue ethics that emphasizes the moral perplexity that people 
encounter in everyday life as they strive to arrive at a momentary  
“best good” in complex situations.33 Heeding Webb Keane’s call for a “multi-dimensional 
approach to the study of ethical life in first-, second-, and third-person perspectives,” in 
Chapter 2 I analyze a family conflict that reveals how an ethical self is constructed 
through negotiations and accommodations between a shared vision of the “good life” 
and the unique ethical challenges and dilemmas that individuals confront as they strive 
to live up to that ideal (Keane 2016: 37). I seek to incorporate first-person perspectives 
in other portions of the dissertation as well by bringing attention to moments of 
awareness when individuals reflect upon the moral frameworks that they are called 
upon to be accountable to in their religious lives. It is in these moments that the spaces 
of possibility afforded by religion come most clearly into view. As I seek to show, these 
moments of ethical reflexivity are not products of individual consciousness alone; they 
grow out of social interactions (Keane 2016: 26). As such, they are mediated not only by 
language, but also by a host of other material forms, including song and chant. My 
approach to ethics draws from research on mediation and voice to understand how 
people’s first-person ethical perspective emerges through mediatory practice.  
                                                        
33 To be clear, Mattingly’s framework acknowledges that ethics always takes shape in relation to shared 
codes and models while also recognizing that these models often fall short, requiring people to engage in 
creative forms of experimentation (Mattingly 2014a: 49, 55; 2014b: 479).    
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Mediation in Religious and Ethical Life 
 While both Kloos and Mattingly place individuals at the center of their 
ethnographies, as an ethnomusicologist, I am equally interested in how mediatory forms 
and practices—including, but not limited to, music and sound—shape religious and 
ethical life. Such practices are not external to the ethical projects and dilemmas that my 
interlocutors are involved in; as I seek to show, they create the conditions of possibility 
for religious and ethical subjectivities. This dissertation thus builds on the work of Kloos 
and Mattingly by highlighting mediatory practices—in all their material, semiotic, 
sensory, and affective complexity—as a site of religious and moral agency. 
 In highlighting mediation, I take inspiration from a wide body of scholarship that 
has come to be identified with the ‘material turn’ in religious studies.34 I draw as well 
from the work of scholars who, working outside religious studies, have explored how 
material forms mediate the presence of ghosts and other invisible beings in social life 
(Schwenkel 2017, Strassler 2010, 2014). Scholars working in both of these areas have 
highlighted the active (even agentive) role that media play in enabling people’s 
interactions with otherworldly beings and the larger social formations these interactions 
sustain.35 This efficacy extends far beyond simply circulating the ideas that form the 
basis for religious beliefs and practices. Media may also function to train and retrain the 
                                                        
34 For reviews of this body of scholarship, see Eisenlohr 2012, Engelke 2010, and Stolow 2005.  
35 I am broadly sympathetic to the turn to recognize the efficacy of material forms, as I believe it provides 
an important critique of an earlier tendency to equate agency with individual autonomy. At the same time, 
however, I appreciate James Laidlaw’s caution against positing the efficacy of material things as a form of 
agency, a framing that problematically brackets the issue of responsibility. 
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senses (Hirschkind 2006, Schmidt 2000), distribute agency beyond the boundaries of 
individual human bodies (Gell 1998), enable sensory encounters with deities or 
prophets (Eisenlohr 2009, Engelke 2007, Pinney 2004, Rajagopal 2001), and furnish 
concrete ways of inhabiting particular religious or ethical subject positions (Keane 
2007).  
 Among the various media that I discuss here, I focus particular attention on the 
voice. The voice is important in a study of Balinese religion because it has been central 
to the ways Balinese people engage with religious texts: traditional modes of studying 
religious literature typically center on oral performance. As religious reformers have 
sought to elevate the place of scripture and doctrine in Balinese religiosity, they have 
adopted and adapted indigenous forms of Hindu chant and recitation as tools of 
religious and ethical reform, a topic I discuss in Chapters 3 and 4. Meanwhile, 
movements like ISKCON and Sai Baba employ globalized forms of religious song and 
chant to circulate their distinct religious and ethical vision, as I discuss in Chapter 5. 
Here, the focus is less on linguistic meaning and more on the bodily and affective 
experiences afforded by vocal expression, which are posited as signs of divine 
presence and manifestations of ethical progress.  
 I use the phrase “religious pedagogies of voice” to capture the ways that religious 
traditions employ implicit and explicit forms of training in order to mold the voice and 
teach people to use their voices in religiously appropriate ways.36 In focusing on how 
                                                        
36 While I am not aware of any other scholars who use this term, there is a vast and wide-ranging body of 
ethnographic writing on this general topic, which includes scholarship on religious song, recitation, oratory, as well 
as other forms of religious language. See Engelhardt 2014, Gade 2004, Harkness 2014, Keane 2007, Nelson 1982, 
Rasmussen 2010, Shannon 2004, to list just a few examples.  
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voices are trained and shaped, I draw from and build upon a large body of 
ethnomusicological scholarship that has investigated vocal training—the training of the 
body in service of a particular vocal and musical aesthetic—as a key site in the 
formation of selves, subjects, and cultural identities (Desai-Stephens 2017, Gray 2013, 
Harkness 2014, Newland 2014, Rahaim 2012). Since my own research deals with vocal 
practices that are performed for religious—rather than, or in addition to—aesthetic 
reasons, my approach to pedagogy is somewhat different. “Pedagogy” as I use it here, 
is not simply about vocal production and technique; it extends to all facets of vocal 
expression, including language use and ordinary speech. Religious pedagogies of voice 
are about using the resources of vocal and linguistic expression to form religious 
persons. These pedagogies may engage with the aesthetic aspects of singing and other 
forms of vocal performance, but aesthetic values often have to be negotiated with other 
values, such as moral values.  
 The religious pedagogies of voice that I discuss in this dissertation include efforts 
to regulate how religious texts are set to melody, how singers engage intellectually with 
the texts they recite, how many times people recite a particular mantra each day, and so 
on. They also include demands that people to take on specific participation roles with 
respect to the texts they sing and the messages those texts contain (Goffman 1981, 
Keane 2000).  
 Following Amanda Weidman’s call to study the voice in its multiple registers, this 
dissertation considers the linguistic, sonic, and bodily aspects of vocal expression in 
tandem (Weidman 2014). The vocal practices I analyze, and the questions I seek to 
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answer, draw attention to two aspects of voice in particular. First, I consider what Keane 
has called “the staging of voices” as a facet of moral self-formation. A key referent here 
is Jane Hill’s essay “The Voices of Don Gabriel,” in which she shows how a speaker 
narrating the death of his son uses variations in language and intonation to stage an 
interaction between multiple personae or “voices,” which represent different ideological 
and moral positions (Hill 1995).37 Drawing from Bakhtin, she argues that the speaker’s 
self is not correlated with a singular authentic voice, but instead emerges through this 
interplay of multiple “voices,” or moral figures, with which he identifies to varying 
degrees, and between which he must choose. In a response to Hill’s essay, Keane 
argues that “learning. . .how to stage voices, is part of the process of distinctly moral 
self-formation” (Keane 2011).38 Building on these claims, I would like to suggest that 
religious pedagogies of voice contribute these processes by making certain voices 
available and accessible and investing them with value. However, simply learning to 
replicate particular words, sounds, and bodily gestures does not guarantee a particular 
self as its inevitable result. I argue, rather, that for training in styles of vocal expression 
to play a meaningful role in the formation of ethical subjectivities, the raw materials of 
bodily, linguistic, and sonic form (together with the values invested in them) must be 
taken up as affordances in the practical activity of ethical life.39 This leaves open the 
                                                        
37 For a discussion of the staging of personae through musical performance, see Auslander 2006.  
38 Hill’s essay suggests that the everyday practice of staging voices—of using recognizable vocal 
personae to   can have important political implications, as a form of identification with, or resistance to, 
dominant ideologies. 
39 When Don Gabriel stages voices, he is mobilizing vocal personae that are familiar to his community. 
However, the process of self-formation that Hill describes is not simply a passive process of adopting a 
form of vocal expression and the moral norms that go along with it. What’s important is how he 
operationalizes these voices in the practical activity of constituting himself as a moral person.  
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possibility that styles of vocal expression that are made available through religious 
pedagogies of voice may be incorporated into ethical projects other than those for which 
they were originally intended, an issue I discuss in Chapter 4.   
 While the Bakhtinian conception of voice elaborated by Hill and Keane highlights 
the linguistic aspects of vocal expression, I also draw attention to the sonic and bodily 
materiality of the voice. Of particular interest to me in this regard are instances of 
“auratic indexicality” in vocal performance and sonic experience. Auratic indexicality 
(Strassler 2014) describes a way of experiencing photographic images as points of 
contact and commingling with an otherwise invisible presence. Extending this concept 
to the realm of sound, I highlight instances in which sound functions as “a means for 
putting [participants] into the presence of things” (e.g. deities, spirits) such that 
“representation is subsumed by presence” (ibid.: 124-125). I argue that while auratic 
indexicality runs counter to dominant sensory regimes in Bali, the affective power of 
auratic sounds are also being harnessed to produce “feeling subjects” committed to 
state-sanctioned forms of religiosity and ethics. By tracing out the shifting relationships 
between mediation and presence in auratic experiences of vocal sound, I illustrate that 
the voice’s multiple “modalities of meaning” (Eisenlohr 2018) confound clear distinctions 
between affect and signification.    
 
Semiotic Mediation and the Social Analysis of Music 
 Given my disciplinary identity as an ethnomusicologist, an explanation is in order 
as to why I have chosen to focus this dissertation on mediation. Why not place music or 
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sound at the center of my ethnography? My answer to this question is that musical and 
sonic practices are central to this study, but in order to address the question of how they 
contribute to the formation of ethical subjectivities, I need to consider other media as 
well. Explaining why this is so requires a digression into the semiotic theories of Charles 
Sanders Pierce, particularly as they have been developed by semiotic anthropologists 
like Webb Keane and Alfred Gell. One of the central aims of this study—one of the 
contributions it seeks to make to the field of ethnomusicology—is to show how theories 
and frameworks developed by linguistic and semiotic anthropologists offer valuable 
resources for analyzing the social significance of music, including music’s sensory, 
bodily, and affective dimensions. To briefly summarize the argument I develop below, 
building on Keane’s work, I aim to demonstrate the value of studying music from within 
a “representational economy,” which includes other (non-musical) signifying practices. 
The concept of representational economy, as Keane develops it, is meant to highlight 
“the dynamic interconnections among different modes of signification at play within a 
particular historical and social formation” (Keane 2003: 410). If one of the goals of 
ethnomusicology is to understand how music contributes to the processes by which 
such historical and social formations are created, reproduced, and transformed, then I 
suggest that we need to attend to the broader representational economies within which 
music operates.   
 To study music as part of a representational economy requires moving beyond 
some of the ways that Piercian semiotics has been applied within ethnomusicology.40 
                                                        
40 Here I am primarily thinking about the work of Thomas Turino. See, for example, Turino 1999 and 
2014.  
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While semiotic analyses of music have focused on decoding musical meaning, 
highlighting the ways that musical sounds can represent and evoke extra-musical ideas 
and images in the minds of individual listeners, semiotic anthropologists have used 
Pierce’s theories to bring attention to the ways that signs mediate social relationships 
(Gell 1998, Mertz 2007, Mertz and Parmentier 1985). Here, the focus is not only on how 
signs are perceived and interpreted by individuals, but also how signifying practices 
form the basis for particular “modalities of action and subjectivity” and thus also, for 
social orders (Keane 2003: 413).    
 Pierce’s work provides two contributions to semiotic theory that are particularly 
relevant to this dissertation. First, his framework encompasses meaning and materiality 
within a single unified model.41 Signs, in the Piercian view, don’t merely represent the 
socio-material worlds in which they circulate, they are embedded in them in varied and 
complex ways. Piercian semiotics thus contrasts sharply with Saussurean semiology, 
which assumes a radical separation between the world of signification and the world of 
material things. Within Saussure’s structuralist framework, signs are simply bearers of 
                                                        
41 Saussure proposes a binary conception of the sign, conceived as a relation between a signifier (e.g. an 
abstract “sound pattern,” which exists independently of its occurrence in actual speech or writing) and a 
signified (a mental representation of the thing being signified). Pierce proposed a tripartite concept 
consisting of an object (the thing being signified), a representamen (the sign vehicle), and an interpretant 
(the representation of the object received by a perceiver) (Mertz 1985: 2-3, Saussure 1983: 66-67). We 
can illustrate this difference using the example of the linguistic sign “bird.” Within Saussure’s binary 
conception, this sign consists of a relation linking a signifier (the sound pattern “bird,” independent of its 
concrete materialization in writing or speech) to a signified (a shared mental concept of what a bird is). 
Within Pierce’s tripartite model however, the relation links an object (an actual bird) to a sign vehicle (a 
specific materialization of the word “bird,” e.g. in writing), and an interpretant (a mental image of a bird 
received by a specific perceiver, e.g. a person reading the word “bird”). As we can see, the Saussurean 
model is only concerned with relations between abstract types, which are to be analyzed in isolation from 
the concrete tokens in which they are embodied and which they represent (i.e. actually occurring speech 
or writing and the things in the world represented by it). Saussurean structuralism thus assumes a radical 
separation between the world as represented and the world in itself, and it places signification entirely 
within the former (Keane 2003: 410-412). 
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meaning. Their materiality is thus merely the passive medium through which meaning is 
circulated, and it can therefore be bracketed from the analysis. In the Piercian model, by 
contrast, sign vehicles and the objects they signify (both of which are potentially 
material entities) are included as part of the semiotic process (Keane 2003: 413). For 
Pierce then, signs are points of articulation between two realms—the world as 
represented and the world in itself—realms which, in Saussurean structuralism, are kept 
in isolation from one another (Parmentier 1985: 24-25). Recognizing materiality as a 
formative component of semiotic practices, Piercian semiotics considers the ways in 
which signs are both representative of the world and materially located within it. 
 Following from the recognition that signs are part of the material world, Pierce 
also recognized that signs can stand in different kinds of relations with the objects they 
signify (Mertz 1985: 3). Saussure’s model focuses narrowly on what Pierce calls 
“symbolic” relations: those where the sign is linked to its object purely by convention, as 
in the arbitrary relations between words and the objects and concepts they represent. 
Saussure thus conceived of all semiosis as functioning essentially like language. Pierce, 
by contrast, recognizes three types of sign relations: symbols, icons, and indexes. Of 
these three, it is the index that features most prominently in this dissertation. Indexes 
are signs that relate to their objects by virtue of a real (often causal) connection (Keane 
2007: 22).42 Indexicality is at play when smoke indicates the presence of fire, when 
                                                        
42 Icons, Pierce’s third sign type, are signs that relate to their objects by virtue of resemblance or shared 
traits. Iconicity thus includes the ways in which a map or a portrait is able to represent a place or a person 
by virtue of having a similar shape. Many signs are both iconic and indexical, such as footprints or 
photographs, which share both a visual resemblance and a causal relationship with the objects they 
represent.  
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tears indicate a person’s emotional state, and when the use of a particular speech 
register represents the unequal relationship between a speaker and his addressee.43 
More germane to the topic of this dissertation, the expressive features of a singer’s 
voice may index her sincere identification with the text she’s singing, her musical ability 
and training, or divine inspiration.     
 This last example points to one of the defining features of indexicality, namely, 
that the meanings of indexes are not given, but rather, inferred through a process called 
abduction.44 As used by Alfred Gell, this term denotes a particular type of inference 
made in relation to indexical signs, in which a presumed causal relationship produces 
                                                        
43 The distinction between symbols, icons, and indexes can be illustrated with reference to Balinese 
offerings. Much of Balinese Hindu religious practice revolves around the presentation of offerings—
intricate and varied constructions of palm leaves, flowers, rice, fruit, meat, coins, and other items—to 
deities and spirits. The material forms of Balinese Hindu offerings are complex signs that represent, in 
various ways, the natural, spiritual, social, and ethical worlds that Balinese Hindus inhabit. The various 
shapes and colors of offerings are iconic and/or symbolic representations of specific elements of Balinese 
Hindu cosmology. For example, some of the offerings presented during the holiday honoring the goddess 
Saraswati include what look like tiny geckos made of rice flour dough. These are iconic representations of 
actual geckos, complete with eyes, mouths, and tails; and because geckos are conventionally used to 
represent Saraswati in Balinese iconography, the geckos in the offerings can also be understood as 
symbolic representations of Saraswati herself. Offerings can also function as indexes. For example, 
insofar as offerings for a particular ceremony may vary in terms of the size, quantity, and quality of their 
components, they may serve as indexes of the economic status of the ceremony’s hosts. The inclusion of 
costly red imported apples in place of the yellow local variety is an indexical sign of lavish expenditure, 
and therefore also, of wealth. With regard to the iconic or symbolic significance of offerings, the 
relationship between the material form of the offering and the object it represents is understood to be 
based on resemblance or convention, respectively. With regard to indexicality however, a causal 
relationship between the offering and the people responsible for it is inferred.  
44 In Art and Agency, Gell explores how material artifacts mediate social relations by functioning as 
indexes of the agents responsible for their existence and circulation. An art work, for example, may index 
the artist who created it, the patron who sponsored its creation, the public whose demands and 
expectations informed its production, the collector or curator who selected it for display, and so on (Gell 
1998: 28-34). All of these agents, in one way or another, caused the art work to exist in a particular form, 
at a particular time and place, and the art work is a kind of imprint or trace of their agency, which works by 
stimulating inferences (abductions) about the agents that produced it. As an index of these agents, which 
is separable from their physical bodies, the art work is also an extension of their personhood (ibid.: 20-
21). Many of the signs I discuss in this dissertation function in a similar way: they ‘stand for’ the agents—
human, divine, or otherwise—that are believed to be responsible for their existence in a particular time 
and place. Gell’s theory of art works as indexes of social agency can thus be usefully applied to the 
objects, events, and practices I analyze here.  
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an inference from the index back to some likely cause (Gell 1998: 13-15). For example, 
if singing a particular text is believed to require some form of divine guidance, then a 
successful performance may prompt the singer to infer (through a process of abduction) 
that she was aided by a divine being. Her performance, then, is an index of divine 
agency. To give another example, if imported red apples are known to be more 
expensive than the local yellow variety, then the presence of red apples in a person’s 
religious offering may prompt others to infer (through a process of abduction) that that 
person’s family is wealthy; this in spite of the fact that the apples may have been 
purchased at a discount or with a loan. Abduction, then, is an uncertain business having 
to do with the formation of ad hoc hypotheses about the likely causes that lie behind 
particular observable effects. Uncertain though it may be, it is also a ubiquitous strategy 
of human thought as it provides an effective means of reducing the number of possible 
explanations for a given state of affairs (ibid.: 14). 
 This raises a crucial point about indexicality: the kinds of abductions that present 
themselves to a person will depend on basic assumptions that person holds about the 
world. That is to say, the meanings of indexes derive in part from shared beliefs about 
the chains of causality that bring such things into being, including beliefs about the kinds 
of beings and objects that inhabit the world, as well as the various capacities those 
beings and objects possess. For my interlocutors in Bali, these include beliefs about the 
existence of deities, ghosts and spirits, beliefs about how those beings intervene in and 
communicate with the human world, and so on. These beliefs form part of what Webb 
Keane has called a “semiotic ideology.” Semiotic ideologies are sets of shared 
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assumptions about signs and signification that shape semiotic practice.45 As Keane 
explains, semiotic ideologies determine such things as “what people will consider the 
role that intentions play in signification to be, what kind of possible agent (humans only? 
Animals? Spirits?) exist to which acts of signification might be imputed, whether signs 
are arbitrarily or necessarily linked to their objects, and so forth” (Keane 2003: 419). 
Since signification, in the Piercian sense, includes all relations in which one thing stands 
for another, semiotic ideology encompasses beliefs about the relative plausibility of the 
different abductions that present themselves as possible explanations for the existence 
of any observable artifact or circumstance, including natural phenomena. For example, 
semiotic ideology will play a role in determining whether a rain shower is interpreted as 
an omen or merely a consequence of particular atmospheric conditions. Semiotic 
ideologies thus help stabilize the inherently unstable meanings of indexes: by 
presenting certain causal relations as more plausible than others, semiotic ideology in 
effect narrows the range of meanings that are likely to be inferred from an index, 
thereby giving the material world a certain degree of coherence among people who 
share the ideology (Keane 2003: 419). According to Keane, it is this stabilizing effect of 
semiotic ideology that allows indexes to gain social and moral force (2003: 418-419, 
2007: 17).46 To return to the topic of music, this dissertation seeks to show that semiotic 
                                                        
45 The concept of semiotic ideology builds on the earlier concept of language ideology, which Judith Irvine 
defines as a “cultural (or subcultural) system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together 
with their loading of moral and political interests” (Irvine 1989: 255). Semiotic ideology is simply an 
extension of this concept to include the full range of semiotic practices. In using the term “ideology” 
authors do not mean to cast these representations as false, but to highlight their performative aspect. Like 
all ideology, semiotic ideology “creates and acts in a social world while it masquerades as a description of 
that world” (Schieffelin 1998: 11).  
46 Keane writes that “since the power effects of language (and of semiotic form more generally) are not 
fully determinate—the ‘same’ forms can, for example, have quite different implications in different 
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ideologies play an important role in enabling certain ways of understanding and 
experiencing music to circulate and become widespread—and thus to gain social 
force—while others do not.47  As we will see with respect to the practices I discuss in 
this dissertation, however, semiotic ideologies do not eliminate the ambiguity of 
indexical signs. Both the meanings of indexes, and the underlying semiotic ideologies 
that shape how indexes are interpreted, can, and frequently do, become sites of 
contestation.48 
 The concept of semiotic ideology captures how people’s underlying beliefs about 
the world and the beings that inhabit it may inform different domains of semiotic 
practice, thus creating a sense of coherence across those different domains such that 
varieties of semiotic forms “enter into a larger economy of mutual, often unexpected 
consequences,” what Keane calls a representational economy (2003: 411, 2007: 19-
20). The term “semiotic form” here refers to the material forms in which meanings are 
embodied, which “can include such things as the sounds of words, the constraints of 
speech genres, the perishability of books, the replicable shapes of money, the 
                                                        
contexts—ideological mediation is a necessary component of any political consequences that might 
follow from form” (2007: 17).  
47 In my view, one of the shortcomings of Turino’s Piercian semiotics of music is that it does not explain 
the social processes by which certain musical meanings become stabilized and gain widespread currency 
while others will have only personal relevance. The same could perhaps be said for Tia DeNora’s Music 
in Everyday Life, which focuses significant attention on the deeply personal meanings that music has for 
individuals, but it does not explain how individuals’ musical experiences draw from, and contribute to, 
broader shared meanings (DeNora 2000). This limitation is especially apparent in DeNora’s discussion of 
music as a technology of the self, for although she indicates that “the constitution and maintenance of the 
self” is a “fundamentally social process,” her analysis falls short of showing how individual engagements 
with music structure, or are structured by, social processes and formations that extend beyond the sphere 
of private musical experiences (DeNora 2000: 47). I would argue that the concept of semiotic ideology 
provides one way of addressing these shortcomings. For another critique of the microsocial focus of 
DeNora’s work, see Born 2005.  
48 Encounters between competing semiotic ideologies have been a central focus of Keane’s work. See 
especially, Keane 2007.  
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meatiness of animals, the feel of cloth, the shape of houses, musical tones, the 
fleshiness of human bodies, and the habits of physical gestures” (2007: 5-6). Applied to 
music, semiotic ideology brings attention to the ways that people’s musical experiences 
are shaped not only by their beliefs about music, but also by their assumptions about a 
whole range of other material practices and forms. In Bali, for example, music is one 
among many semiotic forms that serves to make divine agents present and active in 
human lives. Musical practices thus enter into a broader representational economy with 
other signifying practices that mediate human-divine relations. This means that a 
musical performance may get its meaning as much from its relationship to other musical 
events as from its relationships to a host of other non-musical signifying practices. To 
study music as part of a representational economy is to recognize this dynamic 
interconnectedness of music with other semiotic forms.    
 One of Keane’s stated aims in elaborating the concept of semiotic ideology is “to 
show why moral arguments may focus on semiotic forms” (2007: 21). His answer is that 
semiotic ideology links “apparently minor matters” of material form to serious questions 
concerning “the preconditions for and consequences of moral action” (20-21). The moral 
questions that I explore in this dissertation pertain to people’s relationships with invisible 
beings. How should humans interact with the divine? How are deities likely to respond? 
What moral significance do their responses have? As we can see, these questions are 
not only about morality; they also have to do with signification. Since music is one 
among many semiotic forms that serves to make invisible beings present in human 
lives, it can have important moral implications. This is why understanding how musical 
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and sonic practices contribute to the formation of ethical subjectivities requires that they 
be studied in relation to the broader representational economies that mediate Balinese 
Hindu relationships with the divine.   
 In thinking about the ways that semiotic ideology imbues music with moral 
significance, I draw on Keane’s concept of “ethical affordances.”  Ethical affordances 
are properties that people “might draw on in the process of making ethical evaluations 
and decisions, whether consciously or not” (Keane 2016: 27). The concept of 
affordance is meant to draw attention to the fact that material forms can have certain 
innate potentials—they make certain kinds of activity possible—while also stressing that 
these potentials do not determine that people will respond to them in any particular way. 
Affordances are properties that are available for being taken up in some way within 
some form of practical activity (Keane 2016: 28). Many of the ethical affordances that I 
discuss here serve a semiotic function. They are material objects and sensations that 
are understood to be indexes of some circumstance that has ethical significance, and 
as such, they afford opportunities for ethical evaluation. For example, as I show in 
Chapter 4, the expressive aspects of a musical performance may be taken to afford 
insight into the performer’s moral character. The affordances of music (or any other 
mediatory practice) are made possible by, and depend upon, particular semiotic 
ideologies, which put music into relation with other semiotic forms; they also grow out of 
the specific material qualities of music, which carry particular associations and also 
enable particular kinds of bodily, sensory, and affective experiences. In characterizing 
these affordances as “semiotic,” my intention is simply to indicate that they make 
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something present that would not otherwise be apparent, such as an inner quality or 
sentiment, or a divine being. It is not my intention to reduce music’s material complexity 
to a dematerialized meaning or to draw attention away from the capacity of semiotic 
forms to produce other kinds of effects. Building on Keane’s thoroughly material 
semiotic framework, this dissertation seeks to develop an approach to semiotic analysis 
that can account for the interplay between semiotic, sensory, and affective registers.49 
 
Fieldwork 
 The research on which this dissertation is based took place during two extended 
periods of fieldwork in Bali conducted in 2013-2014 and lasting a total of 18 months. I 
also draw to a limited extent on several earlier trips to Bali, which took place between 
2008 and 2011. Over the course of my fieldwork I studied three forms of Hindu chant. 
Each of these took me to multiple field sites. The art form that I studied most extensively 
was a Balinese form of literary performance called pepaosan. I took private lessons in 
pepaosan performance with three practitioners, each of whom brought a different 
religious perspective to their artistic practice. I also performed and studied with three 
sekaa santi (pepaosan clubs). Since Balinese pepaosan performers typically do not 
take private lessons, participating in these groups was crucial to get a sense of how 
pepaosan is typically studied in Bali. By spending time singing alongside and 
conversing with these groups’ members, I was also able to gain crucial insights into the 
                                                        
49 As Karen Strassler notes, “sensorial, experiential encounters between people and things. . .are not 
excluded from Piercian semiotics” (2014: 124 n88). For more on the relationship between semiotic and 
affective registers, see Hutta 2015, Mazzarella 2009, and Navaro-Yashin 2012.  
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beliefs and values that motivate pepaosan activity. To better understand the role of the 
state in shaping pepaosan practice, I attended state-sponsored pepaosan competitions 
(Utsawa Dharma Gita or UDG) throughout various regions of Bali, as well as the 
national competition in 2014, which was held in Jakarta. I also attended the Parade 
Pesantian competitions that take place at the annual Bali Arts Festival. In addition to 
observing the performances that took place at these competitions, I also observed and 
recorded the numerous speeches that preceded UDG events, which revealed much 
about the aims of the figures and institutions responsible for organizing the 
competitions. For comparison I also attended state-sponsored Quranic recitation 
competitions (Musabaqah Tilawatil Quran or MTQ) in Denpasar and Singaraja.   
 To learn more about the Hindu Reform, I observed classes at the Bangli and 
Denpasar campuses of the National Hindu Theological Institute (IHDN). I hoped that by 
observing classes and interacting with faculty and students at the institute I would gain 
insight into a wider variety of strategies by which the state is working to transform 
Balinese religiosity. After working my way up the chain of command to acquire official 
permission to conduct research at the Institute, I was put in touch with a young faculty 
member and preacher, who agreed to let me observe his course on dharma wacana 
(Hindu sermons) and promised to invite me to attend his public sermons as well. 
Despite this promising start, I was only able to observe a small handful of class 
meetings—over the course of a 13-week semester this instructor cancelled class 10 
times—and one public presentation. These challenges were revealing in themselves: 
many of the instructors are expected to travel between campuses in south, central, and 
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north Bali on a weekly basis; meanwhile, the administration often makes scheduling 
errors and is unable to effectively hold faculty accountable for missing work, and on top 
of this, the low-ranking faculty are quite poorly remunerated. Furthermore, as one 
faculty member complained to me, “the students don’t show up to class, so why should 
we?” While my research at the Institute did not go as planned, I was nonetheless able 
gain some valuable insights through my interactions IHDN faculty members and 
students.     
 It was through my difficulties at IHDN that I came into contact with the world of 
New Religious Movement’s in Bali. On one of the many occasions when I made the 1.5- 
hour motorbike ride to the IHDN Bangli campus only to find that the class I had hoped to 
attend was cancelled, I got to chatting with a couple of students who had also been left 
in the lurch by the instructor’s absence. Through our conversation, I discovered that the 
disfunction of this particular class was typical of their experience at the Institute as a 
whole. Seeing my predicament, one of the students suggested that I might instead 
pursue research at an “ashram” where she herself was a regular participant. When I 
discovered that the ashram in question was affiliated with ISKCON, my initial reaction 
was to think that it was outside the scope of my research, which was, after all, about 
Balinese Hinduism. However, subsequent conversations with this student revealed that 
she saw her activities at the ashram as a (much needed) supplement to her studies at 
IHDN, and complementary to the religious practices of her parents (who were not 
affiliated with ISKCON). Over time I discovered that many Balinese devotees saw their 
involvement with ISKCON as continuous with their identities as Balinese Hindus. This 
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convinced me that the practices I was observing at the ashram were not irrelevant to my 
broader research project, so I became a regular participant at ISKCON services and 
celebrations. The frequency and regularity of the activities at the ashram proved to be a 
welcome contrast with the dysfunctionality of IHDN, and with the intermittent nature of 
much traditional Balinese religious life.   
 For the duration of my fieldwork I lived with a family in the greater Ubud area, in a 
village I call Tegal.50 This family, whom I call the Dangin family, consisted of an elderly 
grandmother, her five adult children, and one young adult grandchild. While I spent time 
with all family members, I interacted most closely with two individuals: Kompiang, the 
eldest of the five siblings, and her younger brother Wayan, the de facto head of the 
household, both of whom appear frequently in what follows. The family lived in a 
traditional Balinese compound consisting of a north, east, and west house (bale daja, 
bale dangin, bale dauh), a kitchen (paon), a house temple (mrajan), which they shared 
with their extended family, and an extra building (not part of the traditional compound 
structure) that the family hoped to turn into a guest house for tourists, but which 
remained unfinished at the time of my fieldwork. I stayed in one of the rooms in the 
extra building; the other rooms were occupied by the grandmother and two of her adult 
children.  
 Studying the Dangin family was not part of my original research plan. However, I 
ended up learning a lot from the time I spent with them, and these insights informed my 
thinking about many aspects of my research. I therefore decided to incorporate the 
                                                        
50 The name of this village, as well as all personal names, have been replaced with pseudonyms.  
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family into my ethnography. Because some of my ethnography deals with interpersonal 
conflicts and other contentious matters, I have chosen to keep the identity of this family 
confidential, replacing all personal names with pseudonyms. I have used pseudonyms 
for all personal names in this dissertation, with the exception of instances in which I cite 
language that was presented in a public forum (e.g. the speeches at UDG competitions, 
televised sermons, etc). In such cases, I have included the speaker’s real name.   
 While living in the Dangin household I participated in a range of domestic 
activities, from casual socializing, often in front of the television in the bale dauh, to 
helping the women with cooking and offering preparation. I also participated in some of 
the communal activities of the family’s desa adat. I accompanied Kompiang when she 
went to temple to maturan (present offerings and pray), when she attended neighbors’ 
life-cycle rituals, and when she joined the members of Tegal’s women’s organization 
(PKK) to sweep the public cemetery and temple grounds.  On a few occasions 
Kompiang asked me to substitute for her when the women of the village gathered to 
ngayah (contribute ritual labor), making offerings for an upcoming temple ceremony. 
(Typically, however, this was a job she kept for herself, as she was somewhat of an 
expert in offering preparation and took great pride in this role.) I also participated in 
another form of ngayah, joining Wayan and his brother Kadek to perform wayang lemah 
(ceremonial shadow puppet theater) at local religious ceremonies.  
 
Talking about “Religion” in Bali 
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When I told a new acquaintance that I was doing research on Balinese religion 
he or she would typically react in one of two ways. Most commonly, my interlocutor 
would claim to be ignorant about religious matters, saying things like “I’m Balinese and I 
don’t understand my own religion” or “most Balinese people don’t really understand 
religion.” They might then recommend a priest or other religious expert who would be 
better able to assist me with my research. Less often, a person would react in an almost 
directly opposite manner, proceeding to lecture me on the meaning of various rituals 
and offerings, about core religious beliefs, about common misconceptions about 
Balinese religion, and so on. More often than not, I would come to find out that the 
person delivering this ‘lecture’ had studied religion at the college level. Neither of these 
responses was particularly satisfying to me as a researcher, but my efforts to elicit 
different kinds of information through further questioning were not particularly successful 
either. Over time, I became frustrated with my attempts to learn about religious life in 
Bali by asking people questions, as these questions, and my position as a peneliti 
(researcher) seemed to direct my addressees away from what I most wanted to 
understand.  
It was only after completing my fieldwork that I began to see the problem in a 
clearer light. I realized that the picture that emerged when my interactions with people 
were defined as “research” about “religion” was a third-person perspective on Balinese 
Hinduism; people assumed that what I, as a researcher, was hoping to get from them 
was an authoritative representation of Balinese Hinduism, and that this was something 
only an expert could provide. Even more problematic was the fact that this third-person 
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perspective that my interlocutors furnished for me aligned closely with official state-
sanctioned representations of Balinese religiosity: both the content of the experts’ 
‘lectures’ and the claim that non-experts “don’t understand” their own religion echoed 
reformist representations of Balinese Hinduism. What was missing from these 
conversations—and what I was, in fact, most interested in learning about—was people’s 
first-person relationship to their religion. If I had come to this clear understanding earlier 
perhaps I could have developed a workable, systematic approach to studying first-
person religious ethics in Bali. Instead, my imperfect solution was, in many cases, to 
avoid asking too many questions, allowing my interlocutors to direct our conversations, 
and generally going with the flow of whatever was happening around me. The resulting 
ethnography is a patchwork of observations and conclusions that leaves many 
questions unanswered. Nevertheless, through the close relationships that I was able to 
cultivate with a limited number of interlocutors, I was able to gain some valuable insights 
into how religious values and ideals are lived on a first-person basis.  
 The distinction between first-person and third-person religious discourse is 
represented in my ethnography through two different kinds of characters: ordinary 
Hindus and religious authorities. These figures should be understood not as two 
different segments of Balinese society, but as two different discursive roles that any 
individual can potentially occupy. All of the people who appear in my ethnography are 
“ordinary” Hindus when acting in their capacity as individual practitioners of their 
religion, and, at least in theory, all are capable of speaking authoritatively about 
religious matters, though in practice, some felt more qualified to do so than others. 
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Some of my interlocutors moved fluidly between these two roles. My pepaosan 
teachers, for example, would sometimes lecture me about Balinese religious beliefs, 
while at more informal moments, their personal relationship to religion would come into 
view, as when, at the start of one of my lessons, my teacher asked me to wait while she 
finished her daily round of offerings. Similarly, ISKCON devotees would shift back and 
forth between the role of teacher and friend, sometimes pontificating about the tenets of 
ISKCON doctrine, other times discussing their own personal experiences navigating the 
different religious spheres in which they move. Other people tended to interact with me 
primarily in one role or the other. For example, when members of the Dangin family 
spoke to me about religion they generally did so from a first-person point of view, 
focusing on their own religious practices, beliefs, and obligations. Rarely did they claim 
to speak for Balinese Hindus as a whole, and when they did, they would often qualify 
their claims by stating that they represented how things were done in their village, or by 
acknowledging that others may disagree with the view they were expressing. 
Conversely, when I interviewed state employees (school teachers, Theological Institute 
professors, state radio presenters) they almost invariably adopted a third-person 
perspective. In discussing religion with me, they did so as spokespersons for the state 
version of Hindu doctrine, which they represented as the correct basis for Balinese 
religious belief and practice. Their first-person relationship to their religion was not 
something that they revealed to me, or rather, they revealed just enough to suggest that 
their professional and personal relationship to Hinduism may not be one and the same. 
For example, when a professor at IHDN complained of being exhausted due to having 
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to make the long drive, day after day, between the institute in Denpasar and his home 
village in Klungkung so that he could help with preparations for an upcoming temple 
ceremony, I knew that I should not assume that the religious views he expressed to me 
in the privacy of his air conditioned office would necessarily correspond to how he 
spoke about and practiced his religion in his desa adat.   
 In discussing religious and moral agency in this dissertation, I focus on 
individuals who spoke to me about their religion from a first-person point of view. 
Following Mattingly (2014a, 2014b), I locate moral agency in this first-person 
perspective. To be clear, this is not because I see agency as existing only as 
“resistance” to religious authority (whether held by the state, by adat institutions, or by 
leaders within the ISKCON movement). On the contrary, I show that agency can take 
the form of resisting, reshaping, or adopting authoritative practices and values 
(Mahmood 2001, 2005). In this sense, the religious discourses of state employees are a 
form of agency even when they are merely acting as (to use an apt Indonesian phrase) 
perpanjangan tangan pemerintah (‘hand extensions’ of the government). However, they 
are not examples of the kind of religious and moral agency that most interests me 
here.51   
                                                        
51 This claim may seem counterintuitive. My purpose in making it is to avoid conflating state employees’ 
expert representations of Hinduism with their personal religiosity. An experience I had at while observing 
courses at IHDN may serve as an illustration of why this distinction is warranted. During a course on 
dharma wacana (sermon) the instructor ended his lecture by telling his students about the benefits of 
being a pedharma wacana (preacher). In closing, he told the students that delivering sermons could make 
you a “famous person” (he used the English phrase). He then asked me to turn off my audio recorder 
before telling the students and I about the large sums of money he earned delivering sermons at religious 
ceremonies throughout Bali. He added a humorous note by pantomiming the contentious process of 
accepting payment. First, he adopted the role of the person making the payment, who bowed slightly 
while respectfully presenting an imaginary amplop (envelope of money). Then, switching to the role of the 
pedharma wacana, he raised a hand in a polite gesture of refusal, saying jangan pak (no sir) while at the 
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Outline of Chapters  
 This dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part 1 (Chapter 1-2) I discuss the 
representational economy that underpins religious practice in the adat sphere and the 
distinctive forms of ethical life that this representational economy sustains. While 
Balinese adat has often been associated with stasis, I use the case study of the Dangin 
family to illustrate how the moral and semiotic frameworks embedded in the religious 
practices of the adat sphere can create spaces of possibility for creative forms of self-
making and world-making. In Part 2 (Chapter 3-5) I turn my attention to three religious 
pedagogies of voice, each of which seeks to reshape the ethical subjectivity of Balinese 
Hindus in specific ways.   
 Chapter 1 investigates the sensuous presence of invisible beings in everyday life. 
Focusing on the everyday religious practices of the Dangin family, I show how people’s 
relationships with invisible beings draw from, and feed into, a particular semiotic 
ideology, which treats a variety of semiotic forms—from mysterious noises to 
misfortunate events—as indexes of these beings’ agency. Since human-niskala 
                                                        
same time, with his other hand, he accepted the imaginary envelope and placed it in his breast pocket. 
We all laughed, but I was struck by his blatant violation of the delicate norms surrounding payment 
(especially payment for religious services) in Bali. Accepting payment was a source of intense discomfort 
and even shame for many of my Balinese acquaintances, forcing me to devise clever ways of paying my 
teachers for lessons. I believe this instructor’s performance illustrates that, within this professional 
context, he feels called upon to be a religious expert, not a moral role model. The religion he presents in 
the classroom seems to be abstracted from his own moral selfhood. Since moral accountability is what 
most interests me here, I focus most of my attention on people who are not state employees, as these 
were the people who were most willing to discuss their personal relationship to their religion with me. In 
discussing the views expressed by employees of state religious institutions, I treat their statements as 
representations of state religious ideology, which may or may not correspond to their own deeply held 
beliefs.    
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relationships are understood to be dynamic, and to have important consequences in 
human lives, people must take care to monitor and manage these relationships. The 
indexes that make these relationships legible—that mediate the relational entanglement 
of the visible and invisible realms—thus become invested with sensory and affective 
potency. This case reveals how a representational economy can produce and circulate 
embodied dispositions, and in turn, how subjectivity and agency are materially situated. 
In addition, looking at how this representational economy operates reveals that the 
semiotic and affective registers are interrelated in complex ways.  
 In Chapter 2 I continue my discussion of the relational entanglement of human 
and invisible worlds as mediated through semiotic practices. However, I shift focus 
away from the sensory dimensions of these relationships to more closely consider their 
ethical dimensions. I discuss how the semiotic forms that index human-niskala 
relationships are taken up as ethical affordances—as criteria for making moral 
judgments and decisions. This chapter reveals how ethical subjectivity is deeply 
entangled with the semiotic forms that mediate ethical practice.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 investigate how the voice and vocal performance are being 
employed by the state as tools of religious and ethical reform. In Chapter 3 my focus is 
the Puja Tri Sandhya, a chanted prayer introduced to Balinese Hinduism in the 1950s. I 
begin by looking at the Tri Sandhya’s circulation as an audio recording, then in the 
second half of the chapter, I turn to consider embodied practices of performing the Tri 
Sandhya. By furnishing Balinese Hindus with a model for interacting with the divine that 
does not require the mediation of material offerings, but instead depends on the 
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cultivation of proper intentions, the Tri Sandhya functions as a pedagogy of religious 
reform that promotes the normative ideal of sincerity and provides Balinese Hindus with 
a concrete means of inhabiting that norm in daily life. While such models play a crucial 
role in the formation of ethical subjectivities, their social effects are not guaranteed. This 
chapter suggests that in order to be effective as a means of reshaping ethical 
subjectivity, forms of vocal expression must be taken up as ethical affordances and thus 
become embedded in people’s day-to-day efforts to live a good life.  
 In Chapter 4 I discuss the art of pepaosan, a Balinese tradition of singing and 
orally interpreting religious texts. I begin by discussing state-sponsored pepaosan 
competitions then turn to the practices of sekaa santi, pepaosan clubs that perform at 
religious ceremonies. By comparing these two facets of the contemporary pepaosan 
scene, I am able to show how pepaosan operates within two distinct representational 
economies, one linked to the Hindu Reform and another more closely affiliated with the 
adat sphere. Within each of these representational economies, pepaosan’s material 
properties are treated as indexes of the performer’s moral status, but with very different 
results. The case of pepaosan thus shows how a single musical practice can enable 
multiple paths of ethical striving.  
 In the final chapter I discuss the Balinese ISKCON community and the religious 
pedagogies of voice that circulate within it. Focusing on the ethico-musical practice that 
Balinese ISKCON devotees call singing rohani (spiritual singing), I show how the 
distinction between ordinary singing and singing rohani is marked by subtle affective 
sensations, which devotees understand as indicators of ethical progress. I argue that 
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the act of singing rohani allows devotees to sensuously inhabit (however fleetingly) an 
alternate social and cosmic order, an experience that strengthens their attachment to 
the movement and its rigorously ascetic ethical project. The case of singing rohani 
reveals in a particularly vivid way what several other chapters also showed: that music’s 
social efficacy is dependent on its embedding within a broader economy of signifying 
practices that mutually reinforce one another.  
 




One night I was in my room writing field notes when I heard a voice coming 
through my window. It was Kompiang, the eldest daughter of the family I lived with 
during my fieldwork. She was a woman in her mid-forties with a voice that had become 
hoarse and deep from years of cooking over a wood fire. “Do you hear water coming 
up?” she asked. I walked to the back of the room and leaned my ear toward the spot on 
the rear wall where the motor of the water pump was located. If the pump had been 
running, I would have heard a high-pitched electrical hum and the gentle swoosh of 
water flowing through the pipe. I listened quietly for a few seconds and heard nothing.  
The sounds of the household plumbing system had become a frequent topic of 
conversation around the house in recent weeks, garnering what seemed to me to be an 
inordinate amount of interest. Earlier that day Kompiang told the rest of the family that 
she had heard the main water pump start up six times that day. While I recognized that 
this was unusual (the pump should start automatically when the water in the main tank 
gets low—at most once per day), I was nonetheless surprised that she was keeping 
such close track of this activity. I myself hardly noticed when the various water pumps 
started and stopped. Among the sounds of chickens, dogs, birds, televisions, radios, 
motorbikes, and human voices, the water pump was one of the quieter features of the 
household soundscape.  
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I stepped out the front door of my room and told Kompiang that the water was off. 
She said she thought she could hear the toilet running in the empty room next door to 
mine and asked me to come have a listen. The building I lived in had been under 
construction for over a decade, but the family had only recently managed to acquire 
enough funds to finish the floors and install plumbing. The room beside mine would 
eventually house the elderly grandmother and two of Kompiang’s siblings, but at the 
time of this encounter it was still unoccupied and without electricity. I followed Kompiang 
into the dark interior of the empty room. As we stood listening I could hear the sound of 
the toilet tank filling. She said she thought there might be a leak somewhere, but as we 
continued chatting in the dark bathroom, it became clear that her interest in these 
sounds did not stem from concern about wasted water. The family believed there was a 
wong samar (hazy person) living on the patch of land where the new building now 
stood. They would often hear the sound of footsteps coming from the area, but when 
they looked, no one was there. Before the land was cleared, Kompiang said, people 
were “too scared” (tak berani) to pass through it, because in the past, if someone did so, 
a death or illness would result. For instance, many years prior, her younger brother 
Made had dug a large pit for a septic tank on that land. By the time he completed the 
project he had become, in Kompiang’s words, seperti orang gila (like a crazy person).52 
Coming as they did from the same patch of land, the plumbing abnormalities in the new 
building were also signs of this invisible presence. Kompiang suspected that these 
disturbances were an effort on the part of the wong samar to communicate something to 
                                                        
52 At the time of my research Made was taking medication for a mental illness that caused hallucinations 
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the family. The wong samar was not a straightforwardly menacing presence. “He guards 
this household,” she reassured me. “But now that everyone can eat,” she reasoned, he 
may wish to “ask for something” (minta sesuatu).  
Invisible agents like the wong samar are a common feature of everyday life in 
contemporary Bali. Balinese collectively characterize these invisible agents and forces 
as niskala: immaterial or invisible. Though immaterial, the niskala world makes its 
presence known through mysterious noises, unusual sightings, strange sensations, and 
unexpected occurrences. At the same time, niskala beings are partially responsible for 
everything that happens or exists, and they are therefore part of even the most ordinary 
aspects of life (Wiener 1995: 49-50).  
Because of possible connections with niskala, seemingly mundane sounds and 
sensations can take on a powerful affective charge. About a week later, Kompiang 
came out of the room next to mine and asked her brother if he’d turned the pump on. 
“Yeah,” he answered. “Kesiab!” she exclaimed, with a relieved laugh. Like the English 
word “startled,” kesiab refers to a powerful affective and bodily response to a sudden, 
unexpected, or frightening sensory perception. Although the pump outside the two 
rooms would start and stop without warning, the sound was quiet enough that its 
coming and going never struck me as particularly startling. Kompiang’s experience of 
kesiab registers her attunement to the sound of the pump as a sign of a potentially 
threatening invisible agent.53   
                                                        
53 Kompiang may have been in a particularly anxious mood at this time because earlier in the day we had 
heard dogs howling, a sound which is rarely heard during daylight, and which is associated with the 
presence of ghosts.  
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Anxiety was not the only affective tone associated with encounters with niskala. 
At other times mysterious niskala events could create an atmosphere of sociable 
effervescence within the household. For example, one evening I was sitting in my room 
and heard a loud sound overhead, as though a heavy stone had fallen through the roof 
and onto the ceiling above me. I expected to hear the elderly grandmother of the 
household ask apa ulung? (what fell?), as she usually did when a cat jumped onto the 
roof, but on this occasion, she said nothing. A moment later I could hear several people 
laughing and banging on the walls in the room next to mine, then Kompiang’s younger 
brother Wayan came and asked if I had heard the sound. He said they had investigated 
the ceiling and roof and could not see any evidence that something had fallen. He then 
recounted some other mysterious events that had been happening around the house: 
earlier that day a water pipe that had been clogged for months suddenly began to flow 
again, and his younger brother Kadek had reported seeing water spray upward seperti 
kencing (like urine) from the drain while he was showering. He also noted that he had 
been experiencing a mysterious sense of fatigue each time he used the bathroom in the 
building I lived in, causing him to yawn continuously. “I need to do something about 
this,” he said before leaving. Following this conversation, I could hear the family talking 
and laughing boisterously until late into the night.54  
                                                        
54 This boisterous talk might be a result of an easing of tension that occurs when people feel united by 
their shared responsibility toward, and fascination with, invisible beings. However, it may also be a way of 
dealing with underlying fear. It’s possible that fear prompts a need to come together and be ramé (noisy, 
sociable). I also witnessed this (and heard people talk about it) with regard to exhuming corpses. People 
talk and laugh loudly, making jokes, during this process, in order to avoid feeling afraid.  
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A similar burst of socializing had happened a couple months earlier, when I 
awoke to hear Kompiang talking and laughing excitedly with some men whose voices I 
didn’t recognize. When I spoke to her the next morning she was in an unusually good 
mood. She told me she’d been up talking to friends until 2 am because a pair of dancers 
had gone into trance and caused a scene during a ceremony at one of the village 
temples. Following events in which the niskala world makes its presence known, a 
momentary rupture occurs in the flow of ordinary life. At such moments, the tensions 
and boundaries that usually separated people were temporarily suspended, and 
conversation became easy.  
A similar, but more subdued form of sociable effervescence accompanied the 
stories about peristiwa niskala (niskala events) that sometimes appeared in the local 
newspaper. Often appearing on the front page, and sometimes unfolding over multiple 
days, coverage of peristiwa niskala was the news topic most likely to spark conversation 
in the household. The prominence of this coverage suggests that the family’s interest in 
these matters was broadly shared. While niskala events within the home serve to bring 
family members together, newspaper coverage of peristiwa niskala enacts a broader 
Balinese public united by a shared interest in and concern for invisible beings and 
forces. This is worth noting because, as we will see in Chapter 3, niskala matters are 
conspicuously absent or excluded from other Balinese publics.  
The presence of invisible beings can also be linked to moments of intense 
emotion. Among members of the Dangin family, conflicts were usually expressed 
indirectly, through weighty silences. Occasionally, however, family members would get 
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into heated arguments. On at least two such occasions, the youngest brother Kadek 
went into trance. These moments of trance seemed to mark a kind of climax, creating a 
break in the tension which allowed interaction to eventually return to normal.  
Not all Balinese Hindus’ thinking is equally rooted in spirit ontology. Even within 
the Dangin household, family members expressed different degrees of commitment to 
niskala explanations of events. The two youngest members of the household, Kadek 
and Putu, were both fascinated with ‘paranormal’ activity. During my fieldwork, the two 
became regular attendees at Calonarang, theatrical performances that often feature 
outbreaks of trance and other mysterious occurrences. Kadek was believed to be the 
reincarnation of a renowned Rangda dancer, and he often danced the part of Rangda in 
local Calonarang performances. While most of the family believed that Kadek had a 
special connection to the spirit world, Kadek’s older brother Wayan would sometimes 
express skepticism about the authenticity of his younger brother’s trance episodes. 
Kompiang often told me that Wayan tak percaya (didn’t believe). Wayan, for his part, 
often described the women in his family as being lebih tradisional otaknya (more 
traditionally minded). Sometimes he attributed this difference to the fact that they had 
limited schooling: while Wayan, Kadek, and Putu had all finished high school and 
Wayan attended a few years of college, Kompiang and her sister Komang both left 
school before completing junior high. Kompiang was deeply religious and spent much of 
her time assisting people in her community with preparing offerings for religious rituals. 
Wayan would occasionally question whether all of these offerings were really 
necessary. Sometimes he maintained his own explanations of events, which relied less 
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heavily on invisible agency. For example, he did not see his older brother’s mental 
illness as a harm inflicted by ghosts. He said his brother experienced constant 
frustration and disappointment in his life, never managing to get the things he wanted. 
Wayan believed that the process of digging the large septic pit was a kind of embodied 
symbol of his brother’s unending frustration, which unraveled his mind. Nevertheless, 
even Wayan, the most skeptical member of the household, was sensitive to potential 
signs from the invisible world. After hearing the loud noise on the roof, while the others 
were chatting and laughing he pulled his nephew aside and the two had a “serious talk” 
about the sound and what should be done about it.   
In this chapter I describe the lifeworld inhabited by my interlocutors in Bali, 
focusing on niskala as a commonplace yet mysterious and fascinating aspect of daily 
life. Within this lifeworld, people’s actions in the material realm can impact their 
relationships with invisible beings, and this in turn can have significant material 
consequences. Managing these relationships is therefore of critical importance. As I 
show in this chapter and the next, people’s efforts to monitor, evaluate, maintain, and 
repair these relationships were a central feature of daily life in the Dangin household. 
Moreover, these efforts sustained a unique set of sensory and ethical dispositions 
among the household’s members.  
Previous scholarship on Balinese Hindu ritual has emphasized the cyclical 
patterns of ritual exchanges. A line of thought running through the early work of Mead 
and Bateson through Geertz’s famous writings claims that the regular, cyclical patterns 
of ritual operate alongside other aspects of Balinese culture to sustain a 
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“detemporalized” conception of time and a “depersonalizing” concept of personhood 
(Geertz 1973: 390, 398). While it is true that much of Balinese Hindu ritual activity is 
organized as a web of repeating cycles, the outcomes of these practices are not always 
predictable, and indeed, the rituals themselves are subject to variation. This means that 
managing relationships with invisible beings requires much more than rote repetition. 
The ever-lurking possibility of a breakdown in the smooth functioning of ordinary life, 
may in fact play a more important role in shaping how people experience ritual, and 
conceive of themselves in relation to it, than does the cyclicality highlighted in Geertz’s 
work.  
This chapter investigates the ways in which people integrate invisible agents into 
the stories they tell about the world and how the mediated presence of these invisible 
actors shapes the actions people take. I show that people’s relationships with the 
niskala world are dynamic and interactive, and I argue that this dynamic quality 
(enacted both through the communicative and myth-making practices that mediate 
these relationships) sustains a set of sensory and affective sensibilities, which in turn 
undergird a particular configuration of social institutions and practices, most centrally, 
the institutions and practices of Balinese adat.   
In exploring the role of niskala in contemporary Bali I take inspiration from 
anthropologists who have explored the role of ghosts, spirits, and other immaterial 
beings in the modern world (and especially in modern Southeast Asia). Arguing against 
the notion that ghost and spirit ontologies are somehow antithetical to modernity, these 
authors have shown how enchantment is in fact integral to many people’s experience of 
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the material and social transformations associated with modernization. Across urban 
and rural spaces in many national settings, typical features of modernity (such as 
technology, infrastructure, development projects, and other forms of rapid change) are 
deeply entangled with divine or spectral agents and forces (Johnson 2014, McEwan 
2008, Schwenkel 2017).  
Within this body of work, I take particular inspiration from scholars who highlight 
the politics of people’s engagements with invisible beings. For example, Christina 
Schwenkel has shown how the haunting of infrastructure through practices of “urban 
myth-making” has obstructed development projects and visions of the Vietnamese state 
(2017). Sharing her interest in the “productive capacities” of spirits, this chapter looks at 
the haunting of domestic and public spaces in contemporary Bali. However, rather than 
focusing on the conflict between Balinese spirituality and state development, I suggest 
that the intimate presence of niskala beings in the everyday lives of contemporary 
Balinese Hindus fosters a set of embodied dispositions that conflict with the kind of 
sensory order aimed at in state projects of religious reform. In this chapter, I lay the 
groundwork for this larger argument by describing the semiotic linkages, as well as the 
forms of sensory attunement and affective attachment, that sustain, and are sustained 
through, people’s relationships with invisible beings. My argument about how these 
sensory dispositions relate to the Hindu Reform will be fully developed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4.   
Since niskala beings cannot be directly perceived by ordinary humans, their 
reality in people’s lives depends on forms of mediation. Anthropologists and historians 
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have explored how a variety of different material forms have served as evidence of 
divine or ghostly presence in the modern world (Engelke 2007, Schmidt 2000, Strassler 
2010 and 2014). While I do not limit myself to any single medium, I focus much of my 
attention on the role of sound. As shown at the beginning of this chapter, moments of 
listening are a key site for talking about and responding to the invisible world in Bali. 
Both the ephemeral quality of sound, and its ability to radiate and be perceived 
independently of its source, make it particularly likely to become a sign of an unseen 
presence.55 Paying attention to sound—to how people experience and talk about 
sounds, how they construct meanings for sounds, how they themselves create and 
structure sound for particular ends—provides important insights into Balinese 
relationships with invisible beings. However, my interlocutors do not approach sounds 
separately from other kinds of sensory experience. Rather, the sounds I discuss here 
form part of a broader representational economy, which includes other non-sonic media. 
Underlying this representational economy is a semiotic ideology which holds that 
invisible beings actively communicate with humans through unusual sounds, as well as 
many other sorts of signs. Therefore, although I will have plenty to say about the role of 
sound in Balinese Hindu ritual and in Balinese religious and social life more broadly, I 
have chosen not to organize this chapter (or this dissertation) around sound in any 
exclusive sense.  
                                                        
55 This is certainly not unique to Bali. For example, Karen Strassler has noted that sound was traditionally 
one of the primary means by which practitioners of Javanese mysticism would sense the presence of the 
spirit queen Ratu Kidul (2014: 107). In a different vein, Eric Leigh Schmidt has argued that listening was 
an important medium of contact with angels and the divine among early American Christians, and that 
disciplining the ear was crucial to the formation of modern subjects (2002).    
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In the next section I describe the overarching pattern of ritual exchanges that 
bind the lives of Balinese Hindus to the invisible world. This seems to me to be a 
necessary starting point because these practices are so consuming of the time, energy, 
resources, and concern of the people I spent time with in Bali. However, since these 
formalized ritual practices are not my main concern, and since they have been 
described in detail elsewhere, this discussion will be brief and, in many ways, 
incomplete. My purpose is to give the unfamiliar reader a general picture of religious life 
in Bali without overwhelming them with the details of the complex network of institutions 
and practices that organize it. For the reader who would like more detail, I have included 
suggestions for further reading where relevant.   
Following this overview, I turn my attention to the stories people tell about the 
invisible world. These stories draw from, and feed into, a widespread set of beliefs 
about how, when, and where this world is likely to reveal itself to humans. These beliefs 
place the sounds of the Dangin family’s plumbing system in a dynamic relationship with 
a variety of other signs that mediate the presence of invisible beings, which together 
make up a representational economy that mediates between the sekala and niskala 
realms. In emphasizing the dynamic character of human-niskala relations, stories about 
niskala encounters sustain the sense that deities and spirits are a consequential force in 
human lives that requires vigilant attention. The representational economy embedded in 
these stories encourages people to become attuned to particular kinds of sensations 
and perceptions.  
  62 
In the final section of the chapter, I shift focus to examine how people monitor 
and manage their relationships with invisible beings. I show that indexical 
communication is central to both of these processes. Balinese Hindus employ an array 
of indexes to convey their respect toward invisible beings, and they treat circumstances 
in the material world as indexical signs emanating from those beings. These circuits of 
indexical communication between visible and invisible realms parallel the use of 
indexical communication in ordinary social interaction; just as people are attuned to the 
many subtle cues that serve to define their relationships with other people, they 
experience a similar sense of entanglement in their relationships with the invisible world. 
This analysis reveals that Balinese traditions of ritual exchange are not merely a matter 
of repeating what people did in the past (nak mula keto), but about maintaining 
relationships, a process which sometimes requires spontaneity, adaptation, and the 
initiation of new ritual practices.  
 
Patterns of Ritual Exchange 
Balinese Hindu religious practice revolves around a complex system of rituals in 
which people present offerings to invisible deities and spirits. These rituals range in size 
from the daily placement of tiny offerings in various locations within and around the 
home to elaborate festivals that require months of preparation and attract tens of 
thousands of worshippers. The overarching purpose of Balinese Hindu ritual is to 
ensure the wellbeing of humans by maintaining proper relations with invisible beings.  
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Balinese Hindus hold rituals for a variety of reasons. Babies are given rituals at 
birth, three months, and six months of age, most young adults undergo tooth-filing and 
marriage ceremonies, and there are also elaborate death rituals. In addition to these life 
cycle rituals, there are also communal rituals of various kinds, including rituals for the 
deities of particular temples, as well as island-wide religious holidays. Families, villages, 
and larger groups of people also hold periodic purification rituals during spiritually 
dangerous times, or in response to adverse events.  
Maintaining proper relations with invisible beings is, for the most part, not an 
individual matter. Ritual responsibilities are almost always shared. These 
responsibilities thus bind people into social collectivities of various types and sizes. The 
exact structure of the institutions that organize ritual life can vary greatly from one 
village to another. My discussion here will focus on the situation in Tegal. The reader 
should understand that the picture may diverge significantly from how things are 
organized in other places. At the same time, the broad strokes of my description are 
widely shared, across many, but by no means all, villages in Bali.56  
The most basic unit of social organization in Bali is the nuclear family (kuren), 
centering on a husband-wife pair.57 Each kuren is responsible for carrying out the many 
rituals that take place within the home, including worshipping at the husband’s family 
temple (sanggah or mrajan) and carrying out life-cycle rituals. Parents are responsible 
                                                        
56 For a more comprehensive picture of social organization in Bali, see Barth 1993, Geertz 1980, Geertz 
and Geertz 1975, Lansing 1983, and Warren 1993.   
57 It is common for multiple kuren to live together in a single compound.  
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for their children’s life-cycle rituals from birth to adulthood (marriage); meanwhile, 
children are responsible for carrying out the cremation ceremonies for their parents.  
Each kuren belongs to a larger collective known as a banjar.58  The banjar is the 
basic civic community throughout most of Bali, and it plays a ritual, social, and 
administrative role. Upon marriage, a couple typically becomes members of the 
husband’s banjar.59 As members, they are entitled to the banjar’s assistance when 
carrying out cremation ceremonies, and in turn, they are responsible for assisting with 
the death rituals of their fellow banjar members, for helping with certain community 
purification rituals, and for contributing funds and labor to projects that the banjar 
collectively agrees to undertake.60 The banjar controls rights to the land on which many 
Balinese families live as well as access to the cemeteries in which they must bury their 
dead, which means that it is crucial for people to maintain good relations with the banjar 
to which they belong.  
Typically, one or several banjar are incorporated into another organization known 
as the desa adat or desa pakraman.61 Defined by Clifford Geertz as “a bit of sacred 
                                                        
58 For a detailed description of the banjar and its social function, see Warren 1993.  
59 Balinese women typically join their husband’s family upon marriage. However, in cases where the 
woman’s family lacks a male heir, the husband may join his wife’s family, a process called sentana. In 
such cases, the two join the wife’s family’s banjar.  
60 The male members of the banjar have regular meetings (sankep) to plan collective projects, resolve 
disputes, and deal with other matters affecting the banjar membership. Some women attend these 
meetings, but only men are required to attend. The women of the banjar (referred to as PKK) would also 
have occasional meetings, and on afternoons they would sometimes gather to sweep and pick up trash 
around the village.   
61 In Bali today the official name for the organization is desa pakraman. I have chosen to use the term 
desa adat because it seems to me to be more widely used, both in Bali and in scholarship on Bali. The 
nature of the relationship between banjar and desa adat can vary significantly, both in terms of 
membership and function. Sometimes the members of a desa adat all belong to the same banjar. More 
often, at least in central Bali, two or more banjar are incorporated into a single desa adat. The difference 
in function between the two institutions has been a subject of debate in the scholarship on Bali. While 
some scholars have framed the desa adat as essentially a religious counterpart to the secular banjar, the 
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space for which a defined group. . . is humanly responsible,” the desa adat is a territory 
that is ritually looked after by a specific community, the krama desa or desa 
membership, which in the case of Tegal, consisted of two neighboring banjar (1980: 
52).62 The primary responsibility of the krama desa is maintaining and worshipping at 
shared temples or pura.63 A pura typically consists of a walled, garden-like space in 
which several tall shrines, or palinggih, are arranged. Each palinggih functions as an 
earthly ‘seat’ for, and a place to present offerings to, a particular spirit or deity. Each 
desa adat is officially required to have a minimum of three basic temples, known as the 
khayangan tiga: an origin temple (pura puseh), a village temple (pura desa), and a 
death temple (pura dalem). Each temple is “activated” (visited by the deities) on 
particular auspicious days throughout the year, and the krama desa are required to 
assist with these ceremonies, by contributing funds, joining in collective prayers, and, 
most importantly, participating in the collective labor of preparing and executing the 
ritual, which they call ngayah (ritual service).  
 Customary institutions like the banjar and desa adat play a fundamental role in 
structuring the social and political life of Balinese communities, both within and beyond 
                                                        
reality is more complex. According to Warren, Balinese often see the banjar as focused on sekala 
(mundane) matters, while the desa adat is focused on matters related to niskala, but at the same time, 
the banjar is, or functions as the desa adat in many instances. Warren thus argues that the banjar should 
be seen as the “practical executor and institutional expression” of the desa adat (1993: 21). This framing 
aligns with my own informants’ statements on the matter. However, in other regions of Bali, the functions 
of the two institutions are organized differently. For example, see Warren 1993: 21, n30.  
62 Geertz refers to the desa adat membership as a pemaksan, a term which refers to a group of people 
who share the responsibility of worshipping at a particular temple or group of temples. In the desa adat 
where I conducted fieldwork, however, the terms pemaksan and krama desa were used to refer to two 
distinct groups. For example, as outlined in the awig-awig for this desa adat, the khayangan tiga are to be 
looked after by the krama desa, while certain other temples located on the desa’s land were looked after 
by pemaksan, groups which did not include all members of the desa adat.   
63 For a more detailed description of the Balinese temple system, see Lansing 1993.  
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what we commonly think of as the religious sphere. Since at least the 19th Century, and 
probably going back much further, the desa adat has always existed in a complex 
relationship with an overarching state. Throughout the many shifts in state power—from 
the small kingdoms of the pre-colonial period, to Dutch colonial rule, through the 
Japanese occupation, and Bali’s eventual incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia—
the banjar and desa adat have never been subsumed into the state apparatus. Instead, 
they have always been recognized as autonomous governing entities. This was true 
even during the New Order when other institutions of local government came under 
increasingly centralized control (Warren 1993).64 
In addition to worshipping at the temples of their desa adat, Balinese families 
may belong to a variety of supra-local organizations that maintain their own temples. 
These include dadia (descent groups), subak (irrigation organizations), and pemaksan 
(temple congregations).65 Modern institutions such as government offices, businesses, 
and schools also commonly maintain their own temples, which are looked after by their 
employees.  
 Although the desa adat continues to be an object of attachment for many 
Balinese people, it has also been subject to internal critique since at least the colonial 
period. In recent years critics have taken aim at so-called kasus adat (adat cases), 
conflicts within or between banjar or desa adat, which typically arise when an individual 
or group is perceived to have contravened adat law (e.g. awig-awig banjar). While these 
                                                        
64 Warren’s (1993) book is an in-depth investigation of relations between adat institutions and the 
Indonesian state during the New Order period.  
65 On dadia, see Geertz and Geertz 1975. On subak, see Lansing 1983.  
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conflicts are not a new phenomenon, they have been exacerbated by recent 
developments, such as land scarcity, tourism development, economic instability and 
inequality, shifting livelihoods, and other issues (Warren 2000). As both scholarly and 
journalistic accounts of Balinese communal conflicts have amply demonstrated, village 
social bonds have an intense affective charge, manifest both in the strong sense of 
mutual obligation that members share, and in the collective outrage that sometimes 
erupts when an individual, family, or other segment of the community is seen as having 
offended the sanctity of the desa adat.  Such transgressions are sometimes met with 
harsh sanctions, such as forcibly preventing the offending group from using the 
communal cemetery or praying at village temples. In the most extreme cases, the group 
may be permanently banished from their village. Many of the harshest sanctions have 
been formally banned by the Parisada, and when they involve violence or destruction of 
property, they are also considered illegal. Nevertheless, they still occur, and adat 
institutions have often shown themselves capable of imposing their will, even in the face 
of riot police. This means that, for the vast majority of Balinese Hindus, one’s ability to 
live a good life crucially depends on maintaining a good relationship with one’s banjar 
by being an active and dedicated participant in collective religious ritual and other banjar 
activities.   
As can be seen from this description, each Balinese person is affiliated with 
several institutions, and as such, is subject to a variety of ritual obligations. The 
obligation to participate in the affairs of the banjar, desa, and other customary 
organizations typically begins at marriage and ends when one’s children are married. 
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However, I witnessed many exceptions to this rule. For example, people who are unable 
to meet their ritual obligations—because of work or relocation to another area—are 
sometimes permitted to provide a monetary payment as a substitute for their labor. In 
addition, elderly people sometimes substitute for their married children, particularly if the 
latter are busy with waged employment. Conversely, unmarried adults may substitute 
for, or even take the place of, their aging parents. Such was the case with the Dangin 
family. By the time I met this family, their father had already passed away and their 
elderly mother had long since ceased to be active in her husband’s banjar, yet all of 
their children were still unmarried. The family’s obligations to their various customary 
institutions were taken up by Kompiang, Made, and Wayan. Kompiang was particularly 
active; she was a specialist in offerings and was frequently called upon to oversee the 
preparations for local rituals.      
Ritual service, or ngayah, is divided by gender. Typically, men prepare 
ceremonial meals and build the larger items needed for the ceremony while the most 
laborious and time-consuming work of preparing the vast quantities of intricate offerings 
falls to the women. In my observation, women generally spend substantially more time 
on voluntary ritual labor than men do.66  
As noted earlier, the overarching purpose of all of this ritual activity is to maintain 
proper relations with the niskala world, primarily by way of presenting offerings and 
prayers to a variety of invisible beings. Each individual type of ritual has its own unique 
                                                        
66 For more on the gendered division of ritual labor in Bali, see Jennaway 2002: 53-55.    
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procedure, and its own set of offerings and other items that must be prepared.67 The 
immense variety and complexity of these rituals is too extensive for me to do it justice 
here, so a brief (and vastly over-simplified) description will have to suffice.68 In general, 
all rituals are preceded by a period of preparation during which offerings are made by 
the members of the group holding the ritual (whether it be a kuren, a banjar, a desa 
adat, or some other institution). On the day of the ritual, a priest presents these offerings 
to the gods by way of mantras and sacred gestures (mudra) and the beneficiaries of the 
ritual join in collective prayers (muspa).   
The details of ritual procedure are closely monitored and, at least in Tegal, they 
follow a well worked out pattern.69 By contrast, discourses about the beings that are the 
beneficiaries of these rituals are far less regulated. I agree with Margaret Wiener’s 
assessment that “it is difficult, and misleading, to render what Balinese have to say 
about divinities, demons, or spirits in systematic form” (1995: 54). To do so is to impose 
order on a body of knowledge that is rife with inconsistencies and uncertainty. As 
Wiener notes, this lack of standardization is due in part to the fact that speaking about 
                                                        
67 Balinese offerings come in an enormous variety of shapes, sizes, and materials. By and large, the 
precise composition of an offering is determined by custom; diverging from custom is risky, though it is 
tolerated to a limited extent. Many offerings are made of palm leaves woven into various intricate shapes. 
These are sometimes combined with flowers and various edible items, such as rice, fruit, coconut. There 
are also ceremonial cakes (jaja) made of rice flower dough, which is dyed in various colors, molded into a 
variety of shapes, and fried. Ceremonial meat (lawar and sate) is also a staple component of all but the 
smallest rituals. Many larger rituals also require the erection of decorative bamboo structures, such as 
penjor.  
68 For a detailed description of a Balinese temple ceremony and the offerings used therein, see Belo 
1953.  
69 Kompiang, at least by her own account, played an integral role in maintaining this order. She kept a 
notebook detailing the precise types and quantities of offerings required for each type of ritual and 
oversaw offering preparation for many rituals in Tegal, ensuring that the offerings conformed to the 
standards laid out in her notebook. For example, once when the village purchased offerings for a large 
ritual from an outside seller, she oversaw the process of going through all of the offerings to ensure that 
nothing was missing.    
  70 
the niskala world is considered dangerous. In addition, discussions of divine power that 
conflict with the monotheistic Hindu theology promoted by the state are largely kept out 
of public religious discourse. Confined to informal discursive contexts, talk about the 
niskala world tends to be richly varied.  
 One arena where beliefs about the niskala world are circulated and standardized 
is through ritual practice. These practices enact a binaristic conception of the niskala 
world, divided into higher beings (deities) and lower beings (spirits or buta kala). These 
two types of invisible beings are each associated with a particular physical realm: higher 
beings are associated with the mountains, lower beings with the sea. These two poles 
represent opposing types of spiritual energy. Humans and other sekala (material) 
beings occupy a middle realm between these two poles. This tripartite division of the 
world is represented physically through various spatial practices. The mountainward 
(kaja) and seaward (kelod) directions form an axis along which village, household, and 
temple space are organized.70 Within a typical customary village, for instance, the three 
basic temples (khayangan tiga) are arranged at different points along this axis 
according to their degree of association with higher and lower powers: origin temples 
are furthest in the mountainward direction, death temples are closest to the sea, and 
village temples are somewhere between the other two. This tripartite arrangement is 
repeated in the architecture and orientation of the temples themselves. A typical 
Balinese temple consists of three compartments, or mandala, aligned along the 
mountainward-seaward axis: an inner sanctuary toward the mountains, an outer 
                                                        
70 For more on Balinese cosmology and its relationship to the organization of sacred space, see Lansing 
1983.  
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courtyard toward the sea, and a transitional space between the other two. Likewise, 
traditional house compounds are made up of three segments with the most sacred area, 
the family temple, located on the mountainward side of the yard.  
The binary division of the niskala world into positive and negative forces is 
reinforced in ritual practice. Many rituals begin with a caru, a ritual for lower beings that 
serves to clear the space of harmful forces, then proceed to a ritual for higher beings.71 
These two phases of the ritual are clearly distinguished from one another. During caru 
rituals, offerings are placed on the ground. These rituals often involve percussive 
noises, laughter, shouting, and unrefined forms of physical activity. Offerings for higher 
beings are placed in elevated shrines, and the portions of the ritual dedicated to them 
have a different sonic character and mood. They involve refined forms of music and 
dance as well as moments of quiet when the congregants engage in collective prayers, 
known as muspa  
The question of who the beings are that Balinese worship can be answered in a 
variety of ways. When speaking of deities, my interlocutors would sometimes draw on 
state discourses that claim that all of the deities worshipped in Bali are manifestations 
(manifestasi) of Sang Hyang Widhi, the supreme god promoted in the monotheistic 
discourses of the Hindu reform, but largely unknown in Bali prior to the mid-20th century. 
People with more theological expertise might also state that Sang Hyang Widi has three 
aspects (trimurti): Siwa, Wisnu, and Brahma. At other times, however, people spoke as 
though the gods that they worship in a particular temple are unique, individual beings, 
                                                        
71 For more about Balinese caru rituals, see Warren 1993: 143-146.  
  72 
who are not the same as the gods worshipped at other temples. The gods associated 
with temple relics, such as Rangda and Barong masks, sometimes have unique names, 
and when the relics are transported, the truck is often decorated and labelled with a sign 
indicating the name of the deity. When guiding worshippers through collective prayers, 
penginter (M.C.’s) seem to combine these two conceptualizations: worshippers are 
instructed to pray to Siwa, but also to the betara betari (gods and goddesses) of that 
particular temple. These discrepancies are not typically seen as contradictory; they are 
different ways of thinking about the divine.  
Discourse about lower beings is also varied, but differently so. Lower beings do 
not typically have individual names. Instead, they may be differentiated by type. The 
most common term for them is buta kala, or simply, buta. This is a general term for 
spirit, which is used to refer to the beings who are propitiated in caru rituals, or buta 
yadnya.   
When speaking to me about the niskala world, members of the Dangin family 
commonly used vague terms rather than indicating the specific individual or type of 
being at issue. Sometimes it was not even clear whether the being they were referring 
to was a deity or a buta. For example, the phrase ada sesuatu disana (there’s 
something there) could refer to a higher or lower being. Similarly, the phrases alam 
akan membantu (the environment will help) or dibantu alam (helped by the 
environment) could refer to the assistance provided by ghosts or gods.72 When referring 
                                                        
72 The Indonesian term alam is often translated as ‘nature’ or ‘natural environment.’ In my interlocutors’ 
usage, however, it had niskala connotations. For example, in speaking about the spirit of their deceased 
father, members of the Dangin family would often say that their father sudah menjadi alam (has already 
become alam).  
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specifically to divine beings, they often used the Indonesian word Tuhan, a general 
(nonsectarian) term for god. In their usage, however, Tuhan could refer either to divine 
energy in a general sense or to a specific deity, as in the phrase Tuhan yang ada di 
sana (the god in that place). They would also sometimes mention the spirit of their 
deceased father, whom they believed was helping them from his ‘other place.’73 We 
already saw Kompiang use the term wong samar (a general term for ghost) to refer to 
the ghost living in their home. When referring to ghosts, members of the family more 
frequently used the term hantu (ghost).  
According to Balinese beliefs, even lower beings have the potential to play a 
helpful role in people’s lives. As Warren has written, and as Kompiang’s comments 
about the wong samar illustrate, lower spirits are benevolent if treated properly (Warren 
1993: 37). Thus, when it comes to thinking about the ways invisible beings act in human 
lives, the binaristic division of the niskala world into benevolent and malevolent beings 
starts to lose its relevance. This has prompted some scholars to contest the notion of a 
clear binary division of the niskala world into positive and negative agents (Wiener 
1995: 53).  Warren has written that buta kala are in fact the negative aspect of dewa; 
rather than two different sets of beings, she claims, they are like two sides of the same 
coin (1993: 143). This interpretation resolves some of the apparent contradictions that 
have emerged in my description thus far. However, it also does away with much of the 
ambiguity and uncertainty that accompanied the images of niskala that emerged in my 
interlocutors’ narratives. Wayan even sometimes joked to me that there was no way of 
                                                        
73 The spirits of deceased ancestors who have undergone cremation rituals are considered divine. 
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knowing whether Balinese worship gods or ghosts. When reacting to signs of invisible 
presence, they could never be sure who they were dealing with. A mysterious knock on 
the roof could be a wong samar, but on another occasion, Kadek heard a similar sound 
and believed it was the deity of a Rangda mask calling him out to dance. What was 
clear beyond any doubt was that my interlocutors’ world is populated by invisible forces 
that have the potential to powerfully shape their lives. In an effort to preserve the 
ambiguous quality of these forces, throughout this dissertation I tend to use 
encompassing terms like “invisible beings” or “god,” rather than more specific terms, 
when referring to the niskala agents that intervene in people’s lives. 
 
Niskala in Everyday Life 
 The forgoing description of Balinese Hindu ritual may give the impression that 
Balinese exchanges with invisible beings make up a complex but ultimately static 
system of intersecting, repeating cycles, which bind successive generations into existing 
social networks in predictable ways while continuously reproducing the same sets of 
material and aesthetic practices. Such an image has indeed been a recurrent theme in 
the scholarship on Bali. The cyclical patterns of ritual exchange certainly do play a key 
role in structuring people’s relationships with invisible beings. However, the scholarly 
tendency to highlight regularity at the expense of devoting attention to the irregular (but 
not infrequent) disruptions and disturbances in these patterns risks creating the 
impression that these relationships are formalized and remote. In fact, my research 
indicates that niskala beings and forces are intimately involved in people’s lives.  
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 While niskala beings are understood to be inaccessible to ordinary humans’ 
senses, they must take semiotic form in order to have social significance. The niskala 
world’s active and intimate presence is thus inseparable from the signifying practices 
that mediate it. Semiotic ideology serves the crucial function of connecting individual 
perceptions and circumstances in the material world to their hidden causes in the 
niskala world. It is through the mediation of semiotic ideology that the running toilet, the 
sound of footsteps, and Wayan’s mysterious fatigue can cohere into an interconnected 
representational economy, such that they mutually reinforce one another and sustain 
the niskala world as a real and active force in people’s lives.  
 This semiotic ideology is particularly revealed in what I will call, following 
Christina Schwenkel, practices of myth-making: the creation and re-telling of personal 
stories about encounters with niskala beings (2017). We saw several examples of this 
kind of myth-making in the opening section of this chapter. As Kompiang and I listened 
to the sound of the toilet running in the dark bathroom, she located the sound within a 
longer history of unusual occurrences, which included ghostly footsteps, Made’s mental 
illness, and other misfortunes. The loud noise on the ceiling added a new, somewhat 
more dramatic chapter to this evolving narrative, prompting some family members to 
decide that it was time to “do something.” Later that night, Kompiang presented an 
offering to the wong samar, consisting of a tiny glass of coffee, a cigarette, and a piece 
of candy. Wayan and Putu “talked seriously” about the incident, and, Kompiang later 
told me, she and her son made tentative plans to organize a ritual to ask the ghost what 
  76 
it wants from the family. Together, the various pieces of this narrative, including the 
sounds and objects to which it refers, sustain the wong samar’s presence in their midst.    
 Practices of myth-making situate unique perceptions and experiences that are 
proximate to the speaker within a more generalized body of knowledge about the 
niskala world, which includes knowledge about how invisible beings are made 
perceptible to the human senses, the times and places where these beings are 
particularly active, as well as the types of activities that are likely to provoke a response 
from them. As with the example of the wong samar, often the catalyst for acts of myth-
making about the niskala world is a mysterious or surprising sensory experience. 
Sounds are particularly fertile in this regard. Certain animal sounds are believed to be 
signs of ghostly presence, but as we’ve already seen, even ordinary sounds can take on 
significance when they elude sekala (mundane) explanations.74   
 Although the niskala world is not confined to particular locations, the beings that 
inhabit it are believed to frequent certain types of places more than others. Gods are 
believed to favor visually striking locations, such as cliffs, coastlines, mountainsides, 
and natural springs.75 Ghosts, on the other hand, are said to dwell in crossroads, 
graveyards, rivers, and uninhabited areas. Balinese call these places tenget (haunted, 
spiritually charged). At once beautiful and eerie, such places prompt a visceral 
                                                        
74 In particular, the sounds of dogs howling and the call of a particular frog are believed to be signs that 
ghosts are near.  
75 As Rachelle Rubinstein describes in her study of literary depictions of the act of poetic composition in 
ancient kakawin poetry, these kinds of places are described in these writings as sites of poetic inspiration 
due to the divine presence believed to reside therein, a presence revealed to the poet in the profound 
beauty of the landscape. According to these depictions, such locations were sought out by poets, but 
avoided by ordinary people, for whom approaching the divine in this way would be dangerous. See 
Rubinstein 2000: 103-120.  
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response. Often likened to a chill on the surface of the skin, this sensation is said to 
indicate the presence of invisible beings. Places that provoke this sensation are often 
avoided if possible, especially at night or at inauspicious times. Since they afford a 
potentially dangerous proximity to the niskala world, tenget places often attract regular 
ritual attention, which aims to ensure that their invisible inhabitants do not cause trouble 
for the people who live and work nearby. Village crossroads, for example, are a 
common site for collective caru ceremonies, while the striking landscapes preferred by 
deities are often chosen as sites for temple construction.76 The day when a temple is 
established is called its odalan. When the same day returns each calendar cycle, the 
gods of the temple are invited to inhabit their shrines and receive offerings and prayers 
from their human devotees. Both caru and odalan ceremonies aim to ensure human 
wellbeing by maintain proper relations between the visible and invisible inhabitants of a 
territory. In addition to being targeted for ritual activity, tenget places are also common 
settings for sensory encounters with niskala beings. The ceremonies and performances 
that take place at temples and crossroads are common sites for episodes of kerauhan 
(trance, spirit possession). In addition, when anything out of the ordinary is heard or 
seen in these locations, it is often taken as a manifestation of the invisible forces that 
inhabit the area. For example, when I saw an atlas moth during a ceremony at Besakih 
temple, my companions told me it was ‘from the temple’ (i.e. a divine being).  
 In addition to favoring particular places, invisible beings are also believed to be 
especially active at particular times. For example, the transitional points of the day are 
                                                        
76 As a perusal of Bali postcards quickly illustrates, many of the island’s largest and most famous temples 
are found near unique features of the landscape. 
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considered inauspicious; people tend to avoid going out or undertaking other risky 
activities at noon, dusk, and midnight, believing that dangerous invisible forces are at 
work during these times. Days can also be more or less auspicious depending on their 
location in the calendar. Balinese Hindus have their own 210-day calendrical system, 
which they use to identify appropriate times to undertake ceremonies and other 
important activities. This calendar is composed of cycles of varying lengths, which 
periodically coincide. The days when cycles coincide are considered particularly 
important.77 For example, the day when the start of the 3-day cycle coincides with that 
of the 5-day cycle is known as kajeng kliwon. Households must put on a small ritual and 
the day is generally considered somewhat creepy.   
 The likelihood that a sensory perception will be experienced as a sign of invisible 
presence, and thus become a catalyst for myth-making, varies depending on the time 
and location where the perception took place. When significant, this information is often 
included in people’s narratives about niskala beings, as it heightens the sense that the 
sound or other sensation was in fact a sign from the invisible world. Another factor that 
may push people toward this kind of myth-making is engagement in, or awareness of, 
activities that are known to upset invisible beings. When such a transgression has been 
made, any strange or unfortunate occurrences that follow are likely to be scrutinized as 
possible evidence of divine or ghostly offense. Diverging from ritual customs is one 
activity that frequently triggers myth-making of this kind. I encountered an example of 
this when Tegal held a mass cremation ceremony in 2014. I knew from conversations 
                                                        
77 For more on the Balinese calendar, see Geertz 1973b.  
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with Kompiang that there was some contention around the offerings for this ceremony. 
Ada yang mau beli, ada yang mau bikin (there are those who want to buy [the offerings], 
and there are those who want to make them), she told me. In the end, the community 
decided to purchase offerings from a seller in another village. Kompiang was involved in 
the painstaking process of checking all of the offerings to ensure that nothing was 
missing, a task which, for a ceremony of this size, must have been quite daunting. On 
the day of the ceremony I walked with her to the center of the village where the 
procession and burning of the sarcophagi would take place. Shortly after we arrived, an 
elderly woman came rushing toward us looking distressed. Apa kuwang? (what’s 
missing?), Kompiang asked her. They conversed for a moment and then we all rushed 
to the second floor of the banjar meeting hall (bale banjar) where some of the offerings 
were being stored. The two of them immediately began assembling the missing 
offerings, giving me a quick demonstration so that I could also help. When we finished, 
Kompiang and I watched the procession, which went smoothly enough. As the bodies 
were being burned, however, one of the village temples caught fire. When I spoke to 
Kompiang about it the next day, it was clear to her that the fire had something to do with 
the changes that had been made to the usual procedure for cremations in Tegal. She 
speculated that the fire had happened because the gods in her village did not accept 
the way the ceremony was carried out this time, either because the offerings were 
different, or because the bodies of people of different castes were cremated together, 
an increasingly common practice, but one not typically done in Tegal.   
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 Building is another activity that is likely to upset invisible beings. Since empty 
patches of land are common dwelling places for ghosts, clearing or developing land can 
upset human-niskala relations. When something unusual happens in the once-empty 
location where a new building now stands, this is likely to be interpreted as a sign from 
the land’s invisible inhabitants. The Dangin family’s narratives about the wong samar fit 
into this category of myth-making, since the piece of land that the ghost is believed to 
occupy was known to be haunted long before the new house was built. A similar 
narrative emerged around the strip of land that bordered the eastern edge of the Dangin 
family’s property. This land had once been a small road leading to the center of the 
village, but by the time I met this family, the road was closed off and the yards bordering 
it were expanded to fill the space. At the time of my fieldwork only a stone wall 
separated the Dangin family’s yard from that of their eastern neighbor, and the space 
where the road had once been was cut across by the walls that bound the southern and 
northern edges of the row of house yards. Sometime after the road was closed, the 
neighbors to the east created a small opening in the walls that closed off the road, and 
they also erected a shrine where the road had been and began making regular offerings 
to the spirits who, they believed, were using the path. Wayan told me that this was 
because the neighbors believed the closing of the road had angered the spirits, since it 
prevented them from moving freely through the space. The hole was cut in the wall to 
facilitate their movement. When I asked him what had given the neighbors this 
impression he guessed that it was because one of them had gotten sick, but he was 
unsure of the exact reason.  
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 These acts of myth-making about encounters with niskala involve an effort to link 
effects in the material world to causes in the niskala world. Blending together unique 
experiences and general knowledge about niskala beings, these stories draw from, and 
feed into, a mutually reinforcing economy of signs, which together serve to reproduce 
the sense that these beings are a consequential force in human lives; this in turn 
reinforces the need to take precautions in order to avoid coming to harm. Since these 
precautions often take the form of cycles of ritual exchange, we might expect that the 
relationships they mediate are fairly static and formalized. In fact, however, these 
stories highlight the dynamic quality of these relationships. Although instances like the 
mass cremation discussed above, where a village decided to make a significant 
departure from customary practice may be fairly rare, it is nonetheless the case that 
variation and change are an unavoidable feature of Balinese ritual practices. For one 
thing, many Balinese rituals are so complex and involve so many people, offerings, and 
other variables, that it is virtually impossible to ensure that things are done exactly the 
same way each time. As we saw, despite Kompiang’s best efforts to ensure that nothing 
was kuwang (missing) when Tegal purchased cremation offerings from an outside 
supplier, she nonetheless pointed to the offerings as a likely cause of deities’ anger (the 
offerings for a cremation ceremony may simply be too numerous and varied to be fully 
accounted for). Furthermore, Balinese Hindus are under pressure (ideological and 
economic) to simplify their rituals, meaning that they often choose to diverge from 
tradition in order to save resources and conform with new norms. For these reasons, 
ritual exchanges always vary from one iteration to the next, in both intentional and 
  82 
unintentional ways. One consequence of these variations is that the success of ritual is 
never guaranteed.  
 Kompiang’s story about the wong samar illustrates another source of instability in 
human-niskala relations, namely, that the demands that invisible beings impose on 
humans may change at any time. Now that everyone can eat, she surmises, the ghost 
may expect a contribution. This statement recognizes that her family’s relationships with 
niskala beings are tied to the dynamics of their life in the material world. As the family’s 
economic situation improves, the ways they interact with niskala beings may also need 
to be adjusted. Her narrative thus highlights the dynamic interrelatedness of the visible 
and invisible worlds. 
 The various forms of instability woven into people’s narratives about the invisible 
world sustain the impression that this world is ultimately unpredictable. To ensure their 
continued wellbeing, people must not only do what they can to maintain ongoing ritual 
customs, but they must also be attentive to signs that such practices are falling short or 
require revision. To succeed at this, people must be attuned to particular kinds of 
sensory cues. The Dangin family’s evolving narrative about the wong samar’s 
involvement in their lives, as well as their more general knowledge about the potential 
consequences of constructing on land known to be tenget, make them sensitive to 
sounds and other mysterious occurrences that might otherwise pass unnoticed. Acts of 
myth-making about the niskala world thus serve to maintain certain forms of embodied 
sensory attunement. At the same time, the sensations that attuned bodies perceive 
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become fodder for further acts of myth-making. Representational economies and 
embodied dispositions thus mutually sustain one another.  
 
Indexical Communication and the Management of Masalah Niskala 
 As we can see from these examples, the solution to the dangers posed by 
niskala beings is not simply to avoid haunted places—this, in any case, is impossible, 
since nearly any place could potentially be haunted. Instead, the solution is to establish 
and maintain proper relationships with the invisible beings that live in one’s midst. 
Accordingly, people’s sensory attunement to the invisible world is shaped by their sense 
of being relationally entangled with invisible agents and forces. In other words, people 
are attentive to signs of invisible beings not only because they fear or want to avoid 
them, but also because of what these signs may indicate about their ongoing 
relationships with them. Particularly when it comes to the deities and ghosts that dwell 
in domestic spaces, people must be attentive to signs that a relationship has begun to 
fray and needs repair, and they must be prepared to respond appropriately.  
 My interlocutors approach the ongoing exchanges that mediate their 
relationships with the niskala world as forms of indexical communication that serve to 
define and maintain that relationship. An index is a sign that points to or indicates 
something in the communicative context, often by means of an existential, causal, or 
proximal connection with the thing being signified (Keane 2003: 413). Indexical 
communication encompasses a wide range of subtle communicative acts, from the use 
of speech registers or styles of dress to index social class to the ways that vocal 
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inflections and facial expressions can index a speaker’s emotional state. In addition to 
defining individual identities, indexical communication is also widely used as a means of 
defining the relationship between parties to an interaction.78  
 One important way people use indexical communication to establish and 
maintain cordial relations with social others is through asking questions. In Bali this is 
called metakon.79  Often this practice draws on a stock of standard questions, such as 
kal kije? (where are you going?), be ngajeng? (have you eaten?), or simply enken? 
(how are you?); other times the question might be more personal or specific. In either 
case, the questioning functions less as a means of obtaining information and more as a 
means of indexing the speaker’s acknowledgment and respect toward the addressee. 
This kind of acknowledgment is essential to maintaining amicable social relations, both 
within the domestic sphere and outside it. To fail to ask when one ought to do so is to 
nengil (be silent), an act which is often considered offensive.80 People who are 
particularly tight-lipped with regard to greetings are described as being saklek 
(arrogant). Members of the Dangin family often attached this epithet to a family who 
lived a few doors down the road to the south. They said that when they’d pass each 
                                                        
78 Although Goffman does not use this term, his work provides extensive illustrations of this process 
(1959).  
79 Another pervasive form of indexical communication in Bali is the use of language levels to code status 
relationships. Balinese speakers use alus (High Balinese) vocabulary when speaking to people of higher 
caste or status than themselves, and they use kasar (lower speech registers) when speaking to people of 
equal or lower status, or people with whom they are on intimate terms. The use of a particular language 
level is thus an index of the status differential between the two parties to the interaction.  
80 ‘Asking’ is not necessarily reciprocal. More often, it reproduces social difference. For example, my 
observations suggest that female family members are expected to initiate conversation by asking male 
relatives if they’ve eaten. If they do not do so, male family members may feel offended. On the other 
hand, male family members will often ask such questions of female relatives as well, but the stakes do 
not seem to be as high if they fail to do so.  
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other on the street, members of that household would simply stare straight ahead and 
not ‘ask’ anything, behavior which my friends saw as being exceptionally rude. They 
often spoke negatively of that household, claiming they were stingy. When one of the 
elderly women of that household fell ill I went with Kompiang to pay her a visit. I didn’t 
notice anything particularly unusual in their behavior, but as we were walking home 
Kompiang remarked disapprovingly that none of them had ‘asked’ me anything during 
our visit. Metakon, then, is a way of showing respect and consideration for others, while 
failing to do so (nengil) can give others the insulting impression that they are not 
considered to be deserving of respect. In Bali, as elsewhere, indexes play a crucial role 
in structuring and defining social relationships, while semiotic ideology functions to 
stabilize the meaning of indexes, turning evanescent details of interaction into signs of 
“respect” or “disrespect.”   
Within the household sphere, a breakdown in the normal flow of asking was often 
employed as an indexical expression of anger.81 Balinese discourage expressing anger 
directly, relying instead on indexical communication to make their feelings known. For 
example, sometimes Kompiang would maintain a conspicuous silence toward her 
younger brother Wayan. Following their father’s death Wayan became acting head of 
the family. Kompiang did the shopping and prepared meals for the family, with some 
help from her aging mother. She expected Wayan to provide money for these 
purchases, an unspoken duty which he did not consistently fulfill. When the money ran 
short, Kompiang would become very angry at Wayan, and she would often 
                                                        
81 This is sometimes called puik.  
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communicate that anger to me. In her view, it was his responsibility to anticipate and 
fulfill her needs, so that she would not have to go through the humiliation of explicitly 
asking him for money.  Therefore, rather than confront him directly, she expressed her 
frustration indirectly, through silence. As in the case of the saklek neighbors, this conflict 
arises because one party feels that they are not receiving the level of respect that is due 
to them. In this case, Wayan’s failure to consistently provide money is not only 
inconvenient to Kompiang, but, as was clear from her conversations with me, it was also 
interpreted by her as an indexical sign that Wayan does not value or respect her 
contribution to the family.  
It was not uncommon for Kompiang’s silences toward Wayan to pervade the 
household, creating a heavy sense of unease and coldness that made conversation 
difficult, even between family members not directly embroiled in the conflict. Sometimes 
these quiet phases would gradually dissipate. Other times they were broken by the 
sudden sound of Wayan’s zippo lighter or cell phone crashing down on the hard tile 
floor. Loud noises are another way of indexically expressing anger. In extreme cases, 
these expressions would force the conflict into the light. In other cases, however, loud 
noises served as a subtler expression of frustration, similar to Kompiang’s silence. For 
instance, someone might set down an object more heavily than usual, as a sign that 
they are bothered by something (see Chapter 2). Both the weighty silences and the 
sudden noises index an angry emotional state.  
 As has been discussed already, the primary means by which people manage 
their relationships with invisible beings is through forms of ritual exchange. Like the 
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practice of metakon discussed above, these rituals—and especially the offerings 
presented during them—function as indexes of deference toward the deities and spirits 
to whom they are addressed. For example, whenever someone builds a new structure, 
they must follow this up with a plaspas ceremony, which serves to establish an 
appropriately deferential relationship between the visible and invisible beings that 
occupy the area where the new structure was built. We have already noted how places 
that are known to be tenget often become sites of ritual exchange. These landscapes 
can also provoke more spontaneous expressions of deference toward the spirit world. 
For example, when driving past tenget places, Balinese motorists often beep their 
horns. Described as ‘asking permission,’ this practice aims to protect the driver from 
spiritual harm. Balinese friends of mine can identify many tenget places along Bali’s 
roadways, as well as the particular style of beeping associated with them: in some 
locations, I was told, a single short and rather perfunctory beep is the norm, while in 
others, erratic sequences of louder longer beeps are often heard, particularly at night. 
The purpose of these sounds is to acknowledge the authority of invisible agents within 
particular kinds of places. By ‘asking permission,’ the driver indexically communicates 
their respect for the spirits or deities believed to inhabit the area. This practice could 
therefore be said to lie on a continuum with the practices of ritual exchange mentioned 
above, all of which make use of indexes to mediate and manage relationships with 
invisible beings.  The construction of shrines and temples and the regular placement of 
offerings there constitutes the more formalized end of a spectrum which includes this 
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practice of beeping as well as other informal exchanges, such as burning incense or 
uttering mantras.      
People seem to rely on some of the same semiotic practices and forms of 
sensory attunement in managing relationships with invisible beings as they do in 
managing mundane social relationships. In both communicative contexts, continuous 
signs of acknowledgment and respect must be conveyed in order to avoid causing 
offense, while at the same time, maintaining the appropriate level of deference for each 
interaction requires reading subtle indexical cues. Particularly when it comes to the less 
formalized interactions people have with the niskala world, even the indexes used are 
sometimes similar to those used in ordinary social interaction. Beeping one’s motorbike 
horn, for example, can be a sign of acknowledgment for a ghost or a human 
acquaintance.82 Likewise, a sudden noise can be a sign of dissatisfaction across both 
sekala and niskala communicative contexts. That said, there are also important 
differences between these two sets of mediatory practices. For example, when people 
express dissatisfaction in their relations with other people, it is not uncommon for the 
target of their dissatisfaction to become indignant. The latter may feel that the other’s 
expectations are inappropriate or excessive. For this reason, indirect expressions of 
dissatisfaction, like Kompiang’s silence, bring interpersonal rifts to light, but only rarely 
lead to a true resolution. Wayan, rather than simply acquiescing to the demands implied 
in Kompiang’s disgruntled silences, would often contest them, complaining to me that if 
                                                        
82 This must be understood in the context of local practice. While in the US beeping one’s horn is most 
often a sign of aggression, in Bali it is very common for people to beep horns at one another as a friendly 
greeting. Beeping one’s horn can thus be understood as continuous with the practice of metakon 
described earlier.  
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she needs money, she should just ask him. By contrast, relations with the niskala world 
are always deferential. Therefore, I never witnessed anyone respond with resentment to 
perceived demands of spirits. They may be skeptical about the authenticity of those 
demands, and they may question the signs that stand for them (e.g. the mysterious 
sound of water flowing through pipes may simply be an electrical malfunction and not a 
hazy person who wants to ‘ask for something’). However, if the nature and authenticity 
of the demands is not in doubt, then people will accept them as their obligation. 
Therefore, when signs of dissatisfaction come from the invisible world, they do not 
provoke the same kind of tension that they do in the human social sphere. In fact, as 
noted earlier, such signs may actually ease social tension as people are brought 
together by their shared sense of obligation toward niskala beings.  
Much as people are sensitive to subtle signs of trouble in their relationships with 
neighbors and family members, they are also sensitive to indexes that could indicate 
that they are not being sufficiently deferential toward invisible beings. Kompiang’s 
attunement to the sounds of her household plumbing system is a case in point. By 
framing these sounds as a sign that the wong samar wants to ask for something, she is 
sensitive to the ongoing circulation of a whole range of indexical cues. The new house, 
for example, is a sign that her family is better off financially. This newfound wealth may 
in turn be interpreted by the wong samar as a sign that the family is attending to its own 
needs while neglecting the invisible beings with whom they share a home. In other 
words, now that the family is comfortable (now that everyone can eat), they may need to 
do more to make the wong samar feel acknowledged. Kompiang’s interpretation 
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illustrates that the intimate, dynamic quality of people’s relationships with invisible 
beings makes them similar in many ways to ordinary (human) social relationships.  
In addition to mysterious noises, adverse events, such as illness and death, can 
also index problems in the niskala realm, motivating people to act to prevent further 
misfortune. In such cases, people will often consult a medium (balian) to determine the 
cause of the misfortune and the proper response. Several years prior to the start of my 
fieldwork, a priest who lived to the south of my host family lost a young son in a 
motorbike accident. The priest consulted a balian who told him that his son’s spirit was 
living in a small ravine located on the edge of the Dangin family’s land. He was told that 
the gods liked the area and had taken his son to live with them there and look after the 
place. In response to this information, the priest built a shrine in that location and began 
presenting offerings there. He did this without seeking permission from the Dangin 
family, and the shrine soon became a point of contention between them. When a tree 
collapsed on the shrine the Dangin family took the opportunity to reclaim the land, 
seeking support from the village head. The priest asked permission to rebuild the 
shrine, but the Dangin family denied this and the priest relented. This meant that the 
priest was prevented from maintaining the ritual exchanges he had initiated in response 
to his son’s death.  
As can be seen from these examples, maintaining proper relationships with 
invisible beings requires much more than unreflective repetition of handed down 
practices. Not only do Balinese Hindus have to ensure that they do not neglect or fall 
short in their ritual duties, but they have to make choices about what exactly those 
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duties are. This involves being attentive to signs of breakdown in human-niskala 
relationships, determining the cause of problems when they arise, and enacting an 
appropriate response. It also involves compromise as people must strike an appropriate 
balance between the needs and demands of humans and those of gods and spirits. 
Despite their best efforts, people often fall short. These shortcomings are given material 
form in unusual and unfortunate events, which can serve as warnings and guidance 
when relationships with the invisible world have begun to unravel.  
While the majority of interactions between human and invisible worlds take the 
form of indexical communication, it is also possible for spirits and deities to 
communicate with humans through direct verbal demands. This can happen, for 
example, during outbreaks of trance.83 While this was not something that I witnessed 
during my fieldwork, I did come across many newspaper articles describing events of 
this kind. For instance, in the late summer and fall of 2014, the Indonesian-language 
newspaper Nusa Bali ran a series of articles about spontaneous outbreaks of 
kesurupan (spirit possession). Called peristiwa niskala (invisible world incidents), these 
events took place not in temples, but in schools and government offices. (The unusual 
location was probably the reason these events were considered newsworthy.) As an 
example, I will briefly summarize the coverage of three incidents that took place in 
September at a high school in the city of Amlapura.84 These news stories, and the acts 
                                                        
83 For a detailed discussion of trance as a feature of religious rituals in Bali, see Belo 1960.  
84 My descriptions of these events are taken from the following newspaper articles: “Gedung Belum 
Dipelaspas, Belasan Murid SMA Parisadha Kesurupan,” Nusa Bali, September 21, 2014; “Lagi, 8 Siswa 
Kesurupan,” Nusa Bali, September 23, 2014; “Peristiwa Kerauhan Ketiga di SMA Parisadha, 7 Korban 
Lari ke Kantor Bupati,” Nusa Bali, September 25, 2014. 
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of myth-making presented in them, provide a useful illustration of how sensory 
experiences can catalyze a sudden change in how people perceive their relationships 
with invisible beings, as well as the difficulties that can emerge when planning and 
carrying out an appropriate response to such changes.  
At approximately 11AM on September 21st a female student at Parisadha high 
school began screaming hysterically. She and fourteen other students then became 
possessed. One of the students began pointing at objects and places around her saying 
that they were leteh (ritually unclean). With the help of a priest and some offerings, the 
students were soon revived, but the school principal cancelled classes for the rest of the 
day as a precaution. The secretary of the foundation that owns the school told the 
newspaper that he’s convinced that this incident occurred because a temple spirit that 
inhabited the school grounds was disappointed due to the school staff’s failure to 
perform several important rituals when the school was constructed. He admitted that the 
school building had not been given a plaspas ceremony before being used for 
instruction, as would usually be required in Balinese ritual practice. He also 
acknowledged that the land on which the school was built was previously a rice field, 
but that the school hadn’t performed the necessary rituals to Dewi Sri, the goddess of 
fertility, when the land was converted.  Aside from this, he said, the school grounds 
have long been known to be tenget. The land is located on a hill beside the city forest 
and crosscut by two streams that meet in the middle of the schoolyard before joining a 
nearby river, he explained. He also noted that the school had not been given a 
purification ceremony after it flooded five years prior.  
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On September 23rd, a second peristiwa niskala was reported at the same high 
school. At around 7:30AM eight students began screaming hysterically, their bodies 
thrashing as they fell into a trance. One of the students ordered all of the teachers at the 
school to construct a large shrine (palinggih) and conduct a purification ceremony on 
the school grounds. The school principal denied that there was an “invisible world 
problem” (masalah niskala) at the school, noting that the staff held routine purification 
ceremonies there every 210 days.  
On September  25th, Parisadha High School witnessed a third outbreak of spirit 
possession. At 9AM eight students began screaming and then ran to the regent’s office, 
which was located beside the school. The trance victims pointed to a large banyan tree 
outside the office, which they claimed was tenget. One of the students instructed the 
office staff to build a palinggih near the tree. “What use are your big salaries if you can’t 
even afford to make a palinggih?” the spirit asked. The possessed students then ran to 
the city forest stopping at a place where a young pregnant woman had hung herself a 
few months prior. School staff told the reporter that they believed these students went 
into trance because the spirit of the young woman had entered their bodies. One of the 
spirits (speaking through a possessed student) ordered the regent’s office staff to build 
a palinggih near the spot where the woman had died and to place offerings there every 
day. The staff promised to fulfill the spirit’s requests. The paper noted that the school 
principal had fallen ill and was not available for comment.     
In this series of events, spirits speaking through the voices of entranced students 
make demands for more ritual attention from the people who work in the areas they 
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inhabit (the school and regent’s office staff). These demands initiate a process of 
reflection on the part of the spirits’ addressees. As quoted in the September 21st article, 
one of the school administrators referred to this process of reflection as introspeksi diri 
(roughly, ‘self-introspection’). He said that the incident had “reminded us to engage in 
more introspeksi diri and be more cautious, so that, a short time from now, we perform 
the plaspas and purification ceremonies.” As I describe in later chapters, introspeksi diri 
is a common phrase in Indonesian moral discourse. Hindu reformers use the phrase to 
denote the practice of making a personal accounting of one’s actions in light of an 
overarching moral code. The kind of reflection the administrator is capturing, however, 
is somewhat different. When people respond to peristiwa niskala, they reflect on an 
evolving relationship between humans and invisible beings. Instead of assessing 
whether particular actions align with or transgress a pre-existing code, they must think 
of their actions in relation to a dynamic set of demands and expectations, which are 
subject to change at any time. Introspeksi diri, in this sense, means interpreting signs 
from the invisible world in order to anticipate new demands before they go unmet and 
result in misfortune. This is less about following a code than maintaining a delicate 
balance.    
As we can see from these examples, people’s relational entanglement with 
invisible beings is mediated by signs that define that relationship. Communication flows 
in both directions. Humans index their deference and consideration for invisible beings 
through offerings, prayers, and by beeping their horns. Meanwhile, niskala beings 
respond to these signs in a variety of ways. A mysterious noise, an illness, or an 
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outbreak of trance—any of these could be an index of divine or spiritual offense. On the 
other hand, wealth and other signs of good fortune can be indexes of divine approval, 
an issue which I discuss in more detail in the next chapter.  
These examples also show that there are many factors that can lead to a 
breakdown in human-niskala relations. One factor has to do with the ambiguity of the 
signs that mediate these relations. Although the peristiwa niskala described above 
involved explicit verbal demands, determining a proper response nonetheless gave rise 
to debate. As we saw, the school principal denies that there is an “invisible world 
problem” at the school and resists the idea that the school has fallen short in its ritual 
obligations. Meanwhile, the regent’s office staff readily agree to meet the spirits’ 
demands. (It’s noteworthy that after the principal made these claims he fell ill, an 
outcome which could be seen as an additional sign of the need for some sort of ritual 
correction). This shows that even when signs from the invisible world take explicit verbal 
form, determining their human implications and identifying a proper response is often a 
contentious matter. The inherently social and collective process of dealing with ‘invisible 
world problems’ means that these efforts require negotiation between different parties. 
One party’s efforts to be cautious and responsive may, in some cases, be blocked by 
another party who has authority over the necessary resources, as in the case of the 
priest’s efforts to appropriately respond to his son’s death. These elements of 
instability—the inherently dynamic, unpredictable character of invisible beings’ 
expectations and demands, and the frequent inability of humans to properly meet those 
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demands—motivate and sustain people’s sensory attunement to the various indexical 
and verbal signs that mediate their relationships with invisible beings.    
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown that invisible beings are an intimate part of everyday 
life in contemporary Bali. Through their acts of myth-making, as well as their 
communicative exchanges with deities and ghosts, Balinese Hindus create and inhabit 
a shared lifeworld in which their wellbeing depends on maintaining proper relations with 
invisible beings. The invisible world is made present in people’s lives through a set of 
interconnected signifying practices: a representational economy. What holds these 
signifying practices together, making them cohere, is a semiotic ideology that posits 
certain sensory perceptions as messages from the invisible world.  Apprehended 
through the lens of this semiotic ideology, unusual and misfortunate perceptions and 
occurrences function as indexes of human-divine relationships, and these indexes 
provide opportunities for people to monitor and manage their relationships with invisible 
beings.   
 Because these relationships are unstable, they require vigilant attention. The 
need to monitor them thus gives rise to particular forms of sensory attunement. Drawing 
both on their shared knowledge about the niskala world, and from more mundane social 
skills of indexical communication, people work to define, manage, and (when needed) 
repair their relationships with invisible beings. Their sense of being relationally 
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entangled with invisible beings, like their experience of social relationships in the visible 
world, is deeply felt and embodied.  
 Insofar as the Dangin family’s relationship with the wong samar can be 
considered an ethical project, the mysterious sounds of their plumbing system can be 
conceptualized as ethical affordances, which enable the ethical work of keeping that 
relationship in balance. In the next chapter, I show how signs from the invisible world 
afford opportunities for another kind of ethical activity, that of casting moral judgment. 
Building on my argument that human-niskala relations are dynamic and affectively 
charged, I show that they also form the basis for a set of evaluative practices that help 
Balinese Hindus navigate a complex moral world. My discussion further supports this 
chapter’s claim that invisible beings have profound social significance in contemporary 
Bali. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ETHICS OF DIVINE BLESSING 
Hot Ears 
 One morning I went out to the kitchen to make myself some coffee. Kompiang 
was there and I heard her say something angrily under her breath. Bagaimana? 
(Excuse me?) I asked. Panas kuping ibu! (My ears are hot!) she said, laughing slightly, 
but clearly annoyed. Oh, karena itu? (Oh, because of that?), I asked, tilting my head 
towards the west where a pair of construction workers were working and talking loudly. 
Ya (Yeah), she answered.  
 The Dangin Family shared their plot of land with another family. Since the other 
family lived on the western portion of the land, they often referred to them simply as 
dauh (west) so I will call them the Dauh family. During my fieldwork, the Dauh family 
built a new bathroom and kitchen on their share of the land. They hired a man named 
Agung, another relative who lived in a neighboring village, to do the work. Agung was a 
large, gregarious man. He would arrive early each morning, accompanied by his wife, 
who served as his assistant, and the two would engage the members of the Dauh family 
in conversation. Over the course of these construction projects, the sound of Agung’s 
booming voice became a common source of complaint among the members of the 
Dangin family.  
 “Doesn’t he realize how annoying he is?,” Kompiang asked me rhetorically. Then 
she did a pantomime to show me how she had loudly set down a heavy pot to 
communicate to them that she was irritated. “I almost went over there [to complain],” 
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she continued, “because I know Wayan just went to bed.” (Wayan had come home late 
after gambling all night).  
 As I would come to discover, the problem that the Dangin family had with 
Agung’s talking was not, primarily, that it disturbed their sleep. Their complaints were 
part of a larger conflict between the Dangin and Dauh families. Observing this conflict 
provided insight into their ethical lives, how they make judgments and how they work to 
achieve what Wayan called “a good life.”   
 The Dangin and Dauh families are the descendants of two brothers: Gusti Aji, the 
grandfather of the Dangin family, who passed away in 2007, and his eldest brother 
Gusti Rai, who at the time of this writing is still alive. In addition to Gusti Rai, the Dauh 
family consisted of Gusti Rai’s wife, their son and his wife, whom I shall call Jero Made, 
and two granddaughters. Toward the end of my fieldwork Jero Made became pregnant, 
and she later gave birth to a son.      
 According to Wayan, when his father and uncle were both single, they were very 
close. They were both musicians and performed together constantly. However, when 
they married, tensions arose because their wives did not get along. Wayan and his 
siblings despised their uncle’s wife, and they told me many stories of her suspicious 
activities and cruel behavior. They believed she was a witch and that she had caused 
the deaths of several siblings who died before birth or in early childhood. As the rift 
between the two brothers grew, they stopped speaking to each other. They made peace 
when Gusti Aji was on his deathbed, but the conflict was passed on to the younger 
generation.  
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 The main fuel of the ongoing conflict is the shared piece of land that the two 
families inhabit. In Tegal, land is inherited by male offspring. Each plot of land is divided 
unequally: the oldest male sibling inherits the largest share and also bears more 
responsibilities; he is known as the pengarep. Younger siblings inherit smaller pieces of 
land and fewer responsibilities; they are known as pengempi. According to this 
framework, the Dauh family should have inherited a larger portion of the land. However, 
at some point in the past Gusti Rai could not afford to pay taxes on the land. According 
to Wayan, the two brothers agreed to switch roles: Gusti Aji became the pengarep; he 
paid the taxes on the land and took care of a third brother who never married and could 
not support himself, and in exchange, his descendants inherited the larger piece of land 
and also took over the middle brother’s land when he passed away. As a result of this 
arrangement, the Dangin side of the family currently occupies more than twice as much 
land as the Dauh side. Another outcome that the Dangin family attributes to this 
agreement is Gusti Aji’s early death. As Wayan explained it to me, when Gusti Aji 
agreed to take on Gusti Rai’s responsibilities, the younger brother predicted that he 
would die before his older brother as a consequence of this change in roles. From the 
point of view of Gusti Aji’s descendants, the fact that this has in fact come to pass 
permanently seals the agreement as well as the change in land ownership that it 
entailed.  
 The Dangin family’s land surrounds the Dauh family’s land on two sides: east 
and south. At the time when I first met these families, the Dauh family had only two 
structures on their land: a cement block house which served as their living quarters and 
  101 
a mud and thatch kitchen where they prepared their food. The Dangin family, by 
contrast, had a nearly complete traditional house compound: a bale daja, bale dangin, a 
kitchen (built of cement blocks rather than thatch), and a mrajan. They also had the 
foundations for a bale dauh and the walls for the future guest house, both of which were 
later completed. Because some of these buildings—the mrajan in particular—need to be 
used to complete certain rituals, the Dauh family is dependent on the Dangin family for 
certain religious needs.  
 The unorthodox division of land between these two households is a continuing 
source of tension between the two families. Sometimes this tension is in the 
background, as when I first began visiting the Dangin family home. At that time, 
relations between the two families were fairly friendly. During my fieldwork, however, 
they were in a period of very bad blood. The downturn in their relationship started 
around 2011 when the Dauh family began making plans to construct some new 
buildings on their land: a bathroom and a new kitchen. These plans turned out to be 
highly controversial for the Dangin family. It was during moments of irritation, when my 
hosts ears became “hot” from listening to Agung’s loud talking, that they would express 
their concerns to me. As I aim to show, their concerns reflect a larger moral framework.    
 “Most people dislike him” Kompiang said, continuing to vent about Agung. She 
then turned her attention to the Dauh family. Mereka hanya mau rumahnya bagus, tapi 
tak bawa apa-apa ke sana, (All they care about is having a nice house, but they don’t 
bring anything there [to the mrajan family temple],) she said angrily. Wayan came out of 
his room a minute later. He was also annoyed. He asked if I could record Agung’s 
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talking on my digital audio recorder. He said he wanted to speak to the bendesa 
(customary village head) and the police, and he wanted the recording as proof. I was a 
bit uncomfortable with this, but I agreed to set up the recorder for him. After I turned it 
on Agung’s voice quieted down. Wayan came into the room about an hour later and 
turned it off.  
 In conversations with me, Kompiang and Wayan presented two main reasons 
why this loud talking was offensive to them. First, Wayan felt that the Dauh family 
should have consulted him about their plans to build. As de facto head of the pengarep 
side of the family, he felt that he had authority over what happens on their shared plot of 
land, meaning that the Dauh family should request permission from him before 
beginning any major projects. On this occasion, however, there was no such request. 
Wayan interpreted this as an indication that the Dauhs did not accept his status as 
pengarep. He said he suspected that it was Agung who had instigated this. He knew 
Agung did not accept the arrangement between the two families, or Wayan’s status as 
leader. His loud talking was, in Wayan’s view, an expression of insubordination.  
 In addition to being affronted by the Dauh family’s lack of respect for their 
authority, members of the Dangin family also worried that their relatives would use 
these construction projects as a way to lay claim to a larger share of their land. The 
arrangement between the two families rested on a verbal agreement, which had the 
backing of the current village head. At one point, Wayan sought to sertifikat his share of 
the land (acquire a legal title for it), but this turned out to be prohibitively expensive.85 
                                                        
85 Many Balinese families live on plots of land that are collectively owned by the desa adat. Rights to this 
land are under the authority of the desa adat rather than the state. There may be no (or only very limited) 
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Lacking official documentation, Wayan was worried that the agreement could one day 
be called into question and he could be forced to give up a portion of his land. He 
repeatedly assured me that if the Dauh’s dared to build on his father’s land he would 
“fight.”   
 The Dangin family’s concerns about maintaining the established boundaries 
between the two plots of land were especially palpable on the day the Dauh family 
broke ground for the new kitchen, which was to be located right near the border 
between the Dauh family’s land and their own. Tensions had been running high all day. 
During part of the afternoon I helped Kompiang make tipat (an offering). She didn’t say 
anything to me the whole time I was working with her. At first, I wondered whether she 
was angry with me about something, but I later realized she was eavesdropping on the 
conversation between the Dauh family and the construction workers. I could hear her 
muttering half-audible (but clearly irritated) responses to some of their statements. Later 
in the afternoon Agung and his wife tore down the Dauh family’s old kitchen. The sheets 
of tin roofing made loud crashing sounds as they fell, which visibly annoyed the 
members of the Dangin family. I thought to myself that under friendlier circumstances 
they probably would have made a joke about the sound to indicate that it didn’t bother 
them, as I had seen Kompiang do in response to their eastern neighbor’s noisy chicken 
de-feathering machine. Instead, they were silent, merely glancing over occasionally, as 
                                                        
documentation regarding the rights of individual families to specific plots of land. The arrangement 
between the Dangin and Dauh families, for example, rested exclusively on a verbal contract. In 
attempting to sertifikat his land, Wayan was hoping to gain official state documentation of ownership. It is 
not clear to me whether this process would have amounted to a change in his ownership (whether the 
rights to the land would have been transferred to him from the desa adat); what I do recall was that the 
price was in the tens of millions of rupiah (thousands of dollars), which seems like a large sum to pay only 
to document ownership that is already in place.     
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if to make sure no damage was done to their property as the pieces fell. Once the 
kitchen was mostly torn down Agung and his wife started using string to take some 
measurements. Wayan and Putu stood on the southwest corner of the bale dauh asking 
them questions and making sure the plans stayed within the boundary of the Dauh 
family’s plot. Wayan later muttered the words “just fake” to me. When I asked what he 
meant he said that they were only pretending to care about respecting his authority. In 
reality (so he believed) they felt that they were entitled to a larger portion of the land. In 
another bid to prevent them from building beyond the agreed-upon borders, Wayan and 
his nephew built two temporary structures to fill the empty strip of land that bordered the 
Dauh family’s area on the southern side, thereby closing in the Dauh plot on two sides.   
 One day I asked Wayan whether he thought it was possible for the Dauh family 
to lay claim to a larger share of the land. He described another family that had a similar 
conflict and land did change hands. However, he also told me that his own side of the 
family had the support of the village head, which suggested that, in the unlikely event 
that the Dauh family did try to build on Dangin land, the community would back his side. 
This convinced me that when Wayan raised the specter of a “fight” with his relatives, he 
was not sincerely worried that they would suddenly start building on his land—an act 
which they would never have attempted, much less been able to achieve, without the 
community’s support. His claims instead seemed to be part of an effort to discredit the 
Dauh family by exaggerating their unreasonableness. Over time it became apparent to 
me that the very fact that their relatives were building at all—even within the boundaries 
of their own plot—was deeply troubling to Wayan and his siblings. What really worried 
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the Dangin family about these buildings was not their physical location but their semiotic 
potential. However, the Dangin family seemed unwilling to acknowledge this, preferring 
to keep the focus on their relatives’ insubordination.    
 Wayan once told me that when he was away from home the Dauh family was 
more berani (brave) and his own family was tidak kuat (not strong). When I asked for an 
example he said that one day when he returned from a trip to north Bali Kompiang told 
him that while he was away she had overheard Agung talking loudly, telling the Dauh 
family to use their money to buy building materials a little at the time, so that they could 
keep constructing more and more buildings on their land. He indicated that his sister 
was deeply offended by this statement, and that Agung would not have dared to say 
such a thing if he had been present. When I asked him why, he claimed that his 
relatives’ plot to keep building was part of an effort to make his family angry and jealous. 
In following up this statement, however, Wayan seemed anxious to convince me that 
the new buildings, in and of themselves, were of no concern to him. He compared the 
two families’ property, drawing attention to how much more numerous, larger, and more 
impressive the buildings on his own plot were, and reassuring me that it would be easy 
for him to just build a small kitchen and bathroom, as the Dauh family had done. His 
relatives were, he stressed, masih jauh di bawah (still far below) his own family.  
 Although his point was to minimize the Dauh family’s accomplishments, his 
statement also revealed that something significant was, in fact, being accomplished 
through all of this building. While the new buildings did not directly challenge the Dangin 
family’s status as pengarep, since they were built within the agreed-upon boundaries of 
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the Dauh family plot, they did, in a sense, narrow the status gap between the two 
families: the Dauh family remained ‘far below,’ but apparently not as far below as they 
had been previously. The Dangin family’s immediate concern was not about loss of 
land, but loss of status, and Wayan’s exaggerated claims about the Dauh family’s plans 
to steal his family’s land was part of his bid to deny the claims that the new buildings 
could make about status. To preview an argument that I develop more fully below, these 
buildings, like other signs of wealth and status, could be interpreted as signs of divine 
moral judgment with respect to the Dauh family’s actions and behavior—a kind of 
karmic blessing. This interpretation could undermine the Dangin family’s moral 
judgments against them and potentially threaten their position of authority within the 
extended family. In short, wealth is (or has the potential to be) interpreted as a 
manifestation of its owners’ relationship with god, with significant moral and social 
implications.   
 In the last chapter I showed how members of the Dangin family treat a variety of 
semiotic forms as indexes of their relationships with invisible beings. In this chapter I 
show how indexes of human-niskala relationships are approached as ethical 
affordances that reflect people’s moral status. Analysis of the conflict between the 
Dangin and Dauh families reveals a unique ethical semiotics in which signs of status are 
linked to local conceptions of the “good life.” Within this semiotic ideology, the visible 
disparities between the two families’ properties do not merely signal a difference in 
wealth; they also indicate a difference in ethical standing. I describe this ethical 
semiotics in detail in the next section. Before turning to that, however, I would like to 
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briefly situate the arguments I make here within existing scholarship on Balinese 
culture.  
 For readers familiar with the anthropological literature on Bali, one obvious 
framework for interpreting the conflict between the Dangin and Dauh families is “status 
competition.”86 While I agree that competition and status are important issues at play, I 
will argue that this conflict departs from the representation of status competition present 
in other ethnographic writings about Bali, and that it suggests the need for a rethinking 
of the Balinese ‘obsession’ with status. In the work of Clifford Geertz, for example, the 
dramatization of status through competitive practices like cock fighting is said to serve a 
socially reproductive role: hierarchy is preserved, not altered, through these activities, 
which therefore fit within Geertz’s broader conception of Balinese society and concepts 
of personhood as static and cyclical (Geertz 1973a and 1973b). Although the 
competition between the Dangin and Dauh families is closely linked to customary ways 
of life—to the ritual exchanges between humans and invisible beings that are the raison 
d’etre for customary institutions—it nonetheless reveals a picture of Balinese society 
that differs significantly from the static world that Geertz describes. While Geertz 
recognizes that status competition is a kind of performative world-making (Geertz 1980: 
104), he rules out the possibility that such world-making might result in real social 
change (Geertz 1973b: 433, 436, 443-446). Whereas Geertz sees status as always a 
given in Balinese society, my research reveals that status is, at least in some cases, 
negotiable. The Dangin family’s status as pengarep is a case in point: this status was 
                                                        
86 On Balinese status competition, see Geertz 1973b and 1980, and Howe 2001.  
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achieved not by an accident of birth but because of the unequal economic status of the 
two families, which gave rise to negotiation and adaptation of the usual rules of status. 
Even if these kinds of status reversals do not happen very often, it is nonetheless the 
case that individuals’ standing vis-à-vis social others is mutable, to some extent. This 
means that people are motivated to act to maintain or improve their status, not just to 
dramatize it, as Geertz suggests.87 Such motivations were a driving force behind many 
of the practices I discuss in this chapter and a big part of the reason that the form of 
ethical life that I will be describing was so compelling to people.   
 Another way in which my research pushes against earlier analyses of Balinese 
status competition is by highlighting the ethical dimensions of status. As I came to 
discover, signs of status are closely connected to my interlocutors’ conception of what it 
means to be a good person and live a good life. Such signs formed part of a broader 
ethical semiotics, in which things in the material world served as evidence of divine 
moral judgment. These signs are “ethical affordances,” which informed not only how 
people judged themselves and others in relation to one another, but also how they 
evaluated and chose between different possible courses of action in their own lives. 
This ethical semiotics underwrites particular forms of self-making and world-making. It 
makes possible a particular way of imagining and striving for a good life. 
 By focusing on the dynamic nature of Balinese customary practice, this chapter 
builds on my discussion in Chapter 1. There I showed how maintaining relationships 
with invisible beings requires more than just rote repetition of rituals; people must be 
                                                        
87 Geertz argues, by contrast, that Balinese cultural practices serve to downplay the notion of a 
biographical self that develops and changes over time (1973b).  
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attentive to signs from the invisible world and adapt their behavior accordingly. In this 
chapter, I highlight the ethical dimensions of these relationships. I show how exchanges 
between humans and invisible beings function as a basis for moral judgment and as a 
dynamic space in which people’s sense of self and moral standing is worked out. Rather 
than simply limiting individuals’ freedom by imposing an undue burden on them (as 
some religious reformers suggest), these practices also create spaces of possibility that 
enable forms of freedom and agency that may be foreclosed in other moral spaces that 
Balinese Hindus inhabit. This freedom, I suggest, is part of the reason adat practices 
are so resilient even in the face of reformist critiques. 
 This chapter focuses a great deal of attention on the semiotics of ethical life in 
Bali. To some readers this focus on semiotics might seem overly concerned with 
superficial matters of appearance and performativity rather than properly ethical 
matters. It bears stressing that my discussion here is not meant to be an exhaustive 
portrait of ethical life in Bali; many important aspects of ethics, such as the compassion 
and strong sense of mutual obligation that inflect many Balinese social relationships, 
are underrepresented here. Instead, my interest is precisely in the relationship between 
ethics and mediation. Building on Michael Lambek’s claim that “ethical personhood is 
constituted through an interplay of performance and practice,” I seek to show that acts 
of performative self-presentation, such as those involved in the kind of status 
competition described earlier, can be understood as a form of ethical practice (Lambek 
2013: 844).   
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In the next section I describe the semiotic ideologies and practices that undergird 
the ethics of divine blessing. Focusing primarily on the conflict between the Dangin and 
Dauh families, and the forms of moral evaluation that this conflict elicited, I show how 
signs of divine intervention in people’s lives are taken up as criteria for casting moral 
judgment on others and used as a form of moral guidance that helps people make 
decisions about how to act in a morally complex world.  
Following this, I discuss the inherent ambiguity of the signs emanating from the 
niskala world, and I explore how this impacts ethical practice. I argue that while this 
ambiguity does introduce a degree of uncertainty, this does not detract from the 
importance that people attribute to the judgments that these signs allow them to make. 
Rather, the ambiguity of this moral semiotics creates spaces of possibility; it affords 
opportunities for people to fashion themselves as moral persons through performative 
engagements with their material surround.   
 In the final section of the chapter, I turn to the issue of performativity. I make the 
case that the tendency to see the practices discussed in this chapter as overly focused 
on appearances, and therefore lacking in ethical depth, is rooted in a particular 
conception of moral personhood, which seeks to construct an ethical subject that is 
autonomous from material form. We should be especially wary of this line of argument 
because, as I show in Chapter 3, it is also deployed in Indonesian state religious 
ideologies as a way of delegitimizing Balinese adat practices and subjectivities. Using 
the ethnographic material presented here as a case in point, I show that the separation 
of the subject from the material world is not a necessary condition for ethics and is 
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therefore inappropriate as an analytical starting point. I argue instead for an analysis 
that recognizes the deep entanglement of ethical life with semiotic forms.    
   
The Semiotics of Blessing and the Pursuit of a Good Life 
 One late afternoon I was helping Kompiang make jaja (rice flour offerings) for the 
holiday honoring the goddess Saraswati. The sound of tiny gongseng bells drifted down 
to us in soft waves from the flock of pigeons circling in the grey sky overhead, filling the 
lulls in our conversation with their high-pitched warbling. Kompiang told me that the jaja 
were for a client of hers, for whom she’d made Saraswati offerings every year for many 
years. As we sat rolling and pressing tiny bits of white and brown rice flour dough into 
the complex shapes that make up jaja Saraswati, she said that nowadays she’s mostly 
given up making offerings for payment, continuing to fulfill orders for only a few longtime 
clients. She explained the reason for this through the following story. One day several 
years prior someone placed a large order with her. She was hesitant to take the order 
because she knew there was a risk the work would prevent her from completing the 
offerings for a ceremony her own family would be having in a few days. In the end, 
however, she accepted the job because her family desperately needed money to buy 
supplies for their own ceremony. She worked day and night to finish the offerings in 
time, but then, when the client came to collect his purchase, he didn’t have the money 
to make an immediate payment. This meant that Kompiang was unable to use her 
earnings for her own family’s ceremony, as she had hoped to do. She said this 
misfortune was a sign that God didn’t approve of her making offerings with the 
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expectation of payment, and that since that time, she has shifted primarily to providing 
ceremonial help for free. She explained that now, whenever her family needs money, it 
always comes, somehow, and that this was a divine reward for her voluntary labor.88 
 In this narrative, Kompiang touches upon several of the semiotic and ethical 
beliefs that I will be discussing in this chapter. First, she interprets events in her life as 
examples of good and bad fortune, which she then reads as indirect consequences of 
her own activity in the world. Her interpretation is like a theory of karma, in which moral 
actions yield rewards while immoral actions yield punishments, but rather than seeing 
outcomes as deriving from the automatic workings of a moralized cosmos, my friend 
attributes the consequences of her actions to divine participation in her life. Specifically, 
positive circumstances, such as her family’s relatively secure economic position, are 
seen as divine blessings, and thus as signs of divine approval with regard to her 
behavior, while negative events, such as her client’s inability to pay, are punishments 
and signs of disapproval. By reading events in her life as signs of divine judgment, my 
friend is able to wisely evaluate and adapt her own behavior, and in doing so, to 
advance toward the goal or telos of her ethical practice: to become a person whose life 
is filled with divine blessings. I call this ethical orientation the ethics of divine blessing. 
                                                        
88 In this conversation Kompiang used the Indonesian word “Tuhan,” which I’ve translated here as “god.” 
In other conversations however, she attributed divine blessings to the deities of her family temple, and to 
the spirits of specific deceased relatives. According to reformist theology, the many gods and deified 
ancestors worshipped in Balinese ceremonies are manifestations of a singular god called Sang Hyang 
Widhi Wasa. I believe that in referring to “Tuhan” in this conversation, my friend was referring to divine 
agents in a general, inclusive sense, a framing which is consonant with both reformist, monotheistic 
representations of Balinese Hinduism and with traditional religious discourses and practices, which 
recognize a plurality of deities. I follow her usage in this chapter by using “god” as a general term for any 
and all benevolent invisible agents.   
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 Like the forms of myth-making I described in Chapter 1, Kompiang’s story is 
grounded in a semiotic ideology that links effects in the perceivable world to causes in 
the niskala world. These myth-making practices draw from the same representational 
economy. However, Kompiang’s story reveals another facet of this semiotic ideology: 
the belief that material objects, events, and circumstances brought about by invisible 
agents can be signs of divine moral judgment, which can provide insight into the 
ultimate moral value of an individual’s (family’s, community’s) actions, behavior, and 
character, and can thus serve as both a source of moral guidance and a basis for moral 
evaluation. These indexes are ethical affordances, which invite inferences (what Alfred 
Gell calls “abductions”) about the agents responsible for them.89 For example, in the 
case of Kompiang’s story, a misfortune (her client’s inability to pay) invites abductions 
about its cause (my friend infers that her misfortune is divine punishment for engaging 
in the sale of offerings). The misfortune thus indexes the improper behavior that 
precipitated it. Two basic beliefs inform these abductions: first, Kompiang believes that 
when she acts, god responds (or may respond) by providing or withholding blessings 
and protection; second, she believes that these responses reflect divine moral 
judgments upon her actions. Thus, not only does this semiotic ideology link outcomes, 
indexically, to actions, but it also assumes a rough equivalence between their respective 
values, such that the negative quality of a particular outcome indexes the negative 
moral value of the act, behavior, or individual character that precipitated it.  
                                                        
89 As noted in the Introduction, the term abduction denotes a particular type of inference made in relation 
to indexical signs, in which a known causal relationship produces an inference from the index back to 
some likely cause.  
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 In this chapter I explore how this moral semiotics shapes ethical life in the Dangin 
household. Although the ethnographic material I discuss is largely drawn from a single 
family, I suggest that it reveals an underlying moral logic that is more widespread. When 
members of the Dangin family draw on signs to make judgments, and to give reasons 
for those judgments, they seek to make their claims legible to a broader moral 
community. In other words, their evaluations and justifications are outwardly oriented, 
and thus we can infer that they reflect the shared moral commitments to which they, as 
social beings, feel themselves to be accountable. Given that the members of the Dangin 
family are active participants in communal social life, it seems likely that their claims 
would resonate, at least to some degree, with the evaluative practices of others in their 
community. I suggest, therefore, that the semiotic ideology revealed in Kompiang’s story 
has currency that extends beyond her own household.   
 One example that suggests that the connection between misfortune and immoral 
action may be a more widespread feature of Balinese moral thought is the multivalent 
word papa. In both Balinese and Indonesian, papa means destitute. My Balinese 
dictionary also gives several other, related meanings, such as misfortune, disaster, and 
hell (Shadeg 2007: 385). In this sense, papa is similar in meaning to the more common 
Balinese word lacur, which means poor or poor person.90 In Sanskrit, however, the word 
pāpa means sin, or morally evil action. Papa is used this way in Balinese Hindu 
                                                        
90 The Balinese word lacur is most commonly used as an exclamatory curse, as in the phrase aduh lacur, 
which can be roughly translated as “oh damn.” Once when I visited the home of a particularly poor family, 
one of the women of the family gestured toward a dilapidated building on her property and said nak lacur 
(poor people). I heard Jero Biang use this same phrase once during a family crisis. In this case, I think the 
meaning was less about material poverty than a kind of moral failure, something closer to “god-forsaken 
people.”  
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religious literature and in the text of the Puja Trisandhya (see Chapter 3), a reformist 
Hindu prayer.91 Within Balinese religious language (which blends indigenous and 
Sanskrit vocabularies), papa covers a range of meanings, and links immoral acts to 
their outcomes: poverty, misfortune, hell. To be papa, then, is both an ethical and a 
material condition. This linking of moral and material value is key to the ethical practices 
I discuss in this chapter.   
 Within the ethics of divine blessing, a wide variety of semiotic forms can take on 
moral significance. Semiotic ideology plays a role in defining what forms of good and 
bad fortune are likely to count as potential signs of divine judgment, but it does so in an 
open-ended and flexible way: while signs of wealth, poverty, and illness are perhaps the 
most common, many other sorts of things can also be interpreted in this way and end 
up serving as a basis for moral judgment. The Dangin family had a cousin who lived in 
another area of the village. He owned a couple of successful local businesses and was 
considered to be relatively wealthy. When Wayan was a child he used to help out in this 
cousin’s household, caring for their children, painting handicrafts for their business, and 
taking up other odd jobs around the house. Despite their wealth, the family treated him 
poorly and paid him only a pittance, if anything, for his services. Members of this family 
also consistently refused to drive an elderly aunt home when she would visit them 
during holidays, which meant that one of the men of the Dangin family always had to 
pick her up and take her home. The Dangin family resented this cousin and saw him as 
stingy. Later in life, this cousin became a balian (traditional healer). He led meditation 
                                                        
91 In Upadeça Tentang Ajaran-Ajaran Agama Hindu, the word papa is defined as perbuatan yang tidak 
baik (action that is not good/right) (Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978: 30).  
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sessions at his home, which were supposed to have healing effects. Like most balian, 
he served his clients without pay. When I asked Wayan how this transformation had 
come about, he said that his cousin had had a calling in his dreams. He claimed that 
this calling was punishment for the man’s stinginess. In other words, the ‘misfortune’ of 
having to serve the public without pay was evidence that, despite this man’s wealth, he 
was nonetheless disapproved of by god.92 
 Another interaction I had with Kompiang will serve to further clarify how this 
semiotic ideology provides a basis for casting moral judgment. During the final months 
of my fieldwork Bali was experiencing a drought. I began to see neighbors filling buckets 
of water at a spigot near the edge of the Dangin family’s property, and friends made 
sarcastic jokes about the good fortune of those rare men whose tall ladders and 
unusual bravery allowed them to earn an extra income during the dry season by 
climbing deep into empty wells and digging down to a water source. Kompiang was 
friends with a woman who lived in the household immediately to the south of her own 
family’s plot. This southern neighbor woman would sometimes walk with us to the 
temple during ceremonies, and she and Kompiang would often help each other with 
rituals. Then one day Kompiang told me that this woman had taken credit for work that 
she herself had done. Clearly angered by this, she said that her friend was pintar bicara 
di depan umum (clever at speaking in public). Then, a few days later, Kompiang told me 
that her neighbors to the south (the neighbor woman’s family) and west (the Dauh 
                                                        
92 The calling to become a balian need not necessarily be interpreted as a misfortune. Wayan saw it as 
such in this specific case because he saw his cousin as business-oriented, and thus assumed that he 
would not wish to work for free. In general, however, balian are venerated. Wayan’s own brother Kadek 
was a great admirer of this cousin; he studied with him and sometimes attended his meditation meetings.   
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family) did not have any water left in their wells. As we stood chatting in the hot midday 
sun, she explained that these neighbors’ wells had dried up during past droughts too, 
but her own family’s well always continued to flow. Although she did not say so 
explicitly, it was obvious to me that her comment about the wells was a morally loaded 
comparison. The distinction she drew—between wells that dry up and wells that never 
do—was part of an ongoing argument about the respective families’ relative moral 
standing. For her, a household that was spared from having to endure an empty well in 
the midst of a drought was one that had earned divine protection, while her neighbors’ 
recurrent suffering validated her negative judgments about them. Of course, it is 
possible that she was merely pointing out her neighbors’ bad luck, an interpretation 
which rests upon a different abduction of agency and responsibility, and which therefore 
does not carry the same moral implications. However, within this semiotic ideology, this 
is not a very plausible (or compelling) explanation; things happen the way they do 
because agents—human or invisible—make it so (Wiener 1995: 49).  
 This tendency to assume that unfortunate circumstances have hidden moral 
causes is evidenced by the fact that, on other occasions, Kompiang did draw these 
kinds of connections explicitly. For example, she often accused the Dauh family of 
slacking on their ritual obligations, saying makanya, sampai sekarang, mereka tak 
punya apa-apa (that’s why, until now, they have nothing [are poor]). Thus, rather than 
seeing Kompiang’s statement about the wells as merely a comment about luck—an 
interpretation that misses a key part of what she was trying to convey—I would argue 
instead that she assumed I would recognize the indexical link between misfortune and 
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moral failing, and this obviated the need for her to be more explicit in her comparison. 
Without having to say so directly, Kompiang showed me that her neighbors were in the 
wrong while her own family was in the right. If my interpretation is correct, this example 
demonstrates that the importance of semiotic ideology lies not only in the specific 
semiotic links that it favors or ignores, but also in its capacity to circulate and gain 
widespread currency, creating a shared awareness that the semiotic links that one 
person perceives are also legible to others in his or her social milieu. As we will see, it is 
this mutual awareness of a shared semiotic ideology that gives the indexes I discuss in 
this chapter their moral weight and performative potential.  
 As we can see from these examples, signs of misfortune can be used to bolster 
claims against people who one perceives as acting (or having acted) improperly. Such 
signs can function as evidence that one’s own negative judgments are also shared by 
god, who has either caused the perpetrator’s misfortune or failed to protect them from it. 
This connection was made particularly clear to me during a conversation I had with 
Wayan about his conflict with the Dauh family. We were having dinner at a food stall in 
a neighboring village. Only a narrow strip of sidewalk separated us from the busy street, 
so the atmosphere was suffused with the lights, sounds, and smells of the motorbikes 
streaming by outside. We sat eating and chatting at one of the stall’s long wooden 
tables as a quick stream of customers flowed through to buy bungkus (take-out). Wayan 
was complaining about the Dauh family. The Galungan holiday was approaching and he 
told me he planned to forbid them from placing offerings in his mrajan, as they usually 
did on this and other important days in the Balinese ritual calendar. Sensing that this 
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had the potential to provoke a heated confrontation, I asked whether he was sure such 
a move was justified. He said they were disrespectful toward him—he reiterated his 
complaint that they hadn’t asked his permission before beginning the recent 
construction projects on their adjoining land, and added that when he’d held a large 
ceremony the previous month, they provided only minimal assistance. In short, he felt 
that they had failed to fulfill the obligations that would entitle them to the privilege of 
worshipping in the temple his family maintained. 
 Conflicts of the kind Wayan was describing are remarkably common in Bali. 
Local newspapers often run stories about families who were prevented from using their 
village’s temples because they were accused of contravening “custom” (adat). As noted 
in Chapter 1, such sanctions, and the tense and sometimes violent confrontations to 
which they can give rise, have become an object of public debate in recent decades. 
Though upheld by many communities, practices of punitive exclusion have been 
condemned by religious reformers, who claim they are against the Hindu religion.93 
According to this view, villages and families who enact these kinds of punishments do 
so because they are ignorant of their own religion’s teachings. If only people understood 
these teachings, the argument goes, then these kinds of conflicts would not arise, or at 
least, if they did, they could be resolved peacefully, and violence could be avoided.  
 It was clear that Wayan was not trying to engage me in a debate about moral 
principles, religious or otherwise, but I wanted to know whether religious teachings 
provided any guidance that he could draw upon in order to make sense of his family 
                                                        
93 For example, see Jyoti 2012: 24.  
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conflict. It seemed to me that the media said to contain these teachings—texts like the 
Sarasamuccaya, the Bhagavad Gita, the Kakawin Ramayana, etc.—focused on 
obscure concepts, broad abstract principles, and events and circumstances far removed 
from contemporary life in Bali; and that the sermons, books, and magazine articles that 
tried to link these abstractions to concrete experiences rarely provided illustrations 
showing how religious teachings could be applied to messy, real-world problems like the 
one my friend was facing. I had read that the Parisada had a policy stating that it was 
against the Hindu religion for customary villages to prevent members from praying in 
village temples under any circumstances, even as a sanction for serious offenses, so I 
asked Wayan whether he thought the same policy applied to him. Growing more 
animated, he provided additional examples of his relatives’ wrongdoings, insisting that 
they needed to respect his position as head of the household if they wanted to continue 
to use his temple. I said I thought his relatives probably had their own justifications for 
their behavior and asked if there was a specific rule that they had transgressed or a 
story or proverb that admonished people not to behave as they had; something beyond 
his own feelings of offense, which could prove that they were in the wrong. “There 
should be a sign,” he said.  
 In making this statement, Wayan makes explicit the role of ‘signs’ in moral 
evaluation, a relationship which usually remains implicit. Rather than grounding his 
judgments in a moral code, Wayan points to signs of good and bad fortune as evidence 
of people’s relationship with god—of whether or not god approves of their behavior. 
Signs provide Wayan with a means to evaluate people and their actions independently 
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of his own personal biases (or at least, they appear to do so). This distancing from 
personal bias lends authority to these judgments, much as reference to an external 
moral code might do.  
 In addition to serving as a basis for casting judgment on others, signs from the 
invisible world can also help people evaluate and choose between different possible 
courses of action in their own lives. In this way, signs from the invisible world function as 
a kind of moral guidance. We have already seen how Kompiang was able to discern 
that she needed to stop making offerings for money, and how this change in behavior 
yielded karmic benefits for her, indicating that she was now on a correct moral path. The 
story about the cousin who became a balian could also be interpreted in this way. His 
dream is a sign that he needs to take on a new role, and he heeds this guidance by 
becoming a balian. Wayan frames this transition as a punishment for his cousin’s 
wrongdoings, however, it could also be interpreted as a kind of ethical practice. Heeding 
this kind of ‘calling’ from the invisible world is a key part of living a good life within this 
ethical framework.  
 The act of heeding a calling is sometimes called ngiring (to follow). To ngiring, in 
this sense, is to respond to signs from the invisible world by taking measures to improve 
or correct one’s relationship with invisible beings. We saw a commonplace example of 
this in Chapter 1, when a mysterious noise on the roof prompted questions about 
whether an invisible presence wanted to ‘ask for something,’ which in turn prompted the 
placement of a precautionary offering. When the word ngiring is used, however, it 
usually refers to a more dramatic intervention. I have been friends with a North Balinese 
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family since 2004. Beginning in 2009 they experienced a series of tragedies. Two 
members of the family passed away in quick succession, including a young mother, and 
the eldest adult son began suffering from repeated bouts of near-fatal illness. In the 
summer of 2014 I visited the family at their home in North Bali. When I arrived I found 
that the house compound had been dramatically rearranged, to the point where it was 
no longer recognizable to me. My friend explained that he had had to ngiring, due to all 
of the problems his family was having; rebuilding his house was part of this process.94 In 
this example, signs of misfortune function as a form of moral guidance, showing my 
friend that he must act to repair his relationship with invisible beings by correcting the 
location of buildings on his land and building new shrines to place offerings to those 
beings. This is similar to Kompiang’s story, but here the results are inconclusive. Since 
the time of my visit the family has suffered further deaths.  
 When signs from the invisible world function as a form of moral guidance, they 
need not take the form of a misfortune. Blessings can function in a similar way. 
Kompiang was something of an expert at making offerings. She knew the correct types 
and numbers of offerings for a wide variety of different ceremonies and was therefore 
highly sought after to help with offering preparation for communal and domestic rituals 
in Tegal. One day when I was helping her make offerings she told me that she was 
                                                        
94 Many Balinese Hindus believe that the buildings that make up a traditional Balinese house compound 
can have supernatural effects. When a new building is constructed it must be given substantial ceremony 
before being used. If these ceremonies are overlooked, or if the location, size, or proportion of the 
buildings is not correct, this can have an impact on the wellbeing of the people who dwell there. Once I 
accompanied Wayan on a visit to a balian and the balian told him that one of the buildings in his 
compound was out of place by a few meters. He recommended Wayan’s family aim to rebuild in the 
correct location; until they were able to do so their life would be ‘stuck’ and they would have difficulty 
achieving things that they want to achieve. 
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mystified at how she had picked up this expertise so quickly. She said that when she 
began to learn, the rituals came in quick succession, one after the other, allowing her to 
gain a substantial amount of experience in a relatively short period of time. Kenapa 
begitu? (Why was that?) she asked rhetorically. Sepertinya ada takdir (It’s as though it’s 
my destiny) she explained, adding that, if someone asks her for help with a ceremony, 
she harus pasrah (must surrender [to their request]). In describing her ability as a takdir, 
she suggests that invisible forces intervened to help her acquire these skills. This in turn 
indicates to her that it is her duty to do this work. In this instance, guidance on how she 
should live her life comes in the form of a god-given ability.  
 In these examples, signs of good and bad fortune serve as a basis for evaluating 
actions—one’s own and those of others. When approached as criteria for casting 
judgment, signs can distance judgments from personal bias, creating a more 
authoritative (and apparently objective) basis for judgment. When approached as a tool 
for self-reflection, such signs can function as guidance in the ethical work of managing 
one’s relationships with invisible beings.  
 One particularly compelling feature of this ethical framework is that it provides a 
way of understanding and acting appropriately within a complex ethical world.95 The 
kind of ethical complexity that I am evoking here is richly portrayed in the Ramayana 
and Mahabharata epics (both widely known and loved in Bali). The characters in these 
stories encounter morally complex situations in which the most ethical course of action 
                                                        
95 We could also point out some problems with this ethical framework. For one thing, it equates wealth 
with moral status, which would seem to confer undue privilege on the wealthy. My intention here is not to 
condone or condemn this moral framework, but to understand what it affords for the people who engage 
with it.  
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requires taking steps that, from a less enlightened perspective, appear immoral. One 
famous instance of this type of dilemma is the one that Arjuna faces in the Bhagavad 
Gita when he must slaughter members of his own family in order to serve the greater 
good of purifying the world of evil. A similar example of moral complexity appears in a 
famous passage from the Kakawin Ramayana (a Kawi poem composed in Java in the 
9th century and frequently performed by contemporary Balinese pepaosan practitioners: 
see Chapter 4) when Rama consoles Wibisana, who has chosen to join Rama’s army in 
the fight against his own brother, Rawana.96 In both of these examples, the question of 
what constitutes right action depends on the specific context, a context which is, in 
many cases, not fully understood by ordinary humans. (When characters approach the 
world from a human point of view, they feel compelled to be loyal to their family 
members; in both cases, this loyalty does not serve the highest good and must be 
rejected). A simple moral code—which prohibits some actions (e.g. commiting violence 
against one’s own family members) while allowing or encouraging others—is an 
insufficient guide to this complex moral world. To discern the proper way to act requires 
extraordinary wisdom, the wisdom to understand the world from a divine point of view 
and to choose one’s actions accordingly.97 The ethical semiotics that I have been 
describing provides just this kind of insight. In contrast to the guidance provided by a 
                                                        
96 Another interesting example is the fate of Kekayi from the Ramayana. Kekayi forces her husband to 
banish his eldest son Rama to the forest so that her own son can become king. For this, she is universally 
despised, even by her own son, who renounces her and refuses to take the throne. In some versions, 
however, it is revealed later that Kekayi’s actions were divinely sanctioned because they set in motion a 
chain of events that will end with Rama’s defeat of the demon Rawana. 
97 In the case of Kekayi, it was arguably not wisdom that allowed her to follow the correct path, but 
destiny. She is therefore a more morally ambivalent character than either Wibisana or Arjuna, who 
understand and choose their actions (even if their choice may have been pre-ordained).  
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moral code, the guidance that individuals obtain by reading signs from the invisible 
world is unique to them and attuned to the complexities of their specific situation.    
 As I describe in more detail in Chapter 4, proponents of the Indonesian Hindu 
reform promote texts as the exclusive source of religious ethical knowledge. According 
to this view, it is to texts like the Mahabharata and Ramayana that Hindus should look 
for guidance on how to act in the world. Within reformist discourse, however, these texts 
are treated as though they can be boiled down to a kind of catechism that will provide 
answers to all of life’s moral questions. This is problematic because, as I have just 
described, the moral dilemmas represented in these texts are deeply tied to the specific 
narrative context, which means that figuring out how their insights can be applied to 
other contexts is far from straightforward, and even morally problematic. To claim, as 
spokespersons of the reform often do, that people’s moral failings are due to the fact 
that they have not read this literature, suggests that the teachings these texts contain 
are transparent, a view which seems to flatten both the moral complexities of the stories 
contained in the texts, and the inherent complexity of ethical life in the real world, for 
which they are supposed to serve as a guide. The ethical semiotics described in this 
chapter, by contrast, provides a way of dealing with that complexity.  
 This is not to say that this view of the world provides sure-fire answers to all of 
life’s ethical questions. On the contrary, the insights that my interlocutors gained by 
reading signs from the invisible world were ambiguous and uncertain. As I show in the 
next section, ambiguity is a defining feature of this ethical lifeworld. But rather than 
undermining or diminishing the significance of these signs in their lives, this ambiguity 
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may actually serve to fuel people’s engagement with them because it allows for forms of 
creativity and freedom.    
 
Ambiguity, Performativity, and Spaces of Possibility 
 Having encountered several examples illustrating the links between people’s 
material circumstances and their moral status, we are now in a better position to 
understand the semiotics at play in the conflict between the Dangin and Dauh families. 
The members of the Dangin family feel that the Dauhs have continuously acted 
improperly toward them, from causing the deaths of their siblings and children to 
refusing to respect their position as pengarep. Wayan’s assertion that “there should be 
a sign” expresses his view that there ought to be some sort of perceptible misfortune to 
indicate that the Dauh family’s actions were immoral. Instead, the Dauh family’s 
fortunes seem to be taking a positive turn, as indicated by the new buildings on their 
land: signs of wealth, which could be interpreted as a form of divine blessing. This is 
clearly frustrating to Wayan. In conversations with me, he and the other members of his 
family seem anxious to sway me toward a different interpretation. When Wayan made 
this reference to “signs” as a means of judging worldly actions, he referenced the 
concept of karmaphala, the Hindu belief that human actions yield karmic consequences: 
saya lebih baik kalau hukumnya langsung (It’s better for me if the punishment is 
immediate), he said. By referencing hukum (punishment), he suggests that his relative’s 
current situation is temporary: punishment is coming, and he wishes it would come 
sooner. Wayan and his family also sought to minimize their relatives’ accomplishments 
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in other ways, such as by memorializing their former poverty with statements like 
sekarang mereka merasa mampu, tapi dulu tidak (now they feel well-off, but in the past 
they were not). Taken as signs from the invisible world—a visible manifestation of their 
relationship with god—the Dauh family’s relative position of poverty supports Wayan’s 
claims about their moral status. However, he wants a clearer, more immediate sign that 
his relatives are in the wrong. What he gets instead is an ambiguous mix of messages. 
 Sometimes the preponderance of messages conflicting with his own evaluations 
brought him to the point of despair. Such was the case when Jero Made, who was 
already approaching middle age, gave birth to her son, shortly after the end of my 
fieldwork. Prior to this birth, the youngest members of the Dauh family were both girls, 
which left the Dauh family without an heir. From the Dangin family’s point of view, this 
was a possible avenue for resolving the land conflict in their favor: eventually the two 
girls would marry and there would be no one left to battle for the land. However, they felt 
certain that the Dauhs would do everything they could to avoid this outcome. They 
waited anxiously through Jero Made’s pregnancy, wondering about the gender of the 
child. When I spoke to Wayan on the phone after the birth, he was defeated. He 
described a conversation he had had with his nephew Putu in which the latter proposed 
that the two of them were just a transisi (transition). When I asked what this meant he 
said his nephew was suggesting that they will not be able to get a good life in this life, 
and must instead wait for the karmic consequences of their conduct to be realized in 
subsequent generations.98  
                                                        
98 Balinese Hindus generally believe that individuals are reincarnated within their own family line.  
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 The signs at play in this ethical semiotics are inherently ambiguous. Wayan 
interprets his relative’s good fortune one way—as a small and momentary blessing in a 
life otherwise largely characterized by poverty—but he recognizes that other 
interpretations are also plausible, and that others in his community may interpret things 
differently. Importantly, the ambiguity of these signs does not diminish the significance 
that they have for him. The buildings on his relatives’ land are a source of concern in 
spite of their ambiguous meaning.  
 Part of this ambiguity arises from the difficulty of establishing clear links between 
signs of divine judgment and the specific actions that precipitated them. A misfortune, 
for instance, may be the product of the victim’s own wrongdoing, but it could also be 
blamed on sorcery (what Balinese call “magic” or “black magic).” Likewise, as in the 
case of Wayan’s contentions about his neighbors’ new buildings, wealth may not always 
be a sign of divine approval, a point I return to later. Furthermore, even when a 
misfortune is recognized as an index of moral failing, it can be difficult to determine 
which action or behavior was the catalyst.99 Conversely, actions are not always followed 
by clear signs of divine judgment. As reflected in Wayan’s statement, “there should be a 
sign,” but there may not be, and in any case, one has no way of knowing when or in 
what form the sign will come. The practice of making moral judgments and decisions by 
interpreting indexical links between actions and consequences is thus fraught with 
uncertainty. While semiotic ideology helps narrow the field of possibilities, it also leaves 
room for ambiguity and contestation 
                                                        
99 Establishing causal links between actions and outcomes is further complicated by the fact that one 
person’s actions may have karmic effects on their entire family, including unborn descendants. 
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 In addition to the problem of sorting out the causal relations between actions and 
outcomes, another source of ambiguity is the problem of determining which signs are 
relevant as evidence of a person’s moral status. Because there are many signs that can 
potentially provide insight into this, it’s possible that some signs may be overlooked or 
attributed undue significance. For example, people may judge a person based on their 
poverty and overlook other circumstances, such as their exceptional talents. This was 
an issue that both Wayan and Kompiang discussed with me. When Wayan was a child 
his elementary school organized a student gamelan group. Wayan was not chosen to 
play in the group in spite of the fact that his father was one of the most prominent 
musicians in Tegal and Wayan himself was already an experienced performer. When I 
asked him how this could be he said it was because his family was poor. He explained 
that people in Bali often mistakenly assume that poor people do not have talent. 
Kompiang told me a similar story about her own experience being excluded from a 
dance troupe as a child. Like Wayan, she claimed that the organizers favored children 
from wealthy families. According to these stories, the community tends to assume that 
wealth and ability go hand in hand, but their own family’s experience contradicts this 
assumption, suggesting that poverty does not always correspond to moral status. As 
additional evidence of this, they gave a more recent example. Tegal was home to a 
prominent youth gamelan ensemble. At one point the group needed to choose a new 
drummer, and they selected a boy from a wealthy family. According to Kompiang and 
Wayan, this boy did not turn out to be particularly talented, and the group’s level of 
playing began to decline. They both felt that Kompiang’s son Putu would have been a 
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better choice, but that he had been overlooked because their family was, despite recent 
economic gains, still viewed as relatively poor. By critiquing the community’s tendency 
to equate poverty with low moral standing, Wayan and Kompiang contest the judgments 
that (they are painfully aware) are conferred on them as a result of their persistent 
reputation as a poor family. 
 As we can see from this example, the ambiguity inherent in this ethical semiotics 
is not only a source of uncertainty; it also creates a space for acts of performative self-
making. That is to say, people can intervene to construct the semiotic world that 
represents them in a variety of ways. We have seen throughout this chapter how Wayan 
and Kompiang seek, in their conversations with me, to shape my impression of things in 
a way that favorably represents them. (These acts of verbal self-fashioning were the 
primary way that I learned about this ethical semiotics). One especially common way 
people seek to mold impressions in this way is by concealing or downplaying 
unfortunate events and circumstances in their lives. For example, when I found out that 
a female friend had been in a motorbike accident, she responded to my inquiries by 
simply saying “I’m fine now,” ignoring my attempts to find out how the accident had 
happened and how, if at all, she had been injured. When a close male friend of mine 
mysteriously lost consciousness for two weeks I wasn’t able to get more than a brief 
account from him of what had happened before he uncomfortably changed the subject. 
In addition to exhibiting signs of discomfort when asked about these misfortunes, my 
acquaintances in the field would also avoid taking steps that would publicly 
acknowledge a problem. For example, when I told Wayan that my expensive camera 
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had been swiped from my bike basket by a thief on a passing motorbike, he encouraged 
me to quietly report the incident to the police while concealing it from people in his 
village. Wayan and Kompiang’s mother Jero Biang suffered from a chronic cough that 
periodically became quite severe, prompting her children to debate whether they should 
seek medical treatment for her. The grandmother herself was ambivalent: as Wayan 
told me, she often expressed worry about the shame she would feel if people knew 
she’d been taken to see a doctor, an intervention which would mark her as seriously ill. 
As we might expect, this desire to delay treatment in order to avoid the shame 
associated with illness can have serious health consequences: when a neighbor died of 
complications related to diabetes I was told that she had long known that she was sick 
but refused to seek medical attention.   
Another common and more controversial example of these efforts to manipulate 
signs of divine judgment is the use of loans to cover ceremonial expenses. When a 
family hosts a lavish ceremony, this is likely to be read as a positive reflection of their 
own social and moral standing. This is because pulling off a large ceremony is 
presumed to require certain valued forms of assistance: social networks must be 
mobilized to prepare large quantities of offerings and food, and divine blessings of 
wealth and protection are needed to cover costs and to guard against bad weather and 
other misfortunes that might disrupt the ritual. The observable objects and events that 
make up the ceremony index this assistance, which in turn indexes the ceremony’s 
hosts, whose relationships with people and gods enable them to mobilize the assistance 
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in the first place.100 Aware of these indexical relationships, and the moral weight that 
they carry, families sometimes take out loans in order to afford a level of ceremony that 
would otherwise be beyond their means, a practice which is stigmatized but not 
uncommon. The use of a loan is morally significant, as it reduces dependence on other 
forms of assistance: the limitations of poverty can be overcome without having to wait 
around for divine blessings, and the extra money may allow for offerings and food to be 
purchased rather than prepared by volunteers from the hosts’ family or community. 
Loans thus destabilize the causal-indexical relationship linking the material form of the 
ceremony to the social and moral standing of the hosts. No longer dependent on the 
hosts’ relationships with community members and deities, the ceremony is a product 
(and index) of a different kind of agency, which doesn’t have the same moral value. A 
lavish ceremony is thus a morally ambiguous sign; determining its true moral 
significance means correctly identifying the forms of agency responsible for it, a point I 
return to later.  
As we can see, the awareness that people actively work to shape their semiotic 
surround creates an additional layer of ambiguity. These examples highlight another key 
aspect of the semiotic ideology I’ve been describing, namely the belief that signs of 
good and bad fortune are (at least potentially) both indexical and performative: that is, 
they both passively reflect reality and, at the same time, are available as resources for 
performatively creating it.101 The performative potential of these signs introduces the 
                                                        
100 This resonates with Geertz’s description of the basis for royal power in 19th Century Bali (1980).   
101 Drawing on J. L. Austin (1962) and Judith Butler (1990), I use the word performative to describe 
actions that simultaneously represent and constitute reality. Indexicality, on the other hand, refers to signs 
that passively reflect a given reality. In practice, the two are often intertwined: the materiality of inde
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possibility of deception, that people may manipulate their material surroundings in order 
to create an impression that contradicts divine judgments about them. That is, they may 
actively work to encourage incorrect abductions about their moral status.  
We might expect that this ambiguity would serve to diminish the relevance that 
this ethical semiotics has for people. If the signs are so ambiguous, they may not matter 
to people very much. I have already indicated that this is not the case. The example of 
ceremonies provides particularly strong evidence in support of this claim. 
Notwithstanding the performative, self-fashioning possibilities that they afford for their 
hosts, ceremonies are a source of tremendous anxiety, and, when successful, a great 
source of pride, precisely because of their indexical significance, what they are believed 
to reveal about a person’s moral status. I was present as the Dangin family prepared for 
two major life cycle rituals. Both involved many sleepless nights as the family and their 
network of voluntary assistants scrambled to prepare the elaborate offerings and 
decorations needed to mount a level of ceremony appropriate to their caste and social 
status.102 During the prayers at the end of one of these ceremonies, Wayan started 
crying uncontrollably. He told me later that he had been overcome with emotion 
because his ceremony had been a success. He said his feelings of joy and relief were 
                                                        
makes them available for human projects of active world-making, but part of their significance may 
depend on their being misrecognized as passive reflections of the world. For example, gender 
performances are often presumed to be indexes of a gender identity that is already given, and this 
misrecognition is part of their power. Similarly, within the semiotic ideology I’m describing here, the ethical 
significance of signs depends on the abduction of non-human (i.e. divine) agency, which the signs are 
supposed to passively reflect. Thus, the distinction between indexicality and performativity, as I am 
defining it here, is part of this local semiotic ideology in the sense that people work to determine whether 
a particular sign is a passive reflection of a given reality or an active attempt to redefine or misrepresent 
reality.   
102 They referred to this level of ceremony as bebangkit.  
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mixed with a sense of vindication toward the Dauh family, as though he presumed the 
latter would hope for the ceremony to be a failure. This example demonstrates that 
although the indexical meanings of ceremonies are unstable, they nonetheless carry 
significant moral weight.  
I would therefore argue that the inherent ambiguity of this semiotic system serves 
not to diminish its relevance in people’s lives, but to enhance it. The uncertain, 
contestable nature of these signs allows room for creativity, for people to have agency 
in shaping their moral status through mediatory practice.  Rather than only defining 
people as ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ these mediatory practices provide a space for self- and world-
making. In the case of the Dangin family, these performative practices were deeply 
meaningful to them.  
Bringing up issues of performativity may seem to shift the focus away from ethics 
as we commonly understand it. Performative practices like “self-presentation” or 
“impression management” run counter to the forms of activity most commonly 
associated with ethics (Goffman 1959). Within a certain pervasive understanding of 
ethics, behaving ethically seems to demand, on the one hand, that we turn our attention 
inward, to cultivate virtues and use these virtues to choose correct action. On the other 
hand, ethics also demands that we relate to others in a particular way; that we act in 
ways that promote human flourishing. Both in how we act on ourselves and how we 
relate to others, we are not supposed to concern ourselves with impressions too much. 
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Right action should be undertaken for its own sake, not because it will benefit our status 
or reputation.103  
 It is my contention, however, that we must take performative practices seriously 
as ways of living ethically, at least within the Balinese context. In the next section I 
address the issue of performativity and explain why our commonsense ethical 
frameworks are insufficient to the task of interpreting this particular form of ethical life.  
 
Performativity and the Materialization of Ethical Selves 
 In the spring of 2014, the Dangin family was preparing to hold a large tooth-filing 
ceremony. In the midst of the preparations they made plans to demolish their small, 
smoke-blackened kitchen and replace it with a larger, more modern one. They 
appeared to force this project to come to fruition in advance of the ceremony, even 
though they couldn't really afford it at that time, and the added work and financial strain 
was creating extra anxiety and hardship during an already stressful period. One day, 
when Wayan was fretting over the cost of the building materials, I asked him whether it 
would be better to wait and build the new kitchen after completing the ceremony. He 
answered in English, "If people see my kitchen like this, they'll say I'm a bad person."  
                                                        
103 One illustration of this commonsense ethical position can be found in Goffman’s work on self-presentation. 
While Goffman himself does not adhere to the idea that the work of impression management is immoral, his text 
nonetheless highlights the moral problems that are created (within a particular tradition of ethical thought) when 
“instead of allowing an impression of their activity to arise as an incidental by-product of that activity”. . .people 
instead “reorient their frame of reference and devote their efforts to the creation of desired impressions (1959: 
250).  Goffman sees acts of impression management as a ubiquitous and necessary feature of social interaction, 
and he describes the work of impression management as “amoral,” rather than immoral (ibid.: 251). However, his 
descriptions, and especially his emphasis on the lengths to which people will go in order to conceal the work of 
impression management, suggest that he presumes his readers will see the activities he is exposing as deceptive, 
and therefore immoral. This moral position thus pervades his work.      
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 At the time when Wayan said this to me I did not know what to make of it. On the 
one hand, his statement seemed to indicate that his community would view his lack of 
economic means as a moral failing. This seemed extraordinarily unjust to me, so I was 
surprised by his apparent acceptance of it. But given his acceptance, I was even more 
surprised by his response. It seemed like the project was nothing more than a shallow 
bid to make his family appear wealthy, and it seemed out of character for him to so 
candidly admit to this kind of vanity. Later, as I came to better understand the ethics and 
semiotics of wealth display as he and other members of his household and community 
understood them, however, I came to see the link between having a bad kitchen and 
being a bad person in a different light.  
 As the de facto head of his family, Wayan was the person in charge of new 
building projects. Before his father passed away, the two of them had worked together, 
along with Kadek, to collect funds to build several new buildings on their plot of land. In 
their final project together, they built the walls for a large brick house, which they hoped 
to one day rent out to foreigners, the house that I lived in during my fieldwork. When I 
first met this family, shortly after the father’s death, the house remained unfinished. 
There was no roof and tall green grass grew where the floor should have been. Since 
that time, Wayan has managed to finish the guest house, and build or improve several 
other structures within the home. He oversaw the construction of a new bale dauh, as 
well as the new kitchen just mentioned, and made substantial improvements to his 
family temple, adding new shrines, a wall, a gate, and a small garden in front of the 
entrance. In speaking to me about these projects over the years, he often connected 
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them to what he called (in English) “a good life.” On several occasions, he expressed 
sadness that his father wasn’t there to see the improvements he had made. He blamed 
himself for this, seeing it as having failed to “give him a good life.” He worried that his 
mother too would pass away before this elusive “good life” was achieved. At first, I 
thought what Wayan meant by a good life was a matter of comfort, that he wanted his 
parents to have comfortable places to sleep, cook, pray, and so on. Over time, however, 
it became clear that what he wanted to provide for his parents was more like a sense of 
completion, a confirmation that his family has succeeded in life, not just materially, but 
also ethically. Having a nice kitchen, or a nice house more generally, is not just to avoid 
being called a “bad person.” These material successes are also reassurances that one 
is not, in fact, bad.  
 Wayan’s statement did not make sense to me initially because it diverged so 
significantly from the ethical frameworks that were familiar to me. One factor that made 
this statement so counterintuitive was that it seemed to conflate persons and things: 
what kind of person Wayan is seems to depend on what kinds of things he has. 
Meanwhile, the commonsense Western ethics in which I was raised draws a strict 
separation between human subjects and material objects. A key piece of this ethical 
framework is the normative ideal of sincerity. Within the framework of sincerity, interior 
parts of the self are understood to be the core of ethical personhood. According to this 
view, interior thoughts and motivations are the source of (ethical as well as unethical) 
acts and the proper object of ethical cultivation (i.e. efforts to cultivate virtues). Material 
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practices (including speech acts) are morally suspicious because they may 
misrepresent the interior sentiments of the actor or speaker (Keane 2002, 2007).  
 We have already seen that the deceptive potential of material practices is also 
problematic within the moral framework I am describing here. The new buildings on the 
Dauh family’s property are frustrating to members of the Dangin family because (in the 
latter’s view) they create an inaccurate (even deceitful) impression of their relatives’ 
moral status. However, the problem is not that the Dauh family’s actions are insincere. 
That would imply that what is at issue is the latter’s intentions: that the buildings are 
morally problematic because they were constructed with the intention to misrepresent 
reality. Other interactions I had with the Dangin family indicate that intentions were not 
the main issue for them, suggesting that intentions are not morally problematic in the 
same way that they are within the framework of sincerity. For example, in discussing his 
struggle to build a new kitchen before his family’s ceremony, Wayan is clear that part of 
his intention is to prevent people from calling him a bad person. In this sense, the 
project is an intentional act of impression management. His ready acknowledgement of 
this fact is significant because in all of our conversations about the Dauh family’s 
buildings he is meticulous in representing himself and the members of his family as 
morally upright. The fact that Wayan does not attempt to conceal his intention to 
manipulate others’ impressions of him suggests that he does not see this intention as 
morally problematic. Whereas, within the framework of sincerity, people look to 
  139 
intentions to discover the true moral value of actions, intentions do not seem to be a 
major concern for Wayan.104 
 As we have already seen, wealth and other signs of good fortune take on moral 
significance when they are understood to be a divine response to human activity. The 
ability to discern divine judgments on the basis of material circumstances depends on 
the abduction of a certain combination of human and divine agency. For any set of 
circumstances, other abductions are possible, which may prompt very different 
evaluations. Because of this, distinguishing whether or not divine forces contributed to 
producing a particular outcome is morally significant. The importance of this distinction 
was apparent in the ways Kompiang would gossip about the Dauh family. When we 
chatted while making food or offerings, Kompiang would often reveal what she 
perceived to be the hidden machinations behind the various signs of good fortune that 
attached themselves to her cousin-in-law, Jero Made. For example, when Jero Made’s 
husband came home with a new motorbike, Kompiang was quick to point out to me that 
it had been purchased with a loan. On another occasion, she commented on the 
offerings she’d seen Jero Made preparing for an upcoming ceremony. “Her offerings 
look very nice and expensive,” she said, with a note of irony in her voice. Then she 
pointed out that her cousin leaves the plastic wrapping on the grapes and other costly, 
ant-attractive items in her offerings. “We have no way of knowing how God consumes 
these things,” she said; then she explained that she always makes a hole in the plastic 
                                                        
104 I do not mean to suggest that intentions do not have any moral significance for my interlocutors in Bali. 
When a person causes harm to another, the question of whether they did so intentionally matters a great 
deal. Here I am making a more limited claim about the moral significance of intentions vis-à-vis acts of 
performative self-making, particularly those that involve inferences about divine agency.  
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on her own offerings, to ensure that the food inside can be accessed. During the course 
of a Balinese Hindu ritual, offerings are placed in shrines and other locations, 
whereupon deities and spirits are invited to enjoy them. Then, once the ceremony is 
over—anywhere from an hour to several days later—whatever remains in edible 
condition becomes available for human consumption. Although eating these leftovers is 
encouraged, it is not considered appropriate for a person to construct offerings with their 
own mouth and stomach in mind. From Kompiang’s point of view, the intact plastic 
wrappings in Jero Made’s offerings betrayed the latter’s cheap and selfish effort to 
ensure that the food would not spoil before the ceremony’s completion. By pointing out 
these intact plastic wrappings, my friend reframes the expensive fruits and cakes inside 
them as indexes of frugality, rather than wealth. These two moments of gossip differ in 
content, but they follow a similar pattern: first, Kompiang identifies potential signs of 
wealth and good fortune—signs which, if taken as indexes of divine judgment, would 
reflect positively on her cousin-in-law’s moral standing; then, she reveals that the true 
agency behind these observable outcomes is not divine blessing, but her cousin’s 
efforts to appear wealthy while, at the same time, acting in ways that are unlikely to earn 
divine favor. In drawing these connections, my friend is clearly sensitive to both the 
indexical and performative potential of signs of divine judgment. That is to say, she’s 
aware of the tendency to read these signs as passive, transparent reflections of some 
underlying and given reality, and she’s also aware that practices of wealth display can 
be misleading, creating the appearance of divine blessings where there are none to be 
found. Although intentions are lurking in Kompiang’s descriptions (e.g. Jero Made’s 
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intentions to appear wealthy and to preserve food) they are not the most morally 
significant issue for her. The moral weight of Kompiang’s statements derives instead 
from how they expose the ‘fact’ that Jero Made isn’t actually wealthy or devout, for if she 
was, Kompiang suggests, her husband would buy the motorbike outright, and she would 
be less worried about preserving the food and more concerned with pleasing god; she 
would cut holes in the plastic wrappings, as Kompiang herself does. In making these 
morally laden statements, Kompiang is gesturing toward the generative forces that gave 
rise to a particular set of material circumstances. While expensive offerings may invite 
abductions of divine blessing, she pushes me toward a different abduction: that Jero 
Made, not god, was responsible for these apparent ‘blessings.’ 
 To grasp the ethical import of these indexes, it may be useful to think of them not 
as representations of people’s relationships with god, but as manifestations of that 
relationship. This framing helps clarify the fact that these relationships are inherently 
mediated; they do not exist, and are not discussed, independently of the indexes that 
mediate them. Following from this, the performative acts of self-making that I discuss 
here should not be thought of only as acts of impression management (though that is 
part of what they are). These acts do not merely represent (or misrepresent) people’s 
relationships with god; they enact and materialize those relationships, making them 
available for reflection and evaluation. In a sense, they can be thought of as a kind of 
ongoing test of the relationship, whose success or failure depends on whether or not 
divine agents choose to cooperate. An individual or family may be able to manage 
impressions without divine cooperation, but only in a limited way. At some point in the 
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future, the karmic outcome of their actions will catch up to them. This means that to 
properly act within this representational economy people must consider how god will 
respond. Therefore, we must take people’s engagements with material things seriously 
as a form of ethical practice. To surround oneself with signs of divine blessing is to 
constitute oneself as a moral person.  
 Another example may serve to further illustrate this point. After a bout of severe 
food poisoning I decided I wanted to provide funds so that the Dangin family could buy a 
small refrigerator, which I hoped would help me avoid eating out at local food stalls. 
When I proposed this to the family Kompiang brought up the fact that the wall around 
the family temple remained unfinished. She noted that the cost of finishing the wall was 
roughly equivalent to the price of a small fridge and suggested that it would be better to 
finish the wall first. This wasn’t the first time I’d heard her speak disapprovingly of a 
refrigerator purchase. Just a few weeks prior, the Dauh family had bought one. At the 
time of their purchase, they were in the process of constructing their new kitchen, but 
the project had been on hold for several months. According to Kompiang, they should 
have waited to purchase the fridge until after the kitchen was complete. From her point 
of view, this inappropriately-timed purchase served as one of many examples of how 
the Dauh’s always salah arah uangnya (send their money in the wrong direction) which, 
she claimed, was one of the reasons why sampai sekarang, mereka tak punya apa-apa 
(until now, they have nothing). In expressing her hesitation about her own family’s 
decision to buy a fridge, she was certainly sensitive to how this purchase might be 
perceived by others, what impression it would give of her family’s relationship with god. 
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But she was equally, if not more concerned about how the purchase could affect that 
relationship. Members of the Dangin family often spoke about the importance of striking 
the right balance between religious and personal expenditures. Within this moral 
economy, the construction of sacred and semi-sacred structures on one’s property (a 
category which encompasses not only the family temple but also the other buildings that 
make up a traditional house, including the kitchen) should take priority over the 
purchase of things like new clothing, appliances, and other seemingly unnecessary 
items. Although she didn’t say so explicitly, I believe Kompiang was concerned that 
purchasing a fridge before completing the temple wall might upset this balance and risk 
putting her own family in the undesirable position of ‘having nothing,’ a position which is 
both material and ethical, since to have nothing is to have a broken relationship with 
god, or in Wayan’s terms, to be a “bad person.” If this analysis is correct, it follows that 
actions like buying or building things can be a form of ethical self-cultivation.  
If this conclusion seems paradoxical, that may be because it seems to suggest 
that an ethical transformation of the self can be effected simply by altering appearances. 
This apparent paradox dissolves if we remember that the signs that mediate how people 
appear to others are also manifestations of their relationship with god, and it is this 
relationship, rather than an interiorized self, that is at the core of my interlocutors’ 
conception of moral selfhood.  
 When my interlocutors make judgments about the true or hidden moral value of 
an action, the question they ask is not whether actions were sincere or insincere, but 
rather, what kinds of generative forces were involved in producing the consequences 
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that followed from the actions. If the kitchen that Wayan constructed before his family’s 
ceremony is a manifestation of divine blessing, then it carries a positive moral value 
regardless of whether he acted with the intention of manipulating his guests’ 
impressions.105 It is part of the accumulation of signs that mediate and manifest his 
relationship with god. If, however, the kitchen can be determined not to be a 
manifestation of divine blessing but a product of human agency only, then it would not 
carry this same moral value. This shows that performativity presents a different kind of 
moral problem in Bali than it does in a context where the norm of sincerity is 
predominant. Within such a context, the difficulty in evaluating others on the basis of 
indexes derives from the fact that appearances may conceal motives, intentions, and 
personal qualities that are not in keeping with the persona that is being projected. The 
challenge in that case is to look past the outward persona and see the true self 
concealed beneath it.106 But within the ethics of divine blessing the problem is that the 
signs that index divine blessing may be acquired by purely human means. Within this 
ethical orientation, discerning underlying intentions is often less important than 




                                                        
105 It’s conceivable that the kind of performative self-fashioning that troubles sincerity frameworks is 
simply taken for granted in Bali. Whereas Goffman vividly portrays the ways in which people work to 
conceal and dissimulate their acts of impression management, in order to make them appear ‘natural,’ it’s 
possible that my interlocutors in Bali accept that everyone intends to make performative claims about 
themselves, and that the important question is whether or not god steps in to support those claims.  
106 Of course, this process too depends on the reading of indexes.    
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In this chapter I have explored how a particular semiotic ideology underwrites 
and enables a unique form of ethical life in which a person’s moral status is believed to 
be reflected in their material circumstances. Within this ethical semiotics, signs of good 
and bad fortune—such as new kitchens, motorbikes, lavish offerings, skills, and 
poverty—are ethical affordances, which provide a basis for moral judgment and 
decision-making. While these signs serve as guidance for navigating a complex moral 
world, they may also be misleading. As we saw in the case of Wayan’s efforts to 
construct a new kitchen in order to avoid being seen as a “bad person,” this ambiguity 
creates spaces of possibility for people to materialize their relationship with god through 
acts of performative self-presentation, and in doing so, to redefine their moral status.  
The ethics of divine blessing provides a particularly clear illustration of the way 
ethical subjectivity grows out of, and is situated within, mediatory practices. While 
material forms are central to the ways members of the Dangin family think and talk 
about ethics, the forms of ethical life that I discuss in the remaining chapters tend to 
downplay the role of material forms, focusing instead on individuals’ interior thoughts, 
intentions, and feelings. Yet, even these more interiorized versions of ethics require 
material forms in order to gain social currency and become livable in practice. As I seek 
to show, both within the ethics of divine blessing, and in the forms of ethical life that I 
discuss in later chapters, the processes by which semiotic forms are taken up as 
affordances within the practical activity of ethical life play a crucial role in forming ethical 
subjectivities.  
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The picture of ethical life that I’ve painted here highlights signification and 
performativity. This focus on appearances, surfaces, and especially performance, may 
seem to suggest that the ethical life I’m describing lacks the kind of depth we typically 
expect of the ethical domain. Readers may wonder whether the judgments and 
evaluations I’ve discussed are truly ethical in nature, or whether they would be better 
described in other terms (e.g. as a kind of micro-politics). This would imply that what’s 
ultimately at stake in these practices is reputation, not striving to live a good life in a 
deep ethical sense. I would argue, however, that when my interlocutors engage in acts 
of performative self-presentation they are also submitting themselves to the judgments 
that result. According to Lambek, it is this condition of being subject to judgment that 
constitutes ethics (2013: 840). Rather than a simple ploy to manipulate impressions, 
these acts entail a certain kind of ethical commitment: a commitment to be held morally 
accountable if the performance fails. When successful, these performative acts can alter 
the criteria by which actors will be judged, but this is only because success is believed 
to depend on, and thus reflect, a divine moral endorsement.  
I believe the pervasive tendency to view ethics and performance as somehow 
antithetical to one another is part of the reason that questions of ethics have rarely been 
raised in the scholarship on Bali. When ethics has been discussed in this literature, it is 
usually in reference to the reformist ethics I discuss in the next chapter, not the ethics of 
customary and domestic life discussed here. It is as though Balinese Hinduism only 
begins to concern itself with ethical matters after it has been reshaped through colonial 
encounter and the demands of post-colonial nation-building and capitalist expansion.      
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I would argue instead that this line of thinking is itself grounded in a particular set of 
values that, according to Webb Keane, originated in ascetic Protestantism and 
subsequently came to influence discourses of modernity worldwide—the value of 
sincerity and the concept of moral personhood that it expresses, in particular (Keane 
2007).  
As I show in the next chapter, the idea that traditional Balinese religiosity is 
characterized by a lack of concern for ethics has been taken up by religious reformers, 
who argue that Balinese Hinduism, as traditionally practiced, is superficial—overly 
focused on the material aspects of ritual and neglectful of the deeper ethical and 
philosophical dimensions of Hinduism. In place of what they perceive to be an overly-
ritualistic approach to religion, reformers promote the doctrine of tulus ikhlas (sincerity), 
which asserts that inner feelings and intentions, not material forms, ensure the efficacy 
of worship and define the moral value of actions. In refocusing attention on sincerity, 
these reformers claim to be correcting an ‘imbalance’ in Balinese religion by reviving 
concern for ethical matters.  
Rather than seeing the Hindu Reform as (re)introducing an ethical dimension to 
religious life in Bali, the next two chapters seek to show that what the Reform in fact 
does is introduce a new kind of religious ethics based on different values and a different 
conception of moral personhood. If this reformist ethics has been more widely 
recognized as ethical by Western scholars, this is because it more closely aligns with 
commonsense Western ethical thought.  
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In this chapter, I have sought to show that although the norm of sincerity is a 
particularly pervasive ethical framework, it is not a necessary condition for ethics. It is 
possible to have a robust ethical life that does not hinge on the distinction between 
sincere and insincere action or privilege interiority as the core of moral selfhood. In the 
next chapter I show that the framework of sincerity is not just a misplaced analytical 
tool. It is also an ideological tool being employed by the Indonesian state to delegitimize 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PUJA TRI SANDHYA AND THE ETHICS OF SINCERITY 
Silencing  
 
One late morning I was watching TV in the Dangin family’s bale dauh. I Wayan 
Windia was being interviewed on a television program called Inspirasi Bali (Bali’s 
Inspiration). I recognized Windia’s name and face because I owned two of his books. I 
thought of him as a progressive thinker, not someone who wants to leave Balinese 
traditions behind, but someone who has put careful thought into how they could best be 
adapted to modern life. Windia and the program’s two hosts, one woman and one man, 
both attractive and in their twenties, were seated in chairs in front of a small table. 
Mirroring norms of dress common throughout Indonesian television, the young woman 
was dressed in a knee-length sleeveless dress and the young man was wearing khaki 
pants and a button-up shirt. Meanwhile, Pak Windia was wearing Balinese pakaian adat 
(customary dress): a black jas (jacket) with a reddish-brown batik udeng (Balinese 
headscarf) tied around his head. His appearance thus reflected both his ethnic and his 
religious identity. The conversation was about marriage. The female guest asked what 
she called a pertanyaan sederhana (simple question): kenapa kawin? (why marry?) Pak 
Windia said the first reason was to fulfill sexual needs, the second reason was to have 
descendants, and the third reason, which he described as niskala, was to menebus 
dosa leluhur (roughly: atone for ancestral sins). Dosa seperti apa misalnya? (What sins, 
for example?) the male host asked. Pak Windia demurred. Because the issue had to do 
with niskala, he explained, it was a matter of kepercayaan (belief), and therefore pribadi 
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(private, individual). Kalau tidak percaya, (if you don’t believe) their guest said, bisa 
coret saja (you can just cross it out). Windia then went on to discuss the two sekala 
(material, ‘real’) reasons for marrying in more detail, reiterating that the third reason 
tidak perlu dibicarakan (doesn’t need to be spoken about) because it was linked to 
niskala.  
In the previous two chapters I showed how the niskala world is a dynamic 
presence in the lives of the people I lived with in Bali. This presence takes shape 
through practices of myth-making, by which people attempt to interpret and evaluate 
their relationships with invisible beings, and through forms of ritual exchange and other 
communicative practices, through which they seek to manage those relationships. What 
emerges from these various activities is a particular conception of human-niskala 
relations, which sustains and is sustained by, a whole range of socio-material practices. 
In Chapter 1, I showed how practices of representing and interacting with the niskala 
world sustain particular forms of sensory attunement, which in turn sustain the sense of 
being relationally entangled with invisible beings. In Chapter 2, I showed that people’s 
relationships with invisible beings have ethical significance, and how ongoing ritual 
exchanges are central to their understanding of what it means to live a good life, and 
thus form the basis for forms of ethical self-making. 
The particular conception of human-niskala relations described in those chapters 
was not the only one that I encountered in the field. When I shifted my attention from the 
moral space of the Dangin household to that of the local mass media, I found a 
markedly different conception of this relationship. Twice per day, the local television 
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station Bali TV broadcasts recordings of dharma wacana (Hindu sermons) recorded at 
temple ceremonies and other religious gatherings throughout Bali. On April 30, the 
station aired a sermon by Ida Pedanda Gede Made Gunung, one of the program’s most 
popular preachers. He was discussing common misconceptions about buta kala (lower 
spirits). To illustrate one of his points, he depicted a hypothetical ritual. The scene was 
chaotic; there were people shouting and falling into trance. “The buta kala are going that 
way! They’re running away!” the speaker said, imitating the voices of the villagers 
performing the ritual. Then, returning to his own voice, he pointed toward his body and 
said: Padahal buta kala dini ngoyong! (However, buta kala stay here [in us]). His point 
was clear: buta kala are not beings running around out in the world, they are parts of 
ourselves. In between programs, the same station would sometimes air a short video 
clip of a middle-aged woman walking among the trees of a rubber plantation. Speaking 
in a calm and gentle voice, she admonished her (Balinese Hindu) audience to be tulus 
ikhlas (sincere) like the rubber tree, which gives without expecting anything in return. 
Like the interview with which I started this chapter, these televisual images effectively 
silence the lifeworld I described in previous chapters, bracketing it from the sphere of 
public religious discourse and replacing it with a different set of ethical values and 
ideals.  
As described in the Introduction, from the 1950s to the present, various state 
institutions have sought to impose their version of Hinduism on the Balinese population, 
a project I call the Hindu Reform. Although the post-authoritarian period has seen a 
relaxation of censorship laws and greater opportunities for religious expression, 
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reformist interpretations of Hindu doctrine and practice continue to dominate public 
discourse about Balinese religiosity. Thus, although Bali TV is not a state-controlled 
media outlet, the programs it airs tend to align with state religious doctrine and can thus  
be understood as broadly continuous with the state’s reformist project. Central to this 
project is an effort to transform how Balinese Hindus conceptualize, relate to, and 
interact with invisible beings. In this chapter I discuss one of the key tools in this effort: 
the Puja Tri Sandhya. A distinctly modern Hindu prayer, the Puja Tri Sandhya gives 
material form to several aspects of reformist Hindu doctrine and ideology. It promotes a 
monotheistic concept of divinity, a nationalistic vision of Hindu identity, and an 
individualized and dematerialized understanding of religious devotion. Of particular 
interest to me, the prayer also supports the broader reformist effort to promote what I 
call an ethics of sincerity (tulus ikhlas), a vision of ethical life that posits interior thoughts 
and feelings as the core of ethical selfhood and the primary medium of human-niskala 
interaction. The Balinese mass media is full of Hindu-themed programming that 
admonishes its addressees to be more tulus ikhlas. Yet the Puja Tri Sandhya is unique 
in that it provides Balinese Hindus with a concrete way of embodying sincerity in their 
daily lives.  
The normative ideal of tulus ikhlas, as articulated within the Hindu Reform, is 
linked to a particular semiotic ideology, which holds that sincere words and thoughts are 
the ideal medium of communication between humans and the divine, a view which 
contrasts markedly with the moral semiotics described in Chapter 2. As linguistic 
anthropologists like Richard Bauman, Charles Briggs, and Webb Keane have shown, 
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language ideologies that privilege direct, transparent forms of expression have played a 
crucial role in the construction of modernity across a range of national contexts by 
fostering new subjectivities and justifying new relations of power (Bauman and Briggs 
2003, Keane 2002). In this chapter, I make the case that the Puja Tri Sandhya is part of 
a similar ideological project.       
The Puja Tri Sandhya exists in multiple forms.107 I focus on the two most 
common of these. First, I look at the Tri Sandhya’s circulation as an audio and video 
recording. As a pervasive feature of the contemporary Balinese soundscape, I argue, 
the Tri Sandhya gives audible form to a distinctly modern form of religious identity and 
belonging. Second, I investigate the Tri Sandhya as a religious pedagogy of voice, 
which is learned in school, and, ideally, performed privately on a daily basis. I explore 
how the act of reciting the Tri Sandhya differs from other Balinese prayer practices and 
consider its role in cultivating one of the core virtues promoted by the Hindu Reform: 
tulus ikhlas (sincerity). I argue that the policy of teaching the Tri Sandhya in school is a 
tool for inculcating the norm of sincerity, while also providing Balinese Hindus with a 
way of inhabiting that norm in their day-to-day interactions with the divine. In closing, I 
consider the role of the Tri Sandhya in the lives of adults. I suggest that the prayer 
affords the possibility for a particular kind of narrative re-envisioning, and I provide some 
limited ethnographic evidence to suggest that such a process is in fact taking place.    
                                                        
107 Two interesting manifestations of the Tri Sandhya that I do not get around to discussing deserve 
mention. First, the Tri Sandhya is part of lomba desa pakraman (desa pakraman competitions), where 
pelaksanaan Tri Sandhya (implementation of the Tri Sandhya) is one of the criteria on which villages are 
judged. Second, the Tri Sandhya is part of the national Jambore Pasraman. Pasraman (ashrams) are 
informal schools where children and youth study Hinduism. The Jambore Pasraman are state-sponsored 
festivals where pasraman from across the country compete in various religious activities, including 
chanting the Tri Sandhya.  
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Puja Tri Sandhya: A Modern Hindu Prayer 
  The Puja Trisandhya is a thrice-daily private prayer introduced to Balinese 
Hinduism in the 1950s. As explained in a 5th grade Hindu Religion and Character 
textbook, the word Tri Sandhya comes from the root words tri, meaning three, and 
sandhi meaning hubungan (connection); it refers to the practice of berhubungan 
(connecting) with god three times per day (Darta and Duwijo 2014: 3). Although the 
practice did not originate in Bali, the particular form it takes there appears to be unique 
to Indonesian Hinduism.108  
The Puja Tri Sandhya is unique among reformist interventions in that it was 
unknown in Bali before the reform movement got underway. Thus, while many efforts to 
reform Balinese Hindu religiosity have consisted of applying new interpretations to 
existing material practices, the Tri Sandhya represents a rare case in which an entirely 
new practice was introduced. Though loosely based on priestly practices of mantra 
recitation, the prayer departs significantly from the ways Balinese Hindu laity typically 
interact with god.  
 In its most basic form the Puja Tri Sandhya consists of a Sanskrit mantram 
(mantra), which is chanted while maintaining a specific hand posture. The recitation is 
often preceded by an exercise to regulate the breath (pranayama). The text of the 
mantra is composed of six stanzas, which are compiled from several Vedic sources.109 
                                                        
108 According to Titib, the practice of praying three times a day is advocated in the Rgveda (V.54.6) (Titib 
1997: 31) The term also appears in the Bhagavad Gita. 
109 The text begins with the Gayatri Mantra then proceeds through passages from the Narayana 
Upanisad, Sivastava, and Ksamamahadevastuti (Titib 1997: 32-35). 
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The text discusses the unity and singularity of god and asks for god’s protection and 
forgiveness.  
 The Tri Sandhya first appeared in Bali during the post-independence period, 
when Balinese religious reformers were working to convince the Indonesian government 
that the people of Bali had a legitimate religion.110 The practice resembles the Islamic 
salat and was therefore useful for legitimizing Hinduism in the eyes of Muslims. 
According to Martin Ramstedt, the Tri Sandhya was introduced by Narendra Dev Pandit 
Shastri, a Hindu missionary who settled in Bali in 1950 and became involved with the 
Hindu Reform movement there (2004: 11-12).111 Shastri described the Puja Tri Sandhya 
in his book Intisari Hindu Dharma (The Essence of Hindu Dharma), an Indonesian-
language book that summarizes many Hindu beliefs that would eventually become 
foundational principles in the state version of Hinduism in Indonesia. He also taught the 
Tri Sandhya at Yayasan Dwijendra, a foundation and school that provided courses on 
Hinduism and served as a meeting place for reformist organizations during the early 
years of the reform movement’s existence (Landmann 2012: 257-259).   
 The Puja Tri Sandhya has been taught in Balinese public schools since at least 
the 1960s. Today Balinese students recite it at the beginning and end of each school 
day. On quiet afternoons I could sometimes hear the sound of the prayer wafting over 
from the nearby elementary school. In an interview I conducted with a teacher at the 
school, she told me that students begin learning the prayer in first grade, initially 
                                                        
110 For more on the history and development of the Puja Tri Sandhya, see Lanus 2014.  
111 Bakker claims that Shastri was sent to Bali by the Arya Samaj (1993: 227). Ramstedt supports this 
claim, but also notes that Shastri himself apparently denied it (2004: 11). Somvir, on the other hand, 
claims that Shastri’s activities in Bali were funded by the Birla Mission (2004: 258).   
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memorizing only the first stanza, then they gradually memorize additional stanzas each 
year until by the time they finish third grade they have memorized the entire text. 
 Balinese children are taught that it is their duty as Hindus to perform the Puja Tri 
Sandhya three times each day. Nevertheless, the practice of orally reciting the Tri 
Sandhya appears to be one that most adults associate primarily with their childhood and 
with school in particular. Wayan vividly described how, when he himself had attended 
the elementary school near his home, the entire school would recite the prayer 
simultaneously, each class vying to be louder than the others. Each class had its own 
distinct melody and rhythm, creating a complex polyphony. As an adult, however, 
Wayan struggled to remember some of the words of the prayer. Kompiang, for her part, 
never mentioned the Tri Sandhya to me, despite being an exceptionally devout Hindu 
who conversed with me about all kinds of other religious practices. During temple 
ceremonies in Tegal, the congregation would sometimes recite the Tri Sandhya 
immediately before the first cycle of muspa.112 However, this was not done consistently, 
and even when it was done, it was not repeated during subsequent cycles of muspa, 
which meant that only the first wave of congregants (often a small minority) participated 
in the recitation. Indeed, no one in the Dangin household, and none of the other adults I 
interviewed about the Tri Sandhya, actually claimed to recite the text in its entirety on a 
daily basis. These observations suggest that the Puja Tri Sandhya, in its recited form, 
has a limited role in the religious lives of many adults. We will see later on, however, 
that what it means to perform the Tri Sandhya is not limited to oral recitation. Given that 
                                                        
112 This is always done during the full moon and new moon ceremonies at the Jagat Natha temple in 
Denpasar, the prayers for which are broadcast live on RRI Denpasar.  
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my primary interest in this chapter is in the Tri Sandhya as a means of inculcating and 
inhabiting the state’s model of Hindu ethical subjectivity, I will give detailed attention to 
the various embodied ways of performing the Tri Sandhya later on. Before turning to 
that, however, I take a brief detour to discuss the Tri Sandhya’s mass-mediated 
presence.   
 
The Puja Tri Sandhya and the Hindu Soundscape in Bali 
 While the practice of orally reciting the Tri Sandhya is largely confined to school 
classrooms, the prayer has nonetheless become a pervasive feature of Bali’s 
soundscape, not as a live performance, but as a recording. The Tri Sandhya was first 
recorded at RRI Denpasar in 1967 for broadcast over the air. Today many recorded 
versions exist, and RRI itself has re-recorded it several times. Most recordings follow 
the basic format of the original RRI recording, in which the text is sung in a slow and 
highly ornamented manner, and it is accompanied by the sound of gender wayang (a 
small gamelan ensemble) and genta (a bell that Balinese Hindu priests ring during 
rituals). During my fieldwork, the current RRI recording was by far the most common 
version in circulation. The musical accompaniment for this recording features a gender 
composition entitled Merak Ngelo, which has today become virtually synonymous with 
the Tri Sandhya.113  
 During the period of my fieldwork the Puja Tri Sandhya was broadcast at 6am, 
noon, and 6pm on nearly all local radio and television stations in Bali. In addition to 
                                                        
113 For more on the musical accompaniment to the Tri Sandhya, see Gold 1998: 45-48.  
  158 
these on-air broadcasts, many customary village organizations have taken it upon 
themselves to broadcast recordings of the Tri Sandhya locally, on community-owned 
loudspeakers. Most often, a PA system is rigged up with a CD player and a timer, so 
that the recording plays automatically at the appropriate times, but occasionally the 
responsibility of playing the recording is delegated to a resident of the village. Almost 
invariably, the current RRI recording is used.114 Although Tegal did not amplify the Tri 
Sandhya, several nearby villages did, and their amplification was loud enough that the 
prayer could easily be heard in the Dangin family home coming from several directions. 
At noon and 6pm in particular, when many households have their television or radio 
turned on, the distant sounds of the amplified prayer would intermingle with the nearby 
sounds of on-air broadcasts. The full recording lasts about five minutes, but each 
broadcast would start at a slightly different time. This meant that over the course of 
about six minutes or so, multiple layers of the recording could be heard playing slightly 
out of synch with one another, the sound growing denser as new layers started up, then 
petering out as each recording reached its conclusion.  
 This practice of broadcasting and amplifying the Tri Sandhya invites comparison 
with the Islamic call to prayer, which is also broadcast on television in Bali and amplified 
from local mosques. Indeed, as I discuss later on, my interlocutors in Bali often equated 
the two practices. However, the meaning of the two practices is in fact somewhat 
                                                        
114 Recordings of the Trisandhya are commercially available. However, the RRI recording is not. When I 
asked an employee at RRI how people outside RRI acquired this recording, he said sometimes people 
request a copy from the station, and they give them a CD, but he speculated that most people simply dub 
the recording from the radio. Throughout my fieldwork the only location I encountered that regularly 
amplifies the Trisandhya using a recording other than the RRI recording is the Jagat Natha temple in 
Denpasar.  
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different. For one thing, Muslims distinguish between the azan (the call to prayer) and 
the salat (the five daily prayers). Meanwhile, the Hindu equivalents of these practices 
fall under the single label “Tri Sandhya,” which can refer either to the prayer itself or the 
amplified or broadcast recording, which is often thought of as a reminder for the prayer.  
Secondly, Muslims are required to perform salat at particular times of day. To hear the 
azan and not follow up by promptly performing salat is thus considered a sin.115 The 
sounding of the Tri Sandhya, on the other hand, is not widely understood as an 
imperative to stop whatever one happens to be doing and pray. As several of my 
informants told me, Hinduism is fleksibel (flexible), particularly in comparison to Islam, 
and this applies to the Puja Tri Sandhya.116 Thus, while the airing of Tri Sandhya 
recordings follows a regular schedule, the corresponding prayer practices may be 
performed at the individual’s convenience.117  
                                                        
115 Another key difference between these two practices is that the azan is generally performed live, 
whereas when the Tri Sandhya is amplified the source is typically a recording. One exception to this is 
that sometimes schools will use a PA system to amplify their daily recitations of the prayer. During my 
fieldwork I visited a school in Silungan that did this. Two students recited the text over the PA while all 
other students recited it in unison along with them, which created a more uniform effect than what I’d 
seen at the school in Tegal. The sound of the amplified recitation was loud enough to be audible 
throughout the surrounding neighborhood, whereas the sound of the school near where I lived was only 
audible to a few houses nearby.  
116 The idea that Hinduism is a more flexible religion than Islam is also a recurrent theme in reformist 
texts. Both in conversation and in texts, this claim was often accompanied by references to the Balinese 
concept of desa kala patra, which refers to the variation in custom from one village to another.     
117 Reformist texts vary as to how much flexibility is acceptable with regard to the Tri Sandhya. A 2014 
textbook for the Hindu Religion and Character curriculum (5th grade) includes a chapter on the Tri 
Sandhya that states that the prayer must be performed at 6am, 12 noon, and 6pm, and that it may also 
be performed at other times in addition to the three mandatory (wajib) iterations. However, most other 
texts are far less strict. In Upadeça Tentang Ajaran-Ajaran Agama Hindu (Clarification Regarding the 
Teachings of the Hindu Religion), one of the best-known reformist texts, The Tri Sandhya is described as 
a prayer that’s done individually, at a time and place of one’s own choosing (diwaktu dan tempat yang 
dipilih sendiri) (Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978: 71). In a more recent text entitled Menjawab 
Pertanyaan Umat (Answering the Religious Community’s Questions), the author explains that although 
the Tri Sandhya should ideally be performed during sunrise, at midday, and during sunset, he does not 
specifiy exact times for each of the three daily prayers. In a later passage he explains that while priests 
must do their prayers on a strict schedule, laity are not bound by this requirement, and failure to pray at 
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In another sense, however, the Tri Sandhya does function similarly to the azan. 
Listeners may respond to the muezzin of their own mosque while at the same time 
recognizing the call as addressed not only to a particular congregation, but to the 
Muslim umma as a whole. The azan thus summons its addressees as members of a 
global religious community.118 Similarly, amplified and broadcast recordings of the Tri 
Sandhya are understood to be addressed to all Balinese Hindus (or, for some listeners, 
all Indonesian Hindus).119 They, too, summon a trans-local religious community, albeit 
one whose reach is confined to those who share a common ethnic or national identity.  
To appreciate the significance of this, it will be useful to compare the sound of 
the Tri Sandhya to the ritual soundscape discussed in Chapter 1. As already noted, 
Balinese rituals and their associated sounds generally occur on and around particular 
                                                        
the appropriate times will not in any way reduce the worshipper’s piety (bhakti). This, he asserts, is 
because it is not the frequency but the quality (kualitas) of prayer that god evaluates (Widana 1997: 45-
52). All of the people I spoke to about this issue concurred that the schedule for the Tri Sandhya was 
merely a guideline, not a requirement.  
118 In an article on debates around the use of amplification for the calling of the azan in Pakistan, 
Naveeda Khan provides several examples to illustrate this point. She includes a conversation in which 
one of her interlocutors described the experience of hearing the azan while traveling overseas and feeling 
a sense of connection with fellow Muslims in that country (Khan 2011: 585). Further emphasizing the idea 
of the azan as something that unites all Muslims worldwide, she also quotes a book by a Pakistani imam 
that described the azan as “The Voice that Reverberates around the World at All Times.” “Have you ever 
realized,” the text reads, “that not a second passes in our world without thousands, nay hundreds of 
thousands of muezzins announcing the singularity of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be 
upon him)” (ibid.: 587). However, her article also shows that there were different styles of calling the azan 
in Pakistan, which reflected divisions within the Muslim community, along sectarian and national lines 
(583-584). Thus it would seem that the azan has the potential to address Muslims simultaneously as 
members of a global umma and of specific subgroups within that broader collectivity. 
119 My interlocutors in the field exhibited varying degrees of awareness of the Indonesian Hindu 
community beyond Bali. While many saw themselves as sharing a common religion with members of 
other ethnic groups, some seemed to be either ignorant of the fact that some non-Balinese Indonesians 
call themselves Hindus, or resistant to the idea that their own religion is in fact ‘the same’ as that of those 
other groups. As I discuss later on, another reason the Tri Sandhya is often perceived as ‘Balinese’ has to 
do with the vocal style and musical accompaniment on the recordings.  
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auspicious days. Some of these days are celebrated throughout Bali.120 Most, however, 
are not. Here I am referring primarily to temple odalan, the dates for which are unique to 
each individual temple. While an odalan is in progress, otherwise sepi temple spaces 
become exuberantly ramé, and their festive soundscapes carry well beyond the temple 
spaces from which they originate (and often beyond even the neighborhoods where the 
relevant congregations live). I would guess that from the Dangin home, the odalan of 
about fifteen temples were within earshot. For members of the Dangin family, these 
near and distant sounds marked out a complex yet familiar pattern as the sequence of 
ceremonies repeated itself every 210 days.121 The nearby sounds of the eight village 
temples in which the family regularly worships provided an appropriately festive 
atmosphere as we prepared to present offerings to visiting deities. These sounds 
enacted the desa adat as an “acoustic community,” a social body whose collective 
identity is manifested or symbolized in sound.122  The more distant sounds were sonic 
reminders of other acoustic communities. Marking ritual events in which the family was 
                                                        
120 This includes holidays like Galungan and Kuningan as well as days that are considered auspicious for 
carrying out weddings and other life cycle rituals. On particularly auspicious days many families 
throughout Bali will seize the opportunity to hold a ceremony. On such days, I was often invited to perform 
at one, or sometimes multiple, ceremonies, either playing gender with Wayan, or singing with one of the 
sekaa santi (see Chapter 4). Travelling to and from the ceremony, I would commonly see colorful 
decorative gates and groups of people in festive pakaian adat (traditional clothing) in front of many homes 
along the way, indicating that there was a ceremony taking place in the home. 
121 Since each temple has its odalan once every 210-day calendar cycle, these sounds follow a repeating, 
cyclical pattern. That said, the size and duration of each odalan may vary from one cycle to the next. For 
example, instead of completing an odalan in a single day, a congregation may choose to celebrate it for 
anywhere between three days to several weeks. Each ceremony’s impact on the soundscape will 
therefore also vary from year to year. An especially large odalan can pervade the neighborhood 
soundscape for months.  
122 I have borrowed the term “acoustic community” from Barry Truax, but my usage differs slightly from 
his. While Truax defines an acoustic community broadly as “any system within which acoustic information 
is exchanged,” I am specifically interested in patterns of (primarily environmental or broadcast) sounds 
and the groups of people for whom those sounds are relevant, and whose shared identity is therefore 
represented by the sounds (Truax 2001: 66).  
  162 
not involved, whose comings and goings were in the background of their awareness, 
these sounds were a common topic of relaxed conversation as family members tried to 
determine which neighboring village was having an odalan on a given day. Obviously, 
the specific pattern of ritual sounds that was audible from the Dangin family’s home is 
unique. In Tegal, there were periods during the calendar cycle when several temple 
odalan would happen in close succession followed by periods of relative quiet. In other 
villages, however, dates of local odalan may occur earlier or later in the calendar cycle; 
they may be more tightly clustered around particular dates or more evenly spaced 
throughout the year. The important point here is that the cyclical patterns of temple 
sounds are highly localized—like the religious communities they represent—which 
means that the soundscape of customary ritual sounds varies from one village to 
another.  
The Tri Sandhya is unique among Balinese religious sounds in that it is 
broadcast at the same time throughout all of Bali.123 The broadcast and amplification of 
the prayer thus introduces a daily cycle of religious sound that can be heard 
simultaneously across the island. Moreover, unlike the sound of odalan, the sound of 
the Tri Sandhya applies to all Balinese (and indeed, all Indonesian) Hindus, irrespective 
of their membership in specific temple congregations. The sound thus addresses its 
listeners not as members of specific customary institutions (desa adat, banjar, dadia, 
etc.), but as individuals who share a common religion: members of a pan-Balinese (or 
                                                        
123 I am not aware that the Tri Sandhya is broadcast or amplified elsewhere in Indonesia. A presenter at 
RRI Denpasar assured me that it is not broadcast on any RRI stations outside Bali. However, this does 
not rule out the possibility that it may be broadcast on other (non-RRI) stations or over PA systems.  
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national) acoustic community. Like the azan, the Puja Tri Sandhya gives sonorous form 
to a specifically religious form of identity and belonging, which transcends the 
communal and kinship bonds that form the basis for much of Balinese Hindu religious 
practice. It should be further noted that while odalan ceremonies reinforce the idea of 
localized deities that are inseparable from particular villages and temples, the notion of 
a single prayer that applies to all Balinese (and Indonesian) Hindus reinforces the 
monotheistic idea of a singular abstract god who is worshipped by the entire Hindu 
community. Monotheism is a central theme in reformist discourse and one that is further 
reinforced in the text of the Tri Sandhya, as I discuss below.  
In contrast with the azan, the Puja Tri Sandhya is unique to Indonesian 
Hinduism, and in its recorded form, it has a distinctly Balinese sound. Thus, whereas 
the azan is known throughout the Muslim world and summons Muslims as members of 
a global umma, the gamelan accompaniment included on most recordings of the Tri 
Sandhya bears the unmistakable mark of Balinese cultural identity.124 The Balinese 
quality of the prayer is also emphasized in the video recordings that accompany 
televised broadcasts. Nearly all of the videos broadcast on Balinese television stations 
feature images of Balinese rituals. People in Balinese traditional dress are prominently 
featured as are famous temples and other features of Bali’s landscape. These 
recordings invariably include subtitles in Sanskrit and Indonesian. While the use of the 
national language points toward a national Hindu community, the use of Balinese script 
                                                        
124 While instruments called gender are shared across several Indonesian gamelan traditions, the specific 
ensemble used on these recordings, known as gender wayang, is unique to Bali, though I believe a 
closely related ensemble is also found in the neighboring island of Lombok.    
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for rendering the Sanskrit on some of the televised recordings is an additional link to a 
distinctly Balinese cultural identity.   
 Tri Sandhya recordings endeavor to bridge the gap between customary forms of 
worship and the modern religious ideologies of the state. However, public soundings of 
the recording can highlight disjunctures between these two spheres of religious 
knowledge and practice. As noted earlier, locations that amplify the Tri Sandhya often 
rely on a timing system so that the prayer plays automatically at 6am, noon, and 6pm. 
The sound is typically loud enough to be heard throughout the village and in several 
neighboring villages. This means that when the prayer is playing the area around the 
loudspeaker can become quite noisy—enough to make conversation difficult, or even 
impossible—for about five minutes. If the sound plays automatically it can be quite 
disruptive. The first time I attended class at IHDN a recording of the Puja Tri Sandhya 
suddenly started playing in the middle of the instructor’s lecture. I glanced around to see 
if any of the students would take the opportunity to pray. None did, or at least, not 
visibly. After a brief pause, the instructor tried to resume his lecture, shouting over the 
sound of the recording, but the volume was so loud that it was impossible to make out 
what he was saying. After a minute or so he gave up and the class sat awkwardly 
waiting for the recording to end. Lebih baik dikecilkan (it would be better if it was turned 
down), the instructor said when it finally finished. I witnessed another interruption of this 
kind while attending a ceremony at a temple in Klungkung. While we were seated inside 
the temple waiting to perform collective prayers (muspa) a recording of the Tri Sandhya 
suddenly started playing on a loudspeaker right outside the temple. The people 
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gathered in the temple looked around with bemused expressions on their faces. A 
dancer who was in the midst of a topeng pejegan (sacred masked dance) performance 
seized the opportunity to make a joke: Om bhur bwah swah, amonto gen tiang inget 
(“Om bhur bwah swah [first line of the Tri Sandhya], that’s all I remember!). Again, no 
one responded by visibly praying. Later on, however, the congregation recited the Tri 
Sandhya as a group before doing muspa. These disruptions emphasize the lack of fit 
between the state’s idealized notions of how Hindus ought to pray and actually existing 
prayer practices. As I discuss later, Balinese Hindu prayer is typically embedded within 
a longer ritual process, which involves the presentation of offerings. Therefore, rather 
than being timed to a specific schedule, it is done when the appropriate point in the 
longer process has been reached. The idea of individually taking time to pray while 
being in the middle of some other activity—as is expected within Islam—is quite 
unknown within Balinese customary practice. 
 Interviews that I conducted in several villages that amplify the Tri Sandhya 
indicate that while few people view the sound of the prayer as an essential part of 
Balinese Hindu worship, its amplification is nonetheless widely seen as important. When 
I inquired further, my interlocutors almost invariably spoke of Islam, saying things like 
‘Muslims have the azan; Hindus have the Tri Sandhya.’ Others answered in ways that 
revealed uneasiness about the perceived or potential Islamization of Bali’s soundscape. 
During an interview at RRI Denpasar, one of the station’s most well-known presenters, 
and a host of several religious programs, told me that there was a plan to amplify the Tri 
Sandhya in all of the banjar in Denpasar. When I asked him why, he said it was 
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because the sound of the azan was growing increasingly common; amplifying the Tri 
Sandhya was a way to mengantisipasi, supaya ‘balanced’ (anticipate, so that [the Hindu 
and Muslim soundscapes] will be balanced). The five daily repetitions of the Muslim call 
to prayer have in fact become a powerful presence in some Balinese neighborhoods, 
against which the traditional Hindu soundscape, with its irregular patterns of 
ceremonies, can seem to fade into the background. Playing the Tri Sandhya over 
loudspeakers three times a day is seen by many of the people I spoke to as a way to 
preserve the Hindu identity of an increasingly diverse religious space.125   
While the Puja Tri Sandhya has been taken up as a way of preserving the Hindu 
character of Bali’s soundscape, the version of Hindu-ness that is sounded through the 
prayer is distinctly modern. The sound of the prayer summons Balinese Hindus as 
members of a pan Balinese, and, somewhat more tenuously, a national and even 
global, Hindu community. This in turn reinforces a monotheistic conception of the divine, 
which aligns with state policies that require all Indonesian citizens to worship Tuhan 
Yang Maha Esa (the Almighty God). By sonically embodying a de-localized Hindu 
community sharing in the worship of a single god, the Tri Sandhya interpellates its 
addressees as national subjects.  
 However, this does not mean that listeners will necessarily experience the prayer 
in this way. The prayer affords opportunities for Balinese Hindus to imagine themselves 
                                                        
125 In an article on the amplification of the azan in Singapore, Tong Soon Lee describes how mosques 
reduced the volume of their loudspeakers as neighborhoods became more religiously diverse (1999). In 
Bali, the trend seems to be moving in the opposite direction as increasing diversity motivates more 
widespread use of amplification, at least among the island’s Hindu majority. When the azan is amplified in 
Bali, it tends to be at a much lower volume than in other regions of Indonesia.  
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in particular ways and to experience particular forms of belonging, but there is no 
guarantee that they will actually engage with the prayer in this way. In fact, some of my 
interlocutors said that they hear the sound as little more than an indicator of what time it 
is.  
 How, then, might the Tri Sandhya contribute to the shaping and re-shaping of 
ethical subjectivity in Bali? To begin exploring this question, I turn to consider how the 
Tri Sandhya is taught and performed in school. For students in Balinese public schools, 
the Tri Sandhya is more than just background sound. Hindu students are required to 
recite the prayer at the beginning and end of each school day, and they are also 
provided instruction as to what the Tri Sandhya means and what its purpose is. School 
is therefore an important site for examining the Trisandhya’s role as a tool of ethical 
reform.126   
 
Embodying the Puja Tri Sandhya 
 To begin it is important to point out that by the time children begin learning the Tri 
Sandhya in school most of them have already been participating in prayer for a number 
of years. Children typically accompany their parents to religious ceremonies where they 
join in the collective prayers.127 I have seen infants as young as six months old being 
                                                        
126 I did not have IRB clearance to conduct research with children. Although I did observe the Tri Sandhya 
being performed in a couple of schools I did not observe classes or conduct interviews with students. My 
analysis in the next section is therefore based on interviews I conducted with adults, including one 
elementary school teacher and one junior high school teacher. I also discuss textbooks and teacher 
manuals for the 2014 Agama Hindu dan Budi Pekerti (Hindu Religion and Character) curriculum, which 
offer instruction in the Tri Sandhya.  
127 Belo states that mothers are permitted to begin bringing infants to temple once the child has 
undergone its sambutan ceremony at three months of age (Belo 1953: 36). 
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held on a parent’s lap while the latter presses the child’s tiny hands together in a 
sembah (gesture of prayer where the palms of two hands are pressed together with the 
fingers straight and pointed up). This prayer practice is called muspa after the offerings 
of flowers (puspa) which are held between the fingers, or mabakti, from the Sanskrit 
word bhakti (devotion or piety). Muspa generally takes place near the end of a ritual, 
after a series of rites have been carried out by the priest and his or her assistants.128 
During odalan ceremonies, for example, each family in the congregation will bring a 
basket of offerings to the temple (maturan). The priest presiding over the ceremony 
utters mantras and rings a genta (bell) to ‘send’ (ngastawayang) the offerings to the 
visiting deities while the people (women, primarily) who presented the offerings 
participate in a series of sembah (prayers). Nowadays, these prayers are typically led 
by a penginter (M.C.) who announces each sembah over the temple PA system.129 
Typically the penginter instructs the worshippers as to the deity or deities to whom each 
prayer is dedicated and the flower offering that should be used in each case.130 The 
                                                        
128 For a detailed description of these rites, see Belo 1953: 20-34. 
129 I have been told that before amplification was widespread, people prayed sendiri-sendiri (individually, 
i.e. not in unison). This aligns with Belo’s description in Bali: Temple Festival, which is based on fieldwork 
conducted in the 1930s (Belo 1953: 34-36). According to one of my elderly informants, as the population 
grew and temple ceremonies became increasingly crowded, it was desirable to have a penginter to keep 
the prayers orderly. With the leadership of a penginter, the prayers happen in waves: a group of people 
will fill the temple, place their offerings, pray in unison, receive holy water, then exit en masse, allowing 
the next group, who will have been lining up outside, to enter.  
130 There have been some efforts among reformist Hindus to impose a standard pattern on these prayers. 
This standard pattern, known as kramaning sembah, consists of a series of five sembah or prayers. 
According to the book Sembahyang ke Tempat Suci (Praying at Sacred Places), kramaning sembah 
begins with a sembah puyung (empty prayer, i.e. without flower offering), then proceeds through prayers 
to the god Siwa Raditya (also called Sang Hyang Surya), the gods/goddesses who have assembled at 
the temple (which the book calls “Ista Dewata”), and god as the giver of blessings (Bhatara Samodaya); 
the sequence ends with another sembah puyung (Arwati 2006: 24-31). During my fieldwork I found that 
this general pattern was followed by the penginter at most, but not all, of the ceremonies I attended. 
When the penginter diverged from this pattern, it was typically to insert additional sembah, which were 
performed alongside those just listed.  
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purpose of maturan (bringing voluntary offerings to temple during an odalan) is to pay 
reverence to the visiting deities; the accompanying prayers serve the purpose of asking 
the gods to witness this act of reverence and give blessings to the families who 
presented them. Following muspa officiants give each of the congregants tirta (holy 
water) and bija (rice grains, which are placed on the forehead). After receiving these, 
the congregants disperse.  
 The Puja Tri Sandhya is different from muspa in several respects. This means 
that when children enter school they begin learning to pray in a new way. One 
significant difference is that the Puja Tri Sandhya is readily detachable from the 
materialities of customary worship. Muspa is generally performed as part of a larger 
ritual. This need not be a temple ceremony, as just described, though these are 
probably the most common contexts in which people participate in muspa.131 The fact 
that muspa happens in the context of a larger ritual most often means that it requires 
entering sanctified spaces, such as pura (temples), mrajan, or sanggah (house 
temples). To enter these sanctified spaces, people must dress in pakaian adat 
(traditional dress) and must not be sebel (in a state of ritual impurity as happens 
immediately following the death of a family member, and to women during menstruation 
and immediately following the birth of a child). According to this custom, participation in 
prayer is also subject to these same restrictions. Although the Tri Sandhya is also 
                                                        
131 During life cycle rituals, the individuals undergoing the ritual typically muspa; however, the other 
attendees at the ceremony do not participate. Some Balinese Hindus also muspa at home on a daily 
basis (typically in the morning). However, as I discuss later, this private form of prayer is often equated 
with doing the Tri Sandhya, so I believe it should be understood as distinct from other forms of muspa. In 
its most typical form, muspa is a form of prayer that accompanies the presentation of offerings.  
  170 
sometimes done in ceremonial contexts, it is most pervasively envisioned as a private 
prayer performed independently of ritual events. It can therefore be performed 
anywhere, by anyone, regardless of their appearance or state of bodily purity. This point 
is driven home in a recent Balinese Hindu self-help book entitled Menjawab Pertanyaan 
Umat (Answering the Religious Community’s Questions). In a chapter entitled “Tri 
Sandhya during Menstruation,” the author explains that Hindus are permitted, and 
indeed expected, to perform the Tri Sandhya even when in a state of sebel, as during 
menstruation. This, the author claims, is because the Tri Sandhya does not require the 
worshipper to enter a sanctified space, so it’s not subject to the restrictions that apply to 
other forms of prayer. The Tri Sandhya can even be done in one’s bedroom, the author 
explains, so although it is popular to perform it in one’s house temple, this is not, in fact, 
a doctrinal requirement. This option of performing the Tri Sandhya within the private 
space of the bedroom was also presented in a recent school textbook, which included 
photographs of the proper posture for performing the Tri Sandhya while lying down in 
one’s bed (Darta and Duwijo 2014: 9). 
 Another way the Tri Sandhya is different from muspa is in the emphasis it places 
on individual responsibility. When women maturan and muspa at their village temples, 
they do so on behalf of their family. While it is considered beneficial for other family 
members to join as well, they do not need to do so in order to receive benefits. In the 
Dangin household Kompiang was usually the one who would maturan for odalan in 
Tegal. However, if she was menstruating she could send her younger sister instead. 
Wayan and his male siblings would often go separately to muspa, but not always. For 
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them, the purpose was more social than religious, since the crucial act of performing 
maturan was carried out by the women. Their elderly mother rarely attended temple 
ceremonies in the village, but she would often pray from the family’s mrajan instead. As 
noted in Chapter 1, people’s obligations toward niskala beings are understood to be 
shared, not individual. The practice of muspa also fits this description in that it can be 
delegated to, or performed on behalf of, other people. The Puja Tri Sandhya, on the 
other hand, is an individual responsibility. At least in theory, each individual Hindu is 
supposed to perform it three times each day.  
 One of the most crucial differences between muspa and the Puja Tri Sandhya 
has to do with the use of offerings or other material items (sarana). As described above, 
muspa is most commonly performed in conjunction with maturan or some other form of 
presenting offerings. As traditionally understood, the offerings are the primary medium 
of interaction between the worshipper and god; the prayers that follow are merely to ask 
god to bear witness to the fact that the offerings were presented on behalf of a particular 
group of people. The Puja Tri Sandhya, by contrast, is usually performed without any 
kind of sarana. As explained in prayer books and by nearly everyone I interviewed on 
the topic, the purpose of the Tri Sandhya is to focus one’s thoughts on God. As one 
elementary school teacher explained to me, students are taught that thinking about God 
as they recite the Tri Sandhya is in itself a way of maintaining a proper relationship with 
God. This act of thinking is thus the source of the Tri Sandhya’s efficacy, and thought, in 
this sense, takes on a role traditionally played by propitiatory objects and gestures.  
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 This notion that thought can be an efficacious way of maintaining a proper 
relationship with god raises significant questions about Balinese religious practice. If it is 
possible to pray effectively without any kind of offering, then what is the purpose of 
holding elaborate rituals involving hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of 
offerings? In this chapter, I focus on how this idea challenges the ethical disposition I 
described in Chapter 2. As noted above, I see the Tri Sandhya as an ideological tool 
whose purpose, in part, is to transform Balinese ethical subjectivity. The proposed 
transformation has crucially to do with how the prayer positions interior thoughts and 
feelings (rather than material objects and gestures) as the primary medium linking 
humans to the divine, a framing which supports the broader reformist project of placing 
interiority at the center of Balinese Hindu ethics. Before delving further into how the 
prayer inculcates this interiorized ethical disposition, I need to clarify how my analysis 
departs from other scholarly writing on the ethical dimensions of the Hindu Reform. 
While I agree with much of what has been written about the Hindu Reform, I take issue 
with how the topic of ethics has been discussed in the literature. In my view, authors 
have tended to rely on an overly narrow (and peculiarly Western) conception of ethics, 
which has the unfortunate consequence of deflecting attention away from the 
ideological project to reconfigure Balinese ethical subjectivity.  
 
Ritual vs. Ethical: A False Dichotomy 
 Throughout the scholarship on religious modernization in Bali, there is a 
tendency to characterize the state-sanctioned version of Hinduism as having an ethical 
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bent (Bakker 1993: 274, Geertz 1973a: 175, 185, 188). The most detailed discussion of 
this matter appears in the work of Leo Howe, who writes that the Hindu reform proposes 
a shift away from a “ritual interpretation” of religion toward an “ethical interpretation” 
(Howe 2005: 68). Howe characterizes this shift as a “protestantization” of Balinese 
Hinduism: “a belief in the importance of ethical conduct and inner spirituality rather than 
in external ritual and magical action” (ibid.: 7). He further explains this difference by way 
of a discussion of two divergent Balinese interpretations of caru rituals (rituals for lower 
beings or buta kala). According to Howe, most Balinese Hindus believe that buta kala 
“are real entities with an independent existence, [who] consequently must be given 
offerings. . .in order to assuage and change them.” Meanwhile, the minority of reformist-
oriented Hindus in Bali see buta kala as “symbols of morally bad behaviour,” an 
interpretation which places less emphasis on placating spirits, and more on “monitoring 
[one’s] own behavior in ethical terms.” It would seem, then, that part of what Howe 
means by a ritual orientation to religion is one in which religious practice is directed at 
entities outside the self, while within an ethical orientation, it is the self that is the 
primary object of religious concern. He further elaborates this difference in his 
discussion of the Balinese saying suci baan banten, suci baan kenehe, which he 
translates as “pure through offerings, pure through thoughts.” According to Howe, 
Balinese Hindus interpret this saying in one of two ways. Some see it as meaning that 
“a benefit—becoming suci, or pure—can be obtained in two different ways, either 
through material offerings or through purity of thought.” Howe writes that this 
interpretation “adds weight to the idea that malevolent spirits are real physical entities 
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which can be placated with offerings of real meat.” Others, however, see purity of 
thought as the crucial element. According to this explanation, “offerings are merely 
outward signs of inner sincerity, and therefore not really necessary.” This latter 
understanding of the saying, Howe states, “places the emphasis on an ethical 
interpretation rather than a ritual one, since it relates to a person’s actions and 
intentions” (Howe 2005: 71-72, my emphasis). Here again, the difference between the 
ritual and ethical interpretations of religion hinges on whether concern and action are 
directed primarily toward the self or external entities.    
Howe is right to emphasize the diversity of Balinese beliefs about niskala beings 
and human obligations toward them. His description of two distinct interpretations 
regarding caru rituals resonates with much of what I’ve written: what he calls a “ritual 
interpretation” of religion mirrors what I described in Chapter 1 and 2, while his “ethical 
interpretation” aligns with the television clips discussed above. Problematically, though, 
Howe’s analysis seems to be rooted in a narrow conception of ethics, which views 
interiority as the core of ethical selfhood and thus expects ethical practice to be directed 
inward, toward the interior aspects of the person. This is why, in his view, ritual appears 
to be opposed to, rather than central to, ethics. 
As I argued in Chapter 2, Balinese Hindu ritual has important ethical implications, 
and many of these are intertwined with beliefs about the existence and potency of 
invisible beings and the “magical” efficacy of ritual action, beliefs which Howe locates 
within his “ritual interpretation.” By setting up a contrast between these beliefs and those 
more explicitly focused on individual conduct and character, and by claiming that the 
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latter amount to an “ethicized reworking of Balinese religious ideas” (ibid.: 7), Howe’s 
analysis seems to deny—implicitly, and perhaps unintentionally—that the practices of 
ritual exchange that I described in Chapter 1 and 2 can be ethical in any ‘real’ sense. 
Although the ethics of divine blessing is largely implicit—embedded in everyday practice 
and informal talk rather than formalized moral codes—it is an ethics no less insofar as it 
guides people’s judgments and actions (Keane 2016: 24-26, Lambek 2010: 2-3). To 
claim that the Hindu Reform proposes a shift from a ‘ritual’ to an ‘ethical’ orientation is 
problematic not only because it overlooks the ethical dimensions of ritual exchange, but 
also because it resonates with reformist discourse, which casts the average Balinese 
Hindu as being overly focused on the ritual aspects of their religion while neglecting its 
ethical aspects.132 Although Howe’s analysis lacks the normative tone of reformist 
discourse, it is nonetheless complicit with the ideological claim that ethics is a matter of 
inner disposition and character, not material exchanges between humans and invisible 
beings.  
In the introduction to this dissertation I proposed that it will be useful to think of 
Balinese Hinduism as a moral assemblage, a heterogeneous collection of practices, 
values, and beliefs concerning what it means to live a good life, be a good person, and, 
especially, be a good Hindu. The Hindu Reform, itself a diverse collection of sometimes 
                                                        
132 According to reformist discourse, Hinduism is made up of three components: tatwa (philosophy), susila 
(ethics), and upacara (ritual) (Jyoti 2012: 41-44, Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978: 13-14). These 
three elements ought to be kept in balance, but in Bali, the reformist argument goes, people have been 
overly focused on ritual, allowing the philosophical and ethical aspects of their religion to wither away 
(Jyoti 2012: 53-58). Reformist texts stress the need to correct this imbalance and propose a variety of 
solutions. This way of conceiving of ethics and ritual as two distinct components of religion (rather than, 
for example, seeing ritual as a form of ethical practice) serves to justify reformist interventions, such as 
efforts to reduce the amount of time and resources that Balinese Hindus expend on ritual. 
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conflicting values and doctrines, provides some key components of this assemblage, 
but, as we saw in Chapter 2, it is not the only source of Balinese Hindu ethical thought. 
Rather than enacting a shift from a ritual to an ethical orientation to religion, what the 
historical emergence of the Hindu Reform has done is introduce a new set of ethical 
values and projects that diverges from the ethics embedded in domestic and communal 
ritual practice. I would therefore propose that we conceive of the Hindu Reform’s ethical 
project as an ongoing and incomplete effort to enact a shift from an ethics of divine 
blessing to an ethics of sincerity. Interaction between these two competing ethical 
frameworks is a characteristic feature of contemporary Balinese Hinduism, and it will be 
a key theme of the remaining chapters of this dissertation.  
 
The Puja Tri Sandhya and the Ethics of Sincerity 
 The theory and practice of praying without offerings, as promoted by way of the 
Puja Tri Sandhya, is linked to a broader reformist argument about Balinese Hindus’ 
relationships with god. While most Balinese believe that material offerings are 
necessary to maintain a proper relationship with the niskala world, reformers assert that 
offerings are unnecessary. According to this view, the efficacy of ritual and prayer 
comes from the interior disposition of the worshipper, not the material objects 
exchanged.133 This means that rather than concerning themselves with the material 
                                                        
133 When reformers make this claim, they often back it up by citing verse 9.26 from the Bhagavad Gita, 
the Indonesian translation of which reads “Kalau seseorang mempersembahkan daun, bunga, buat atau 
air dengan cinta bhakti, Aku akan menerimanya” (If one offers Me a leaf, a flower, fruit, or water with love 
and devotion, I will accept it) (Prabhupada 2000). The idea here is that rather than desiring the kinds of 
elaborate offerings typical of Balinese ritual, god will accept any form of devotion provided it is offered out 
of devotion. During a class I observed at IHDN the instructor recited this verse in reference to his claim 
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dimensions of ritual, people should worry about cultivating a proper disposition toward 
ritual acts. According to reformist discourse, the worshipper’s interior disposition is what 
god cares about, and without a proper attitude, worship will be ineffective (Jyoti 2012: 
48-51, Parisada Hindu Dharma [1967] 1978: 32). Within reformist discourse, this ideal 
disposition is called tulus ikhlas (sincere, sincerity).134 The Indonesian phrase tulus 
ikhlas has become ubiquitous in reformist Hindu discourse. We have already 
encountered one example of it in the television clip, described earlier, admonishing 
Hindus to model themselves after rubber trees. The phrase also appears frequently in 
the sermons aired on Bali TV, both in the sermons themselves and in the band of titles 
that periodically appears across the bottom of the screen. These titles list some of the 
themes covered in the sermon, and they frequently include exhortations for Balinese 
Hindus to be more tulus ikhlas. For example, during a sermon broadcast on April 27, 
2014 on the topic upacara yadnya sebagai media pendidikan untuk meningkatkan 
moralitas umat (ritual as an educational medium for improving the religious community’s 
morality), one of the themes listed in the titles was menyembah tuhan dengan hati yang 
tulus ikhlas (worship god with a sincere heart). Another sermon broadcast on May 8, 
2014 included a title that read selalu tumbuhkan sifat tulus ikhlas (always cultivate 
sincere character).   
                                                        
that Hindus boleh sembahyang tanpa sarana banten (are permitted to pray without offerings) (see also 
Jyoti 2012: 49).  
134 The Arabic-derived word ikhlas is used widely in moral and religious discourse in Indonesia (for 
example, see Hoesterey 2016). Here I focus specifically on its usage in reference to Balinese Hindu 
religiosity.  
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 As used in reference to Balinese Hinduism, the phrase tulus ikhlas has a similar, 
though not identical meaning, to the Protestant notion of sincerity as discussed by 
Webb Keane in his writings on Calvinism in Sumba (2002, 2007). Keane asserts that 
the framework and performance of sincerity has been important in enabling new, 
distinctly modern, forms of subjectivity among Sumbanese converts to Calvinism. Given 
Keane’s attention to the role of mediatory practices in enabling particular forms of 
selfhood, his work can serve as a model for thinking about the Puja Tri Sandhya and 
how it might contribute to enabling a distinctly modern form of ethical subjectivity rooted 
in the value of sincerity. According to Keane, the notion of sincerity (as generally 
understood in English) is rooted in a set of beliefs about language, selfhood, and social 
relations that privileges interiority as the core of selfhood and draws a sharp distinction 
between the inner world of the self and the outer world of social and material relations 
(2002: 68-69). As semiotic ideology, the framework of sincerity assumes that a person’s 
outward speech, action, and demeanor may potentially misrepresent their true 
motivations and intentions, and as a normative ideal, it places a high value on forms of 
expression that are transparent representations of internal thoughts and feelings (i.e. 
“sincere” forms of expression) (ibid.: 74-75). According to Keane, representational 
practices and ideologies related to the notion of sincerity (such as praying from the 
heart rather than a written text) are an important means by which the transcendent and 
autonomous subject of modernity is made to “work in concrete terms that can become 
part of ordinary everyday experience” (ibid.: 79). I would suggest that the Puja Tri 
Sandhya serves a similar purpose in the Balinese context, making the abstract idea of 
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the tulus ikhlas Hindu person into something that people can actively ‘be.’ Following 
Keane, I believe such mediatory practices are necessary for abstract theories about 
subjectivity and selfhood to have meaning in people’s lives (ibid.: 74, 2003: 413, 2007: 
68).  
 In the discourse about Balinese Hinduism, tulus ikhlas is most commonly used to 
describe ritual and prayer. Like the more general understanding of sincerity, it refers to 
a particular alignment between a person’s inner disposition and their outward action. 
The discourse of tulus ikhlas is also based on (and promotes) certain assumptions 
about ritual, namely, that the purpose of Balinese Hindu ritual activity is to express one’s 
love (cinta kasih) and devotion (bhakti) toward god without hope of receiving anything in 
return (kerja tanpa pamrih). As we saw in Chapter 2, this is not how all Balinese 
understand ritual in all cases. Within the reformist discourse of tulus ikhlas, however, 
this is more or less taken as a given. To be tulus ikhlas, outward representations of 
devotion—such as the presentation of offerings—must be backed up by internal feelings 
of devotion (rasa bhakti).  Thus, when Hindu reformers instruct Balinese Hindus to 
“worship god with a sincere heart,” what they mean is that the worshipper must actually 
feel the devotion that is given form in their outward gestures of piety.   
 To better understand the meaning of tulus ikhlas in reformist discourse, it will be 
useful to consider the kinds of attitudes and motivations that reformers contrast with the 
feeling of sincerity. Reformist discourse gives several reasons why the feeling of tulus 
ikhlas may be lacking. For example, the worshipper may not understand the purpose of 
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ritual activity and may simply be blindly following along.135 Or, the worshipper may have 
limited personal involvement in the ritual, simply letting the priest and other officiants 
take care of everything (Jyoti 2012: 55-58). In either case, there is a disconnect 
between the material activity of the ritual and the inward disposition of the worshipper, 
rather than the kind of alignment that characterizes sincerity. Relatedly, a person may 
participate in ritual activity because they feel social pressure to do so. For example, 
people often feel pressured to spend lavishly on ritual, and they may do so even when 
they can’t afford it and must resort to selling land or taking out a loan. According to 
reformist discourse, such acts are not tulus ikhlas because the worshipper feels forced 
into them (ibid.: 33). In each of these three cases, the individual’s acts of religious 
devotion are not tulus ikhlas because they are, in a sense, not wholly their own, not 
authentic. The sincere individual must be self-aware and autonomous; their actions in 
the ritual sphere must be transparent expressions of that awareness and autonomy.  
 Another reason ritual activity may not be tulus ikhlas is that the worshipper may 
have ulterior motives. For example, their activity in the ritual sphere may be motivated 
by pamer (showing off) or gengsi (prestige) (ibid.: 10, 56). Or, it may be a way of 
seeking particular kinds of material benefits, such as wealth (ibid.: 13). In other words, 
the worshipper may be acting out of a desire for personal gain. This is insincere 
because ritual acts are presumed to stand for the worshipper’s devotion. If the 
intentions behind them are tainted by motivations other than that of expressing 
                                                        
135 Hindu reformers use the Balinese phrase nak mula keto (or simply mula keto), which roughly 
translates as ‘what’s been done from before,’ as a parody of someone who unthinkingly repeats handed-
down ritual traditions without understanding their meaning or purpose. For example, see Jyoti 2012: 36, 
76-80. See also Howe 2001: 173.  
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devotion, then there’s a disjuncture between interior attitude and outward gesture, 
meaning that the gestures are not tulus ikhlas.   
 To pose the question of whether religious activity is tulus ikhlas or not is already 
to make certain assumptions—about the purpose and meaning of ritual, about the 
nature of the human subject and its relationships with other beings and with the material 
world—that conflict with the beliefs described in earlier chapters. What emerges from 
these discourses about tulus ikhlas is not just a particular view of how Balinese Hindu 
ritual ought to be performed, but also a particular conception of ethical selfhood. While 
the forms of myth-making discussed in Chapter 1 and 2 emphasize the entanglement of 
humans with invisible and social others and with the material world, the ethics of 
sincerity imagines a religious self that is abstracted from these entanglements. The 
discourse of tulus ikhlas emphasizes autonomy, individuality, and interiority.  
 Now I would like to consider how the Puja Tri Sandhya may provide a way of 
inculcating and inhabiting this distinctly modern self-understanding. I have already noted 
that the process of learning and reciting the Tri Sandhya in school teaches Balinese 
Hindu children that they can connect with god without the use of material mediations; 
without entering sanctified spaces or wearing traditional dress; without giving offerings 
or relying on priest’s mantras to connect them with god. This process also teaches 
children that prayer is their individual responsibility, not something that can be handed 
off to someone else. By learning the Tri Sandhya in school, Balinese Hindus are 
familiarized with, and socialized into, an interiorized, de-materialized relationship with 
the divine. In the next section I focus on the language of the Tri Sandhya. I argue that 
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the Tri Sandhya promotes a distinctly modern understanding of religious language, 
which further reinforces the notion of an interiorized religious subject.  
 
Subjectivity and the Language of Prayer 
One way the Puja Tri Sandhya works to make a modern religious subjectivity 
inhabitable for Balinese Hindus is by promoting new ways of using language to connect 
with god. When performing muspa, Balinese Hindus typically pray dalam hati (silently, 
from the heart). Although the Hindu Religion and Character curriculum teaches specific 
mantras to be recited during muspa, in practice people often pray in more personal and 
spontaneous ways. This was brought to light during a call-in television show I watched 
during my fieldwork. In the evening the members of the Dangin family would frequently 
gather in the bale dauh to watch television, some attentively, others more passively. On 
one such night we watched part of an on-air healing program on Bali TV. This was one 
of several programs in which the public was invited to call in to discuss their health 
problems and receive healing over the phone.136 The idea behind these programs is 
that the host has the power to effect cures by way of his mediated voice and image. On 
this particular evening, the program was hosted by a Javanese dukun (traditional 
healer), but the callers were Balinese. During one call, the host instructed the male 
caller to berdoa menurut kepercayaan sendiri (pray in accordance with your own belief). 
There was silence on the line. After a long pause, the host repeated his prompt for the 
caller to pray. Again, his request was greeted with silence. As the dukun kept repeating 
                                                        
136 These programs are referred to as penyembuhan jarak jauh (long-distance healing).  
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his requests, the viewers gathered in the bale dauh became increasingly amused. 
Finally, the host asked the caller to pray supaya saya bisa dengar (so that I can hear). 
Another lengthy silence followed, then the caller finally responded maaf pak, saya tak 
bisa (I’m sorry sir, I can’t), whereupon the bale dauh erupted with laughter. Part of the 
reason this awkward interaction was so humorous was that it revealed the Muslim 
host’s lack of knowledge about the religious norms of his Balinese audience, which in 
turn cast doubt on his legitimacy as a religious healer, which, even before this incident, 
was quite dubious to those around me. The host was apparently unaware that Balinese 
Hindus typically pray silently, and furthermore, that they do so (more often than not) 
without using publicly recognized entextualized prayers, and in some cases, without 
using language at all. Thus, while attempting to situate his show as non-denominational 
by asking callers to pray “in accordance with their own beliefs,” the host also defines 
‘prayer’ as something that takes the form of an audible (presumably linguistic) formula 
that can be comfortably performed in public, like the texts recited during the Muslim 
salat. It is entirely possible that the caller was praying in accordance with his own belief 
the whole time, but because the host was unfamiliar with Balinese assumptions about 
prayer, he failed to recognize this.  
 While the gestures of Balinese Hindu prayer are formalized and standardized, 
the internal mental activity that accompanies these gestures is not (or at least, not to the 
same degree). As explained earlier, the most common form of prayer, muspa or 
mabakti, is often done as part of the practice of maturan (bringing voluntary offerings to 
temple on behalf of one’s household). In this practice, the offerings are the crucial 
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medium of human-divine interaction; prayer is secondary, and according to Balinese 
beliefs, it does not need to take any particular verbal or textual form to be effective. The 
physical gesture of obeisance is sufficient. This is evidenced by the fact that infants may 
begin praying before they possess language, and further supported by the ways my 
interlocutors spoke about prayer.137 When I first began participating in Balinese Hindu 
prayers, I was told to follow along with the outward gestures; no one instructed me 
regarding my thoughts. Then one day, after I had already been visiting Bali for a few 
years, Wayan asked me what I think about when I pray. I told him that I typically tried to 
meditate, stopping the language of my thoughts and focusing on my breath or other 
sensations, such as environmental sounds or the smell of incense and flowers. I 
expected that he would tell me this was ‘wrong,’ or at least unusual, but instead he told 
me that he sometimes does the same. In another conversation, however, he told me 
that he sometimes silently recites the last stanza of the Tri Sandhya when performing 
muspa, suggesting that his prayer practices do not follow any fixed pattern. When 
people did offer instruction as to how to direct my thoughts during prayer, they often told 
me to ask for something. For example, when I was applying to graduate school, friends 
instructed me to pray that I would be accepted. Before leaving to travel out of Bali, 
Kompiang and Wayan would often take me around to the village temples to pray, and 
on these occasions, they instructed me to ask for protection during my trip. This practice 
of asking for something during prayer aligns with Belo’s description of prayer in 1930s 
Bali. Belo writes that during the ceremony she observed, some of the worshippers 
                                                        
137 Of course, one could question whether Balinese believe infants’ prayers are efficacious.  
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brought especially lavish offerings to the temple in fulfillment of a “promise” that they 
had made to the gods (i.e. they had previously requested something from the gods—a 
cure to an illness, the return of a lost cow—and promised the gods that if their request 
was fulfilled they would bring certain gifts to the temple in return) (Belo 1953: 36). 
Members of the Dangin family would also make these sorts of agreements with the 
gods in their mrajan (household temple), praying for help with some difficulty or other 
and promising to make specific improvements on the mrajan (e.g. adding new shrines, 
building a surrounding wall, etc) if the help was granted.138 In the context of muspa, 
people seem to pray in a spontaneous, personal, and context-dependent manner, and 
they may even pray without using language.  
 The personalized forms of prayer just discussed stand in contrast to the practice 
of reciting mantras (mantram), which is another way Balinese Hindus connect with god. 
The terms mantra and mantram are used in Bali to refer to entextualized Sanskrit 
phrases that are believed to produce some sort of effect in the world.139 According to 
                                                        
138 As I discuss more later on, there are standardized Hindu prayers in Sanskrit, which are taught in 
school and circulated in prayer books, but these do not seem to be widely used, or at least, praying in a 
more impromptu manner is not widely considered to be any less effective than using a written formula, 
despite reformist claims to the contrary. The mantras that the priest recites during muspa are responsible 
for enabling the necessary connection between human and divine worlds; for the congregants to recite 
mantras as well could therefore be seen as redundant.  
139 Much has been written about Balinese beliefs about the power of written and spoken language and I 
can only briefly mention a few points here. Zurbuchen has written that Balinese understand language as 
an interface between macrocosmic and microcosmic realms, whose sounding through vocal recitation 
makes possible the union of human and divine power. Sacred syllables are uttered by priests as a means 
of achieving unity with the supreme deity, a feat which enables the priest to produce the divinely infused 
water (tirta) used in Balinese Hindu worship. As Zurbuchen describes it, the priest’s mantras are able to 
affect the outer world because they are “a distillation of the ‘written language within the body’ (sastra ning 
sarira), a literal exhalation or ‘ex-pression’ (forcing out) of inner power toward some external goal” 
(Zurbuchen 1987: 96). According to Lansing, Balinese believe the Sanskrit language is particularly 
powerful because its words are connected to the things they signify not by arbitrary convention but by an 
intrinsic iconicity. This iconicity—which allows words to bring about the things that they name—is not 
unique to the Sanskrit language; it is also present in other archaic languages, such as Kawi, but to a 
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traditional beliefs, using these phrases poses significant dangers and should only be 
undertaken by people who can handle these dangers.140 Therefore, practices of 
chanting, reading, whispering, or silently reciting mantras are strongly associated with 
priests and other religious adepts, such as traditional healers (balian), who are believed 
to have the requisite power to deal with the forces that these phrases can unleash. 
While many Balinese living today believe in the power (and possible danger) contained 
in language (and especially written texts), the taboo on studying and reciting Sanskrit is 
no longer in effect.141 It is difficult to know to what degree this shift is attributable to state 
efforts to promote the Puja Tri Sandhya, as well as the use and study of Sanskrit texts 
more generally, but certainly these efforts have played a role. Today, Sanskrit phrases 
have become an ordinary part of everyday life in Bali. For example, the phrase om 
swastiastu is used as a formal greeting, and the phrase om santi santi santi om is used 
to close an event, such as a radio or television program or a public gathering. 
Performers of pepaosan (discussed in Chapter 4) recite the mantra om awignamastu 
before they perform. And of course, the Puja Tri Sandhya is itself referred to as a 
mantra, as are the doa sehari-hari (everyday prayers), which I discuss later.  
 As we can see from the discussion thus far, Balinese Hindus use language to 
interact with god in at least two distinct ways: through spontaneous, personal forms of 
                                                        
lesser degree. Sanskrit, believed to be the oldest language, is considered the most powerful (Lansing 
1983: 86-87). 
140 Some manuscripts contain warnings against sharing the text indiscriminately (aja wera) (Zurbuchen 
1987: 60-61). Because the power embodied in texts is potentially dangerous, priests and others who 
undertake intensive study of sacred texts must undergo ritual purification (mawinten) to prepare 
themselves for contact with this power.  
141 I spoke with one of the gender players on the original 1967 recording of the Tri Sandhya and he said 
that at that time, it was highly unusual for ordinary lay persons to recite mantras.  
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prayer they request blessings and protection from god, and through the entextualized 
language of mantra they seek to use the divine power contained in language to achieve 
a variety of ends. These practices reflect underlying beliefs about language, or what 
linguistic anthropologists call language ideology. Within the particular language ideology 
at play in the prayer practices just described, archaic languages (Sanskrit in particular) 
are believed to be imbued with the power to bring about changes in the material world, 
and thus should not be used casually. Meanwhile, the languages of everyday 
communication, such as modern Balinese and Indonesian, are primarily valued for their 
referential function (i.e. as a means of conveying information), as in the practice of 
‘asking for something’ through prayer.  
 Changes in language ideology have been key to the production of modern 
subjects across various contexts (Bauman and Briggs 2003). Here again, Keane’s 
writing on Sumba can serve as an illustration. Keane writes that while Catholics and 
ancestral ritualists use formulaic, entextualized language to pray, Sumbanese Calvinists 
value spontaneous, authentic forms of prayer. Hence, Keane writes, they conspicuously 
close their eyes during prayer (2002: 77). Theirs is a distinctly modern language 
ideology, which treats the individual’s interiority as the locus of agency; from their point 
of view, the use of language in ancestral ritual appears as a kind of idolatry, a 
misattribution of agency to words themselves which at the same time fails to recognize 
the true agency and autonomy of the individual human subject. The practice of 
engaging in sincere Protestant prayer gives embodied form to a range of abstract ideas 
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about language and personhood that are foundational to many understandings of 
modernity.  
 How does the Puja Tri Sandhya compare to Calvinist prayer, and to other 
Balinese prayer practices? With its use of entextualized Sanskrit language, the Tri 
Sandhya would seem incompatible with a modern view of language as primarily 
referential. I would suggest, however, that despite its apparent similarities to traditional 
forms of mantra recitation in Bali, the Puja Tri Sandhya in fact functions as a means of 
inculcating a modern language ideology. To understand how this is so, it will be useful 
to look at the relationship between language and the speaker’s interiority as configured 
in reformist discourses about prayer and in the language of the prayer itself. One way 
interiority comes into these discourses is around the issue of the meaning contained in 
language. Here I would like to focus on a chapter on the topic of mantra, which appears 
in a teacher’s manual for the 2014 Hindu Religion and Character curriculum (7th grade 
level). When we pray, the text states, it is best to use a mantra; however, if we do not 
understand the meaning of the mantra, then it is best to pray in our mother tongue, the 
language we understand best (Sugita and Widia 2014: 55). Later the author explains 
that to pray using a mantra that we don’t understand has no benefit; like a piece of 
firewood that has been soaked in oil, which will not burn unless you light it with a match, 
so too is the person who recites mantras without ever receiving the illumination of true 
knowledge (ibid.: 65).  According to this view, simply uttering the words of a mantra has 
no effect; in order for the words to have efficacy, their meaning must be understood by 
the speaker. Further driving this point home, all mantras discussed in school textbooks 
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and commercially available prayer books are accompanied by a translation into 
Indonesian. Likewise, as noted earlier, television broadcasts of the Tri Sandhya also 
always include subtitles in Indonesian. This emphasis on meaning and understanding 
around the Tri Sandhya stands in stark contrast to traditional beliefs about mantra. Belo 
quotes a priest stating that he “would not dare to understand” some of the mantras he 
recites, for fear of coming to harm, implying that these mantras are capable of 
producing effects whether or not the priest understands them (Belo 1953: 9). Indeed, it 
seems that the priest’s ability to use the mantra effectively depends on him not 
understanding it. Within the language ideology promoted in this textbook, however, it is 
the speaker’s interiority (rather than material form, such as sound or written shape) that 
imbues language with efficacy. This language ideology emphasizes the interior self as 
the site of agency. Words do not have power independent of the speaker’s 
consciousness and intent.   
 To ‘understand’ a mantra is to have a particular interior relationship to its 
meaning. Within the textbook view of Hindu prayer, this relationship seems to have two 
facets. On the one hand, the speaker must know what the words of the mantra signify, 
and on the other hand, they must be able to select the mantra that is appropriate in 
each context (Sugita and Widia 2014: 61). Understanding, in this sense, is a matter of 
both comprehension and intention. The difference between the priest who ‘dare not 
understand’ the mantras he recites, on the one hand, and the kind of recitation 
advocated in the teacher’s manual, on the other, can be thought of as a difference in 
what Goffman has called “participation roles” (cf. Keane 2000: 272). This concept is 
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meant to draw attention to the fact that people can have different kinds of relationships 
to spoken or written language, as, for example, animator, author, principal, or some 
combination of these.142 In the case of mantra recitation, the animator is the person 
reciting the mantra, while the author is the deity whose words are being recited.143 This 
much is true for both the priest and the teacher’s manual. The difference lies in the role 
of principal, the person (or other being) responsible for the message contained in the 
mantra. For the priest who ‘dare not understand’ the mantras he recites, his role is 
confined to that of animator. By contrast, the teacher’s manual calls on people to be 
both animator and principal of the mantras they recite. That is to say, students must be 
able to use mantras in such a way that the words of the mantra correspond to their own 
intentions (yang dimaksudkan), otherwise they would be better off simply praying using 
the language they ‘understand best.’ When used correctly, a mantra is a verbal 
reflection of the speaker’s interiority. In this view, language’s power lies in its capacity to 
externalize the speaker’s own thoughts and feelings.144 Without entirely removing divine 
agency from the picture, the conception of mantra recitation outlined in the teacher’s 
manual places greater responsibility in the hands of individual worshippers, whose 
interior alignment with the meaning of public texts is necessary for the language of 
prayer to be effective.  
                                                        
142 Keane provides a clear illustration of the distinctions between animator, author, and principal: “A press 
secretary may animate words whose author is a speech writer but whose principal, the person 
responsible for the message, is the President (who may in turn be claiming to speak in the name of the 
nation)” (2000: 272).  
143 The rsi, or prophet, who recorded the mantra is also understood to be a kind of animator, who 
rendered god’s words in written form.  
144 It should be noted that the teacher’s manual also gestures toward the magical power of mantras, 
claiming that they can produce getaran energi Tuhan (a vibration of Divine energy), which in turn can help 
people achieve goals and avoid harm.  
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 This alignment between mantra texts and speakers’ interior intentions is 
emphasized in Indonesian translations of the Tri Sandhya as well as the other mantras 
discussed in school textbooks, known as dainika upasana or doa sehari-hari (everyday 
prayers).145 Below I’ve included a rendering of all six stanzas of the Puja Tri Sandhya in 
three languages. The Sanskrit and Indonesian were taken from a 2014 Hindu Religion 
and Character textbook (5th grade level) (Darta and Duwijo 2014: 6-7).146 
 
 Sanskrit Indonesian English 
1 Om bhur bhuwah swah 
Tat sawitur warenyam 
Bhargo dewasya dhimahi 
Dhiyo yo nah pracodayat 
Oh ya Tuhan penguasa 
alam bawah, tengah, 
dan  alam atas. Kita 
memusatkan pikiran 
pada kecemerlangan 
dan kemuliaan San 
Hyang Widhi Wasa, 
semoga Ia berikan 
semangat pikiran kita.  
Oh Lord, you are the 
ruler of the lower, 
middle, and upper 
worlds. We focus 
our thoughts on the 
radiance and glory 
of Sang Hyang Widi 
Wasa.147 May He 
inspire our thoughts.  
2 Om Narayana ewedam 
sarwam 




Sudho dewa eko 
Narayano na dwitiyosti kascit 
Oh ya Tuhan yang 
disebut Narayana148 
adalah semua ini apa 
yang telah ada dan apa 
yang akan ada, bebas 
dari noda, bebas dari 
kotoran, bebas dari 
perubahan tak dapat 
digambarkan, sucilah 
Dewa Narayana, Ia 
Oh Lord, who is 
called Narayana is 
everything, 
everything that has 
been and everything 
that will be, free 
from flaws, free from 
dirt, free from 
change, which 
cannot be 
                                                        
145 These prayers can be found in Darta and Duwijo 2014: 11-12.  
146 The English translation of the text is my own. I have tried to adhere to the meaning of the Indonesian 
translation of the prayer as provided in the textbook since very few Balinese readers would understand 
the Sanskrit. I have changed some of the punctuation for clarity. 
147 Sang Hyang Widi Wasa is the name given to the supreme deity in Indonesian Hinduism, who is, as far 
as I know, of undefined gender. My use of the pronoun “He” in the next sentence could thus be contested. 
The Indonesian translation uses the pronoun “Ia”, which is gender neutral.  
148 I have replicated the use of italics in the original. The italicized terms are proper names and the non-
Indonesian word papa, which means sin or sinful in Sanskrit, but means poor or miserable in Balinese. I 
have translated papa as sinful, in part because of the use of the Indonesian term for sin (dosa) in stanza 
5 and 6.  
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hanya satu tidak ada 
yang kedua.  
explained. Lord 
Narayana, the pure 
God, He is only one, 
there is no other.   
3 Om tvam Siwah tvam 
Mahadewa 
Iswara Parameswarah 
Brahma Wisnucca Rudrasca 
Purusah parikirtitah 




Wisnu, Rudra, dan 
Purusa.  





Rudra, and Purusa. 
4 Om papaham papa 
karmaham 
Papatma papasambhawah 
Trahi mam pundarikaksa 
Sabahnya bhyantara sucih 
Oh ya Tuhan hamba ini 
papa, perbuatan hamba 
papa, diri hamba papa, 
kelahiran hamba papa, 
lindungilah hamba Sang 
Hyang Widhi Wasa, 
sucikanlah jiwa dan raga 
hamba. 
Oh Lord, I149 am 
sinful. My acts are 
sinful, my person is 
sinful, my birth is 
sinful. Protect me oh 
Sang Hyang Widhi 
Wasa. Purify my 
soul and body.  
 
5 Om ksama swamam 
Mahadewa 
Sarwa prani hitankara  
Mam moca sarwa papebyah 
Palaya swa Sadasiwa 
Oh ya Tuhan, ampunilah 
hamba, Sang Hyang 




bebaskanlah hamba dari 
segala dosa, lindungilah 
oh Sang Hyang Widhi 
Wasa.  
Oh Lord, forgive me. 
Sang Hyang Widhi 
Wasa, who offers 
salvation to all 
creatures, liberate 
me from all of my 
sins. Protect me oh 
Sang Hyang Widhi 
Wasa.  
6 Om ksantawya kayiko dosah 
Ksantawyo wacikomama 
Ksantawyo manaso dosah 
Tat pramadat ksama 
swamam 
Om, Santih, Santih, Santih, 
Om  
Oh ya Tuhan, ampunilah 
dosa anggota badan 
hamba, ampunilah dosa 
perkataan hamba, 
ampunilah dosa pikiran 
hamba, ampunilah 
hamba dari kelalaian 
hamba, Oh ya Tuhan 
damai di hati, damai di 
dunia, dan damai 
Oh Lord, forgive the 
sins of my body, 
forgive the sins of 
my words, forgive 
the sins of my 
thoughts, forgive the 
sins of my 
negligence. Oh 
Lord, may there be 
peace in my heart, 
peace in the world, 
                                                        
149 Throughout the Indonesian translation the word hamba (roughly, your humble servant) is used for all 
first-person pronouns (i.e. when the speaker of the prayer refers to him or herself). For the sake of clarity, 
I’ve translated these as “I,” “me,” and “my,” which obscures the deferential character of the Indonesian 
version of the text.     
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selamanya Oh ya 
Tuhan.  
and peace always, 




As we can see, the Tri Sandhya—at least in its Indonesian translation—is a prayer 
addressed to god in the second person. The first three stanzas address god in various 
manifestations, emphasizing the monotheistic idea that although Hindus use many 
names for god, the divine is ultimately singular (“He is only one, there is no other”). This 
passage is important as it serves to insert a properly monotheistic conception of god 
into the thoughts and speech of each individual Hindu.150 My primary interest, however, 
is in the final three stanzas. Here, the text shifts focus from describing god to describing 
the first-person speaker of the prayer, who is acknowledging their own sinfulness and 
seeking god’s forgiveness and protection. This passage of the prayer aligns with the 
ethics of tulus ikhlas described above, in that it constructs a relationship between 
worshipper and god that is based on devotion, protection, and forgiveness, rather than 
the bestowal of material blessings. More to the point about language, however, is the 
way the prayer makes use of first-person pronouns to construct the text’s meaning as 
an index of the worshipper’s own ideas and sentiments. Here I will refer to the 
constructed “I” of the prayer as the principal and will use the term animator to denote 
the actual living individual reciting the prayer. It will be useful to distinguish these two 
roles analytically, though, ultimately, I argue that part of the power of this text lies in how 
it collapses this distinction. Throughout the second half of the Tri Sandhya the principal 
                                                        
150 This passage is also noteworthy because, as noted in Chapter 1, Balinese are often reluctant to 
describe god. 
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is identified with the term hamba, which means servant, but which is used here as a 
status-differentiating first-person pronoun. Thus, rather than “Oh Lord, I am sinful,” a 
more accurate translation would be something like “Oh Lord, your humble servant is 
sinful,” with the understanding that the principal is referring to him or herself as a 
humble servant. This first-person term hamba appears thirteen times over the course of 
the second half of the text. Not only does this repetition highlight the deferential 
relationship between the text’s principal and its addressee (god), but it also establishes 
an intimate relationship between the language of the prayer and the individual reciting it 
(the animator). Through its repeated use of the first-person pronoun, the prayer 
constructs the animator as personally identified with the text of the prayer, and thus 
configures the language of the prayer as an expression of the animator’s own 
consciousness. (Or, to put it slightly differently, we could say that in the act of reciting 
the prayer, the animator in a sense takes on the constructed identity of the principal). 
Thus, although the prayer is a compilation of divinely authored texts, it is structured as a 
reflection of the reciter’s own beliefs and desires. A similar use of first-person pronouns 
in Indonesian translations of Sanskrit mantra appears in doa sehari-hari. For example, 
the 5th grade Hindu Religion and Character textbook mentioned above includes prayers 
to be recited while waking up in the morning, washing your hands, beginning work, and 
other ordinary tasks. The Indonesian translation of the prayer for waking up reads Om 
Hyang Widhi, hamba memujaMu bahwa hamba telah bangun pagi dalam keadaan 
sehat (Oh Lord, I worship you because I have woken up in a healthy condition) (Darta 
and Duwijo 2014: 11). As with the Tri Sandhya, the Indonesian translations of these 
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prayers serve to configure them as expressions of the individual’s wishes and 
intentions.  
 The Puja Tri Sandhya can be usefully compared to the Protestant creed as 
analyzed by Webb Keane (2007: 67-76). As Keane describes it, a creed is a verbalized 
statement of religious beliefs, which is typically formatted as a series of sentences that 
each begin with the phrase ‘I believe.’ Keane sees creeds as a significant feature of 
Protestant religiosity because they reinforce the centrality of personal belief in defining a 
person’s religious identity. Through the reciting of a creed, Keane contends, external 
doctrine is (ideally) united with inner, personal conviction. The performative assertion “I 
believe,” enacts an alignment between the language of the creed and the interior 
disposition of the person reciting it.  Whether or not the reciter identifies privately with 
the beliefs expressed, the creed as performance nonetheless reinforces the importance 
of personal identification with doctrinal teachings, and it gives people a socially legible 
way of inhabiting that identification in daily life. “In this way,” Keane writes, “semiotic 
form facilitates a disciplinary practice that tends toward bringing inner thoughts into line 
with public doctrine,” while at the same time, the first-person structure of the text “offers 
a paradigm for being agentive toward one’s own thoughts” (2007: 71-72). Thus, while 
Calvinists typically avoid the use of entextualized language in their worship, preferring 
more spontaneous (and thus apparently more authentic) forms of expression, the creed 
is an exceptional case where a written formula can serve as a means of performing 
sincerity and of embodying the interiorized, autonomous subject that the norm of 
sincerity presupposes and promotes.  
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 While the Puja Tri Sandhya does not make explicit reference to the interiorized 
notion of belief, the first three stanzas do lay out the core theology of reformist 
Hinduism, a theology which many Balinese Hindus would recognize as corresponding to 
the Brahma Sraddha (roughly, “Belief in God”), one of the “Five Beliefs” (Panca 
Sraddha) of Hinduism as taught in Balinese public schools. The opening stanzas of the 
prayer would therefore be recognizable to many as a statement of belief, even if not 
explicitly labelled as such. Like a creed, the Tri Sandhya provides Balinese Hindus with 
a socially legible way of performing sincere belief. Moving to the latter half of the prayer, 
the use of first-person pronouns enacts an alignment between entextualized language 
and individual consciousness, similar to that which Keane describes for creeds. As I 
discuss later, Balinese Hindus understand that the Puja Tri Sandhya is meant to model 
and activate a personal, interiorized relationship with god, and furthermore, they see 
their own interior disposition (rather than the sonic or linguistic form of the prayer) as the 
crucial factor in ensuring the prayer’s efficacy as a means of maintaining a proper 
relationship with god.   
 The promotion of Sanskrit prayers in Hindu Religion and Character textbooks 
may seem to foster the belief that language has an agency of its own, independent from 
its users, a view which contradicts the ethics and semiotics of sincerity as I have been 
describing them. I would argue, however, that these textbooks in fact do more to 
support a modern language ideology than they do to undermine it. In requiring students 
to ‘understand’ the mantras they recite (that is, to comprehend and intend the meanings 
they contain) the school curriculum effectively takes the language of divine power and 
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makes it into a medium for self-expression. The fact that this medium is accessible to 
anyone acts as an additional counterweight to traditional beliefs about the power and 
potential danger of Sanskrit words. Rather than teaching students to attribute agency to 
words, the process of learning to recite these prayers functions rather to give structure 
and order to prayerful thoughts while at the same time normalizing the casual use of 
Sanskrit in everyday life.   
 The Puja Tri Sandhya promotes the value of tulus ikhlas in multiple ways. As a 
request for forgiveness (rather than, say, some kind of personal benefit) the prayer 
aligns with arguments that Balinese Hindu worship should be motivated by devotion and 
gratitude, not the desire for personal gain. In staging an alignment between the interior 
discourse of thought and the outer discourse of language, the Tri Sandhya positions the 
interior self as the core of personhood and the primary object of religious concern and 
cultivation. Just as acts of ritual devotion are useless if not backed up by sincere feeling, 
so prayers will be ineffective if not supported by corresponding intentions, thus 
worshippers should worry about their interior dispositions, not material form. (This is 
emphasized by the claim that if you don’t understand the meaning of a mantra, then it’s 
best to pray in your own language). While the discourse and pedagogy surrounding the 
Puja Tri Sandhya promote a particular way of conceptualizing prayer, the prayer, as a 
linguistic and embodied practice, affords concrete ways of ‘being’ a particular kind of 
Hindu. However, it does not determine that people will actually ‘take up’ the 
subjectivities it makes available. To understand how the Tri Sandhya is in fact reshaping 
ethical subjectivity in Bali requires looking beyond the performative and linguistic 
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structure of the prayer. In closing this chapter, I would like to turn to a few ethnographic 
examples that shed light on how the forms of subjectivity that it offers as affordances 
are actually taken up and inhabited in daily life. 
 
Feeling Sincerity: Narrative Re-envisioning and the Reformist Hindu Self 
 In Chapter 2 I argued that the ethical relationships that my interlocutors maintain 
with invisible beings—and with each other by way of those beings—are not based on 
the norm of sincerity but derive their ethical significance from a different evaluative 
framework.  While my interlocutors did try to peer behind the obvious surfaces of things 
to get at the hidden sources and causes of observable circumstances, these efforts 
were not aimed at seeking out individuals’ intentions, the true but potentially hidden or 
purposefully obscured motivations that lie behind actions. Instead, in evaluating 
people’s actions and behavior, my interlocutors tried to discern what forms of agency—
human, divine, magical—were involved in creating the situation in which those people 
found themselves. Was a family’s apparent wealth a blessing from god or the fruit of 
stinginess and frugality? Was an individual’s illness due to black magic or shortcomings 
in the ritual sphere? The answers to these questions have important moral implications 
for the individuals’ involved. Within the ethics of sincerity, the salient questions are 
different. Here, determining whether someone acted morally or not depends centrally on 
discerning the true motivations behind their actions. Are a woman’s lavish offerings a 
sincere expression of devotion or merely an attempt to show off her family’s wealth? 
When a student recites a prayer, does he mean it? 
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 This plurality of ethical frameworks and dispositions within Balinese Hinduism is 
what I mean to capture in referring to Balinese religion as a moral assemblage. Cheryl 
Mattingly has suggested that the inherent pluralism of ethical life may facilitate the 
process of what she calls “narrative re-envisioning,” the activity of coming to reimagine 
oneself and one’s commitments and in doing so to become, in effect, a different kind of 
(ethical) self (Mattingly 2014a: 20). The reformist discourse of tulus ikhlas, and the 
embodied and linguistic practice of the Puja Tri Sandhya, seem targeted at bringing 
about just this kind of transformation. What kind of effects is this discourse having? Do 
Balinese Hindus ever think in terms of the norm of sincerity? Do they make evaluations 
in light of this norm? If so, how would we access this ethnographically?  
 One way to begin to get at these questions is to look at how people responded 
when I asked them if they perform the Tri Sandhya. One man laughed when I posed this 
question to him. He readily admitted that he never does the Tri Sandhya, and he said he 
suspects that, outside of school contexts, almost no Balinese Hindus do. But he was the 
only person who responded this way. Everyone else told me that they perform the Tri 
Sandhya regularly (albeit perhaps not three times each day). However, these 
performances did not necessarily involve reciting the entire text of the prayer. (Indeed, 
as noted earlier, none of the adults I interviewed claimed to recite the entire text on a 
daily basis). When asked if they perform the Tri Sandhya, a few people told me that 
they pray in their household temple each morning. Further questioning revealed that 
these daily prayers took the same basic form as muspa (hands in a sembah, holding 
flowers) and did not involve reciting the text of the Tri Sandhya. Nonetheless, 
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respondents equated this practice with performing the Tri Sandhya because, like the Tri 
Sandhya, it constitutes a daily routine of private prayer. For these respondents, the Tri 
Sandhya had a broader meaning than what is given in school textbooks, encompassing 
a variety of different ways of privately connecting with god on a daily basis. Some 
informants even told me that they perform the Tri Sandhya without uttering any words or 
adopting any particular bodily gestures or postures; the important thing, they said, is to 
ingat (remember) God. This conception of the Tri Sandhya as something that can be 
done entirely mentally, without having to move one’s body or take time out from other 
activities, was supported by the elementary school teacher I interviewed. She said that 
the Puja Tri Sandhya—the idea of praying at fixed times every day—is really a kind of 
crutch to help people learn how to remember god; once a person advances beyond a 
certain stage, they will be able to remember god all the time, and no longer need to do 
anything physical in order to achieve this.  
 If it is true, as my interviews suggest, that few adults regularly recite the Puja Tri 
Sandhya, this may seem to indicate that the practice has not had a significant impact on 
religious and ethical subjectivity in Bali. However, even if an individual does not recite 
the prayer, this does not necessarily mean that they do not engage with the ideals that 
the prayer embodies. The norm of sincerity rests on the idea that a person’s internal 
thoughts and feelings about god are more important than the material forms that 
mediate worship. Thus, to perform the Tri Sandhya through thinking alone is fully in line 
with reformist semiotic ideology.151 The Puja Tri Sandhya provides a set of concrete, 
                                                        
151 We could imagine an opposite scenario in which people recite the prayer assiduously, but with the 
hope that it will produce magical effects. Such an outcome would run counter to the reformist project.   
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mediatory forms that facilitate and promote a reimagining of human-divine relations and 
ethical subjectivity. When my interlocutors interact with god without material 
mediations—without offerings, without words, without bodily gestures—they are taking 
on a distinctly reformist form of ethical selfhood.  
 I would like to suggest that the Puja Tri Sandhya, broadly understood as the 
practice of maintaining an interiorized relationship with god, also affords particular ways 
of feeling (or, as it were, not feeling) the links between human and invisible worlds. In 
reformist discourse, tulus ikhlas is often identified as a feeling (rasa tulus ikhlas). This 
feeling is described in depth in a recent book entitled Reformasi Ritual: Mentradisikan 
Agama bukan Mengagamakan Tradisi (Ritual Reform: Making Religion into a Tradition 
is not Making Tradition into a Religion), a kind of reformist manifesto.152 One of the 
book’s basic arguments is that Balinese adat ritual is a product of, and most ideally 
adapted for, an agricultural society. When Bali’s economy was still primarily agricultural, 
the author claims, people had plenty of time and resources to hold elaborate rituals. 
However, now that Bali’s economy has shifted toward the tourism industry, and now that 
it has become integrated into the global economy, Balinese livelihoods have become 
more precarious. Materials that were once widely available have become scarce and 
expensive; people must perform wage labor to support themselves and their families, 
                                                        
152 I cite this book frequently in this chapter partly because it provides one of the most sustained 
engagements with what I am calling the ethics of sincerity, but also because it seems to have strong 
backing from state religious bodies, as evidenced by the number of key figures who contributed Kata 
Sambutan (prefaces) at the beginning of the text, a list which includes representatives of the Parisada 
(PHDI), the Balinese Provincial branch of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, the Balinese parliament 
(DPRD), the National Hindu Theological Institute (IHDN), the Majelis Desa Pakraman (MDP), and the 
Indonesian Hindu University (UNHI), where the author of the book is also a faculty member. The back 
cover also includes a comment from the head of the Hindu branch of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion 
at the national level.  
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leaving less time for ritual pursuits; Balinese must now compete with migrants ‘who just 
so happen to have another religion,’ and this creates a situation where ritual risks 
making people unable to compete for jobs. This in turn threatens the entire island’s 
identity (Jyoti 2012: 1-5). As a result of all of this, ritual activity has become a source of 
stress and anxiety (ketakutan, kegelisahan, stres) (ibid.: 30, 75). With all of these 
worries, the feeling of tulus ikhlas cannot be achieved. Since the sincerity of ritual is 
what matters to god, rituals performed under these conditions will be sia-sia (useless) 
(ibid.: 14). Due to the mismatch between ritual traditions and modern livelihoods, many 
Balinese have come to see their religion as expensive and difficult (mahal, sulit, 
memberatkan), and they have begun to feel burdened by it (terbebani) (ibid.: 21, 25). 
The author contests this idea, saying that while Balinese adat traditions are indeed 
burdensome, Hinduism itself is not. In other words, adat is the problem, and adat 
customs can be abandoned if they are no longer cohesive with the demands of the 
times (ibid.). The solution, then, is for people to reform their ritual traditions so that they 
do not impose an undue burden. Instead of being swayed by social pressure to perform 
lavish rituals that strain their time and resources, people must learn to perform ritual 
comfortably and confidently (tanpa ragu-ragu) because only then can those rituals truly 
be sincere (untainted by social pressure) (ibid.: 14).  
 The feeling of tulus ikhlas, thus described, contrasts markedly with the feelings of 
relational entanglement described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Members of the Dangin 
household are deeply sensitized to the ways their material action (or inaction) in the 
ritual sphere produce reactions in the invisible world, leading in turn to positive or 
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negative effects in the human sphere. They are also sensitive to how their actions will 
be perceived and evaluated by other people. Their relationships with invisible beings 
are permeated with feelings of obligation, anticipation, anxiety, and sometimes even 
anger. These feelings, though sometimes unpleasant, are viewed as a natural, and 
even a valued, part of these ethical relationships.  
 To feel tulus ikhlas is, in a sense, to learn not to feel this dynamic 
interrelatedness. In promoting a form of religiosity based on rasa tulus ikhlas (the feeling 
of sincerity), reformist discourses promote a new kind of sensory order. Rather than feel 
the weight of ritual obligations—the anticipation and anxiety that accompany the high-
stakes ordeal of managing relationships with invisible beings, the anger and 
disappointment when misfortune strikes—people should instead simply feel grateful for 
whatever benefits god sends their way. If they choose to express their devotion through 
material offerings, this act must be purified of all concern regarding the expense, value, 
or prestige associated with those offerings. In semiotic terms, the offerings must have a 
purely symbolic function, not an indexical one.  
 Based on what I described in earlier chapters, this way of thinking about feeling, 
sincerity, and the value of ritual action might seem like it would be completely foreign to 
the Dangin household. However, this was not entirely true. Wayan, the most educated 
member of the family, maintained somewhat different views than the rest of his family 
on certain aspects of religious practice. One day Wayan and I visited a childhood friend 
of his so that I could interview the latter for my research. I asked the friend whether he 
did the Tri Sandhya on a regular basis and he told me he prays every morning in his 
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household temple. Wayan and his friend then got into a conversation about how much 
they enjoyed praying alone. They both agreed that praying in one’s house temple was 
more pleasurable than praying in village or other public temples. The friend said that he 
often feels kedinginan (chills) when praying at home, a sensation which is commonly 
understood as evidence of divine presence. They said they could achieve a deeper 
connection with god at home than they could at public temples.  
 At other times, Wayan sometimes complained that he didn’t feel good praying at 
public temples. One night I accompanied a few members of his family to watch a 
performance at a large odalan in a neighboring village. The temple was exceptionally 
crowded; the audience for the performance stood so tightly packed together in the 
courtyard outside the temple that even in the cool night air the space was oppressively 
hot. When we got home, Wayan told his family members that he would have difficulty 
praying at a temple that was so crowded: sing luung bayune (roughly, I wouldn’t feel 
good). During ceremonies Tegal, it was not uncommon for Wayan to simply pray from 
home rather than actually going to the temple to pray. He sometimes said going to 
temple to pray was “more for women,” yet he also acknowledged that people in his 
village would judge him negatively for failing to show up to pray.      
 Wayan felt that such negative judgments were unfair. As he put it, prayer is 
“about feeling.” From Wayan’s perspective, the expectation to physically show up and 
pray at the temple imposed an undue burden on him, a burden which he should not 
have to feel. To support his position on this issue, Wayan would often construct a 
contrasting figure, a ‘diligent’ villager who puts on a good show of being devout, but 
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whose actions in the community are “bullshit,” not underpinned by proper religious 
motivations. The implication here is that since feelings are true, and are what really 
matter to god, judgment based on actions is misplaced. Wayan repeatedly told me that 
people should pray in a way that feels good to them; if he feels good praying at home, 
then this is the best way for him to pray; if others feel differently, they should be free to 
pray otherwise. Along with his sense that the expectations imposed upon him are those 
of his community, not his religion per se, Wayan’s expectation that prayer should feel 
good resonates with Jyoti’s arguments in Reformasi Ritual about the superfluousness of 
ritual “burden” and the importance of avoiding the negative feelings that sometimes 
arise due to social pressure to uphold tradition. While Chapter 2 saw Wayan 
shouldering significant ritual “burdens” without questioning their religious necessity, in 
expressing his views on prayer he seems to align himself with the reformist argument 
that if religious devotion feels like a burden, there must be something wrong.  
 The motivation behind Wayan’s claims is not simply hedonistic. His arguments 
are rooted in an ethics of sincerity, which locates the value of prayer and other acts of 
religious devotion in the worshipper’s interior “feeling,” rather than the material matters 
of where and how they choose to worship. Wayan felt strongly about the validity of his 
arguments, and the moral superiority of his position, but he knew others would disagree. 
He told me that people in Tegal would dislike him if he expressed these views to them. 
He recognizes that his moral justifications may not be valid for many in his community; 
the authority of his arguments (to the extent that they have any) does not come from 
being embedded in communal norms, but from their association with the authoritative 
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religious discourses of the state and the representations of Hindu religiosity that 
circulate in the media. Reformist discourses, particularly those that circulate around the 
Puja Tri Sandhya, provide him with a means of re-envisioning his ethical responsibilities 
and a basis upon which to “give reasons” for his position (Keane 78-81). To be clear, I 
am not making a causal argument here; an ideal as pervasive as sincerity is bound to 
enter into a person’s awareness and self-understanding through multiple channels, and 
moreover, mediatory forms do not cause people to think or feel in a particular way; they 
merely afford certain possibilities. What does seem clear, however, is that some form of 
mediation is necessary for this kind of re-envisioning to take place. I would also argue 
that mediatory forms like the Puja Tri Sandhya are not passive participants in the social 
processes they enable; their sensory, affective, and semiotic affordances play a role in 
shaping what’s possible.  
 
Conclusion 
 The Puja Tri Sandhya is a set of mediatory practices that circulates a particular 
vision of Hindu religiosity. Embedded in social consciousness and practice through the 
efforts of state institutions, the prayer is an important ideological tool of the Hindu 
Reform. Reverberating in the soundscape through community-owned loudspeakers and 
radio and television broadcasts, it instantiates a Hindu public whose addressees are 
presumed to identify with reformist doctrines and values. Layered over the localized 
acoustic communities that are activated during temple ceremonies, public soundings of 
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the Tri Sandhya give sonorous form to a pan-Balinese and broader national Hindu 
community united in the worship of a singular god.  
 In the context of the Hindu Religion and Character curriculum, the Puja Tri 
Sandhya and doa sehari-hari offer a pedagogy of sincerity which endeavors to reshape 
how Hindu students conceptualize and practice their relationship with god. Both the 
linguistic structure of these prayers and the pedagogical discourses that go along with 
them encourage Balinese students to not only recite Sanskrit words with their voices, 
but also to take personal responsibility for the meanings and intentions that those words 
express. In this way, these prayers provide a model of sincere expression as well as a 
concrete means of inhabiting and practicing an ethics of sincerity in daily life.  
 One of the consequences of the inherent materiality of semiotic forms is that they 
always retain the potential to take on new meanings. As we have seen, the Tri 
Sandhya’s sonic materiality may function as a symbol of Balinese identity and 
religiosity, but it can also become an annoyance, a disruption, or simply a way of 
marking time. As Keane writes, “Although semiotic forms are consequential, any 
particular effects depend on their conjunction with social, political, and other forces. . 
.Semiotic form may be powerful, but in itself it is not automatically efficacious in any 
particular way” (Keane 2007: 70).  
 Rather than directly causing specific changes in religious and moral subjectivity, 
the Puja Tri Sandhya creates spaces of possibility for new forms of subjectivity to take 
root. Crucially, this does not mean that the prayer is simply an empty vessel into which 
any possible meaning can be decanted. The various forms that the prayer takes, and 
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the bodies and technologies through which it circulates, are embedded in a material 
world, and this materiality can extend, but also limit, the prayer’s capacity to take on 
social meaning. As we saw in the conversation between Wayan and his friend, the Tri 
Sandhya affords particular forms of sensory pleasure. These sensory experiences in 
turn depend on other material forms—the cool, quiet house yard temples in which the 
two men pray, and the crowded, hot public temples with which the sacred spaces of the 
domestic sphere contrast so favorably, are merely two examples. Operating in tandem 
with a host of other forces, the Tri Sandhya makes available an experience of prayer 
that is desirable to some Balinese Hindus: prayer not as a communal display of 
obeisance, but as a momentary retreat into the self, a reaching out to god through 
thought, and an experience of god through feeling. However, pleasure and desire are 
not the only reasons the Tri Sandhya has meaning for Wayan. He uses the feelings he 
experiences during prayer to construct an ethical argument about how to properly 
interact with the divine. In constructing this argument, Wayan seems to draw from the 
authoritative moral discourses of the state, but his ethical position also grows out of his 
personal efforts to grapple with the more immediate moral questions that he faces in his 
community. One of the ways mediatory practices like the Puja Tri Sandhya enable 
processes of narrative re-envisioning lies in how their material properties are taken up 
as ethical affordances in people’s day-to-day efforts to live a good life. The ethics of 
sincerity that Wayan articulates was not caused by the Tri Sandhya in any direct way; 
but nor would it be the same in the absence of the conceptual, sensory, and affective 
resources that the Tri Sandhya provides. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PEPAOSAN AND THE ETHICS OF DIVINE GUIDANCE 
 
Voicing 
 Two young women walk slowly to the middle of an outdoor stage. Wearing 
matching white blouses and delicate gold leaf flowers in their hair, they kneel behind a 
low table set with two microphones. One of the women arranges a thin blue folder on 
the table in front of her. With palms together and eyes closed, they recite two brief 
mantras in perfect unison. Then the translator executes a choreographed gesture 
inviting her partner, the reader, to commence the performance. Placing her hands on 
her lap, the reader chants a verse from the Yajur Veda, an early Sanskrit religious text. 
As the verse unfolds, her sonorous alto voice traces an austere melody. The sustained 
tones undulate with a wide vibrato, which varies in speed—from a slow pulsation to a 
rapid trill—and occasionally ceases, leaving a pure tone hanging in the air. At the ends 
of phrases, the melody takes on more movement, bending and softening into subtle 
melismatic swirls. Sometimes the reader furrows her brow or glances down at the 
papers in the blue folder, but most of the time she looks out at the audience, her face 
smooth and emotionless. At the end of the passage she gestures to the translator, who 
then begins to orate a paraphrase of the verse. Speaking serenely, in formal 
Indonesian, she asks the gods for favor, friendship, and a long life. A gentle smile 
enlivens the corners of her lips as she speaks, and when she addresses the gods, she 
places her palms together and casts her eyes upward.  
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 These women are experts in the art of pepaosan, an Indonesian Hindu tradition 
of singing and orally interpreting religious texts. I recorded their performance in June of 
2014, while attending a Hindu vocal competition at RRI Denpasar. In contrast with the 
relaxed informality of the many ceremonial pepaosan performances I had observed 
during my research, the performances at the competition that weekend were 
characterized by a remarkable degree of aesthetic refinement in terms of sound, 
appearance, and gesture. What the speeches that preceded the competition made 
clear, however, was that the values the contest’s sponsors ultimately wished to cultivate 
and reward were not aesthetic, but rather ethical in nature.   
 This chapter considers the role of texts and textual knowledge in the Indonesian 
Hindu Reform. Focusing on pepaosan as a key site in which Balinese Hindus engage 
with religious texts, I show how the state is using pepaosan as a tool of ethical and 
religious transformation. By comparing the practices and discourses put forward in 
state-sponsored pepaosan competitions to those that circulate among village-based 
pepaosan clubs, I argue that pepaosan is enmeshed in, and helps sustain, two different 
religious pedagogies of voice, and that within each of these, a unique ideal of the 
devout Hindu self is circulated and promoted.   
 The aim of this investigation is not only to understand the social significance of 
pepaosan as part of the larger assemblage of practices, discourses, and values that is 
contemporary Balinese Hinduism, but also to bring ethnographic and theoretical 
attention to the ways ethical values and projects are manifested in musical practice.  
 
  211 
Literary Performance in Bali 
 Along with its various synonyms (mabebasan, mabasan, and mabaosan), 
pepaosan refers to a practice of literary performance in which pairs of performers work 
together to create an oral interpretation of a passage of text. One performer, the 
pengwacen (reader), sings or chants a phrase of the original text in its appropriate style. 
Then the other, the peneges (clarifier), provides an impromptu spoken translation of it in 
modern Balinese or Indonesian. The performance then continues in this fashion, 
alternating between reading and interpreting.153  
 In Bali, most pepaosan performances take place in the context of Hindu religious 
ceremonies where they commonly serve to fill periods of inactivity between the main 
ritual events. These performances, which are nearly always amplified, often run 
intermittently for several hours a day, and may continue for several days (or even 
weeks) at larger ceremonies, as numerous groups take turns performing. Pepaosan has 
thus become an especially prominent feature of the contemporary Balinese 
soundscape. 
 The rich and varied body of literature used in pepaosan performances includes 
both poetic and prose works in Balinese, Kawi, and Sanskrit languages. Some of these 
works are newly composed, while others date back as early as the ninth century (and 
                                                        
153 There is no general term for literary performance in Bali. In speaking about these practices my 
interlocutors shifted among several terms with distinct meanings. To simplify matters for the unfamiliar 
reader, I mostly limit myself to the single term pepaosan, which I use to refer generally to the set of artistic 
practices in which the singing or chanting of a text is interwoven with spoken interpretation. My usage is 
thus consistent with Zurbuchen’s (1987) and Rubinstein’s (1992; 2000), but it diverges from more recent 
scholarship on Balinese literary performance, such as Fox 2011, Putra 2009, and Putra and Creese 2012, 
which use the terms mabasan, mabebasan, and makidung, respectively. 
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much earlier in the case of the Sanskrit works). These texts draw their narrative content 
from a range of sources, including the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics as well as 
tales and legends of local origin. Each literary genre is sung or chanted in accordance 
with its own unique set of melodies and its own characteristic vocal quality and 
ornamentation style. Each is thus a unique performance form unto itself. What unites 
the different practices I discuss here is the use of the pepaosan format, in which the 
singing of the original text alternates with spoken translation. 
 Throughout this dissertation I refer to the texts read in pepaosan performances 
as “religious texts.” This would seem to imply that they have explicitly religious content. 
However, this is not always the case. In labeling these texts “religious,” I mean instead 
to call attention to the various ways in which they are believed to form links between 
humans and the divine. According to Indonesian Hindu theologians, for example, the 
texts pepaosan performers study are derived from what they call sruti, the word of God 
as heard and documented by the Maharsi or Hindu prophets. In this view, the different 
literary genres used in pepaosan performances mark out a gradual descent, from the 
esoteric to the increasingly popularized, which serves as a bridge connecting ordinary 
people to lofty Vedic ideas. From the simple, entertaining parables of kidung and 
geguritan, to sophisticated kakawin poetry and inscrutable Sanskrit mantra, these 
different literary genres, it is claimed, present the same Vedic teachings at various 
levels of accessibility. In addition, the composition of kakawin poetry has traditionally 
been understood as a yogic practice in which literary inspiration comes through 
unification with the divine (Rubinstein 2000; Zoetmulder 1974). Indeed, contemporary 
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pepaosan practitioners often describe kakawin texts as products of divine inspiration. 
Finally, pepaosan texts are believed to be an earthly abode of the goddess Saraswati, 
and their sounding through oral performance is a means of partaking in Saraswati’s 
divine power. These texts thus function both as a repository of divine teachings, 
communicated from gods to humans in the distant past, and also as a channel through 
which people interact with divine agents in the present.  
 Once practiced almost exclusively by small groups of elderly men, pepaosan 
activities have enjoyed a surge in popularity over the past few decades as the 
emergence of new high-profile performance opportunities has attracted new 
participants, including many women and youth, to the once aging and shrinking 
pepaosan scene. As Putra and Creese have discussed, this resurgence can be 
attributed in part to popular interactive radio and television programs that first appeared 
in the 1990s, which allow listeners to sing verses over the phone to be interpreted on air 
by the programs’ hosts (Putra 2009; Putra and Creese 2012). Perhaps a more 
significant factor contributing to the recent increase in pepaosan activity, however, is the 
rise of state-sponsored pepaosan competitions, now known as the Utsawa Dharma Gita 
(UDG), which were introduced in the 1960s (Creese 2014: 303, Rubinstein 1992: 104). 
Modeled on the prestigious Musabaqah Tilawatil Qur’an Quranic recitation competitions, 
which have existed in Indonesia since the 1940s (Gade 2004:232), contemporary UDG 
events include a range of competitions in Hindu literary performance, as well as Hindu 
sermons and quizzes on Hindu doctrine. Under the banner of the UDG, Bali’s Cultural 
Affairs Department holds an annual series of local, regency, and provincial competitions 
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for children and young adults in the reading of kakawin, parwa, kidung, geguritan, and 
sloka; the Hindu branch of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion organizes a triennial 
national competition in a select subset of these genres; and other state and non-state 
organizations occasionally sponsor their own independent competitions. In connection 
with the UDG contests, the state also organizes and funds training programs in literary 
performance for Hindu youth throughout the Indonesian archipelago (Rubinstein 
1992:104-5).  
 Government efforts to preserve and develop Hindu traditions of literary 
performance are part of a broader reformist project to promote a scriptural orientation to 
religion in Bali in order to bring Balinese Hinduism into alignment with the state’s vision 
of what a religion should be. Before discussing how pepaosan has been constructed as 
a form of ethical self-cultivation—both within and outside ongoing religious reform 
efforts—I will briefly discuss the important role religious texts have played in past and 
present efforts to make Balinese Hindus into national subjects.  
 
Religious Texts and National Modernity in Bali 
 In the eyes of Europeans at least, Bali’s identity as a Hindu society has long 
been bound up with its textual traditions. Metal and stone inscriptions indicate that both 
the Sanskrit language and Hindu religious and philosophical ideas have been present in 
Bali since at least the 9th Century (Zurbuchen 1987: 8). Another place where early 
foreign visitors found evidence of Indic influence on Bali was in the island’s palm leaf 
manuscripts. Painstakingly recopied over hundreds of years, these texts’ fragile pages 
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preserved a literature dating back to the 11th Century, or possibly earlier, which was 
written in a language (Kawi) that drew heavily on Sanskrit vocabulary, and included 
localized versions of Indian texts (ibid.: 82).154 Generations of scholars have framed 
these texts as a medium of religious and cultural continuity linking contemporary Bali to 
India by way of ancient Java, where many of the classical Kawi texts are believed to 
have been composed (Friederich [1850] 1959; Zoetmulder 1974).155  
Given the important mediatory role attributed to these texts early on, perhaps it is 
not surprising that they were later incorporated into colonial efforts to “traditionalize” the 
Balinese. When Dutch colonial authorities sought to strengthen Bali’s traditional Hindu 
culture—in hopes that it could serve as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic 
radicalism, nationalism, and communism in the Indies—they implemented programs to 
familiarize the populace with this ancient literature (Picard 1999:18-22). These 
programs included courses in Balinese language and literature, introduced as part of 
the Baliseering (Balinization) policy of the late 1920s, and the founding of a public 
library of palm-leaf manuscripts in 1928 (ibid.:22; Bakker 1993:36).  
 For Balinese living during the 1920s and 30s, however, studying religious texts 
had as much to do with becoming modern as it did with preserving tradition. As Dutch-
educated Balinese intellectuals began to imagine a place for the people of Bali within 
the expanded world to which colonial rule had connected them, studying religious texts 
came to be seen as a way of achieving kemadjoean (progress). As evidenced in local 
                                                        
154 This body of literature includes some of the kakawin and parwa texts read by pepaosan performers 
today. 
155 For a critical perspective on these claims of continuity, see Fox 2011.  
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Malay-language journals from this period, the Hindu religion represented both an 
essential part of Balinese identity, which must be preserved, and a potential source of 
outdated beliefs and customs, which should be abandoned (Picard 1999). Among the 
traditions that came under scrutiny at this time were beliefs about the magical powers of 
written language and associated taboos restricting the study of religious texts to 
members of particular castes or people who had undergone ritual purification 
(Rubinstein 1992: 90-91; Zurbuchen 1987:60-61).156 As these and other Balinese 
customs were being called into question, religious texts emerged as the key to 
cultivating what these journals’ authors imagined as a properly modern form of Balinese 
religiosity. In the November 1925 issue of the journal Surya Kanta, for example, authors 
advocated religious textual study as a way of ridding the populace of tachajoel 
(superstitions) so that they too could join the ranks of the madjoe (advanced) nations.157 
Surya Kanta also regularly included quotations and translated excerpts from kakawin 
and other religious texts, as a way of engaging its public in this modern religious 
practice.158 
 After Indonesia gained independence in 1949, religious texts became an 
important marker of national belonging for Balinese Hindus. In order for Balinese ritual 
customs to qualify as a religion in the eyes of the Indonesian state, it was necessary to 
                                                        
156 The journal Surya Kanta, published in Bali in the 1920s, includes allusions to the secrecy surrounding 
the religious knowledge contained in texts while specifically encouraging its low caste readers not to be 
afraid to pursue this knowledge (See Surya Kanta 1925 1/3:7, and 1925 1/2:3). 
157 See the article entitled “Ngaben” (Surya Kanta 1925 1/2:7-8). 
158 See the articles entitled “Poerana” and “Pemandangan” in the July 1925 issue (Surya Kanta 1925 
1/1:3-5), and the serialized translation of the Kakawin Sutasoma that begins in the November 1925 issue 
and continues for more than a year (Surya Kanta 1925 1/2:13-5). 
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demonstrate that they were rooted in a sacred scripture. Kawi and Sanskrit texts were 
instrumental in establishing the legitimacy of Balinese Hinduism as a religion that could 
stand alongside Christianity and Islam, and ongoing efforts to "convert" the populace to 
the state-approved version of Hinduism have continued to draw guidance and validation 
from these texts. For example, the textbooks used in the Hindu Religion and Character 
curriculum are full of quotations from indigenous and Sanskrit religious texts, as are 
most books on Hinduism for a general Balinese audience. Like the journals of the 
1920s, these publications promote and exemplify the idea that the foundations of 
Balinese religion can be found in ancient texts. Hindu events organized by the Ministry 
of Religion, such as the Utsawa Dharma Gita and Jambore Pasraman competitions, 
similarly foreground texts and textual learning as central to what it means to be Hindu in 
Bali, and in Indonesia more broadly. Both before and after state recognition then, 
religious texts have played an important role in legitimizing the inclusion of Balinese 
Hindus within the Indonesian national imaginary, and in shaping efforts to make 
Balinese religiosity conform to the state’s vision of what a religion should be.  
 Finally, and most importantly for my purposes in this chapter, the reformist effort 
to promote the study of religious texts has introduced new ways of thinking about 
religious devotion and ethical cultivation among Balinese Hindus, which have 
contributed to the broader reformist effort to circulate a modern conception of the ideal 
Hindu self. Pushing against longstanding habits of treating textual study as an elite and 
specialized practice, proponents of reform now claim that being a good Hindu requires 
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personal familiarity with the contents of religious texts. Studying these texts is thus the 
responsibility of every Balinese Hindu, not just priests and literati.  
 This emphasis on personal engagement with textual knowledge is part of the 
larger reformist project to position the interior self as the primary object of religious and 
ethical cultivation, which I discussed in the previous chapter. In contrast with the action-
focused and communal character of even most contemporary Balinese religious 
practice, Hinduism textbooks and other reformist Hindu media posit an individualized 
religious subject whose behavior is regulated less by community-imposed obligations 
and sanctions than by personal qualities such as “character” (karakter or budi pekerti).  
Religion, in this view, is not just about fulfilling shared obligations to gods and spirits; 
people must work to cultivate the interior dispositions that are said to motivate and 
sustain their religious practices. In Chapter 3 I showed how proponents of the Hindu 
reform promote the ethics of sincerity, encouraging Balinese Hindus to monitor and 
manage their thoughts and feelings, so that the devotion expressed in their actions are 
underpinned by authentic intentions and sentiments. In this chapter I bring attention to 
another aspect of the interiorized Hindu self promoted in reformist discourse: the 
expectation that each Balinese Hindu must study, understand, and internalize the moral 
guidance contained in religious texts and use this guidance in their daily lives.  
 Given the crucial role attributed to texts as a means of cultivating a properly 
modern religious self, it is not surprising that pepaosan has been incorporated into 
reformist programs. However, it would be a mistake to presume that this art form is 
inherently supportive of the kind of ethical subject the state wishes to promote. I show 
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instead that the ethical dimensions of pepaosan are constructed differently across 
different discursive contexts. That is to say, pepaosan affords a variety of different paths 
of ethical striving, which do not necessarily align with a single underlying set of values 
or ideals. By analyzing the different ways pepaosan performers are invited and 
compelled to work on themselves in order to become subjects of divine guidance, I 
show how pepaosan both supports and diverges from the Hindu Reform’s ethical and 
political project.  
 One key point of divergence between different approaches to literary 
performance in Bali has to do with how practitioners imagine the relationship between 
the ethical and aesthetic aspects of pepaosan practice. For many pepaosan 
practitioners, ethical and aesthetic matters are deeply intertwined. Meanwhile, state-
sponsored pepaosan programs like the UDG work to separate the properly ethical from 
the aesthetic aspects of performance. By encouraging practitioners to approach 
pepaosan not as seni semata (mere art), but as a means of cultivating a sikap mental 
(mental attitude) that disposes the practitioner to implement Vedic teachings in his or 
her daily life, spokespersons for these programs seek to marginalize the aesthetic and 
material aspects of pepaosan while prioritizing those aspects most closely related to the 
performer’s interiority: meaning and understanding. This emphasis on the practitioner’s 
interior relationship to the text is consonant with the broader reformist effort to promote 
an interiorized form of ethical subjectivity, as discussed in Chapter 3. Ironically, 
however, at the same time that UDG spokespersons disavow what they see as the 
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excessive focus on form and aesthetics in traditional pepaosan practice, the 
adjudication process incentivizes careful attention to performance aesthetics.  
In the sections that follow, I compare the discourses and practices of various 
participants in the contemporary pepaosan scene. I begin by discussing the official 
speeches that take place at UDG events, then turn to the adjudication and training 
practices that surround the UDG. Finally, I discuss the activities of sekaa santi, 
pepaosan clubs whose artistic endeavors are supported not by the Indonesian state but 
by desa adat, puri (noble houses), gria (priestly houses), and other customary 
institutions.   
 
Pepaosan in Context: The Utsawa Dharma Gita  
 I was fortunate to undertake fieldwork during a year that coincided with the 
largest and most prestigious of all UDG events, the triennial UDG Tingkat Nasional, 
sponsored by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion. More than any other UDG 
competition, this national event locates pepaosan performance firmly within a national 
Hindu imaginary. The competition was held at a large conference hotel in Indonesia’s 
capital city, Jakarta, during the second weekend of July, 2014. On Friday evening, 
contingents from each of the nation’s 33 provinces gathered in the hotel’s largest 
ballroom for a spectacular opening ceremony featuring speeches, dance performances, 
a group prayer, and a closing tableau vivant, in which representatives from each 
province arranged themselves on stage in a display of the “unity in diversity” of the 
Indonesian Hindu community. Throughout the weekend, hundreds of young competitors 
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and middle-aged chaperones filled the hotel.159 Recognizably dressed in the ethnic 
costume of their province, or matching safari shirts of a distinctive regional fabric, they 
wandered in and out of conference rooms to watch and perform. Participants competed 
in two styles of pepaosan (the reading of sloka and excerpts of parwa literature), as well 
as kidung daerah (regional religious songs), dharma wacana (sermons), and dharma 
widya (quiz competitions).160 Between events, they mingled in the lobby, browsed 
among the vendors selling Hindu books along the hotel’s entryway, and piled into vans 
in the parking lot for outings to one of Jakarta’s shopping centers. On Sunday afternoon, 
interested attendees were treated to a symposium discussing the merits of UDG 
activities as a means of inculcating Hindu values. The weekend ended with a closing 
ceremony in which the winners of each contest were announced. 
 Although only the national competition in Jakarta included a symposium, 
speeches explaining the purpose and value of UDG competitions were a mainstay of all 
UDG events I attended during my research. In these speeches, UDG spokespersons 
simultaneously address, imagine, and constitute a national Hindu public (Warner 2002) 
bound together not by communal or ethnic ties, but by a shared attachment to the 
“universal” values contained in Hindu religious texts.161 As addressees of these 
                                                        
159 All competitors appeared to be under the age of twenty-five with the vast majority aged somewhere 
between ten and twenty. 
160 Sloka are Sanskrit verses drawn from ancient Indian texts such as the Yajur Veda and the Bhagavad 
Gita; parwa refers to a body of indigenous prose literature composed primarily of Kawi translations of the 
Mahabharata. 
161 The “universal” character of these values was repeatedly emphasized, both in UDG speeches and in 
interviews I conducted with UDG organizers. This idea of a universal set of values underlying the nation’s 
diverse religions is captured in an Indonesian saying that I heard repeatedly throughout my research: 
caranya beda, tujuannya sama, which can be roughly translated as “different practices, same goal.” 
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speeches, who are presumed to identify with these values, competitors and other UDG 
attendees are encouraged to work on themselves, in an ethical sense, by studying and 
performing religious texts. UDG speeches thus circulate a particular ideal of the devout 
Hindu self that can be achieved through participation in pepaosan.  
Perhaps the most striking and consistent feature of the many speeches I 
recorded is their emphasis on ethical cultivation over and above artistic development. 
During the opening speech at a national UDG competition held at RRI Denpasar in the 
summer of 2014 for example, the station’s director, Made Ardika, listed the eight official 
tujuan (goals) of the UDG. This list of goals, which is printed in official UDG materials 
and often cited in speeches at UDG events, emphasizes the cultivation of qualities like 
sraddha (faith), bhakti (devotion), and akhlak mulia (noble values). Given the central 
place that artistic performance occupies in UDG competitions (the vast majority of the 
prizes being awarded to competitors in pepaosan-style literary performance and 
regional religious song) it is remarkable that only the seventh goal makes mention of 
artistic ability. This focus on moral cultivation rather than artistic development is typical 
of the broader discourse emerging from the UDG. In a later speech at the same event, 
RRI’s director of development, Hasto Kuncoro, said that the motivation for organizing 
the competition had been a desire to uphold RRI’s mission to “preserve and develop the 
nation’s culture” as a tool for “character formation” (pembentuk karakter). He said he 
believed the competition would contribute to this mission by providing pembinaan moral 
(moral cultivation). In a similar vein, a large banner displayed during the closing 
symposium at the UDG in Jakarta read as follows: “By way of this symposium we 
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strengthen our synergy in order to intensify the implementation of Vedic values in 
everyday life.” Statements like these frame the UDG as a forum for personal 
transformation that makes participants more likely to live in accordance with Hindu 
values.  
 Further investigation of these speeches demonstrates that the transformative 
potential attributed to pepaosan lies in the contents of the texts performed, and 
specifically in the important moral teachings these texts are believed to contain. These 
moral teachings are posited as ethical affordances, which provide models and guidance 
that people can apply to their own lives. UDG spokespersons often refer to this 
guidance as tuntunan. Derived from the root word nuntun, which means to guide or 
lead, the word tuntunan encompasses the examples of virtuous conduct provided by the 
heroic characters in stories, as well as the many explicitly didactic passages contained 
in these texts, both of which are supposed to serve as a guide for human action. Since 
the texts are believed to be of divine provenance, these tuntunan are understood as 
divine moral guidance.  
 Within the informal discourses of many pepaosan practitioners, the word 
tuntunan is used to denote not only the moral guidance contained in texts, but also the 
ways in which the divine, in the form of the goddess Saraswati, participates in and 
guides pepaosan practitioners as they perform, enhancing their performances 
aesthetically. However, within the discursive context of the UDG, tuntunan is only used 
in its narrower meaning as information embedded within the contents of texts. For 
example, in his speech at RRI Denpasar, discussed above, Mr. Kuncoro stated “the 
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themes and lyrics [of the texts performed in UDG competitions] generally contain 
religious and ethical teachings, guidance (tuntunan) for living a good life.” Unlike 
Saraswati’s tuntunan, which work directly on and through the performer during the 
moment of performance, the divine guidance discussed in official speeches must be 
actively taken up and “implemented” (i.e., put into practice in daily life) in order to be 
effective in guiding the practitioner. As was stated several times during the 
aforementioned symposium, the hope is that the passages of text performed in these 
competitions are “not merely sung,” but are also “turned into behavior” (menjadi prilaku). 
They ought to become, in the words of Ida Bagus Yudha Triguna, Director of the Hindu 
branch of the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, “a basis for our thoughts, our words, and 
our actions.” The understanding of divine guidance promoted at UDG competitions thus 
foregrounds human over and above divine agency, and, as we have seen, the 
enhancement of ethical, as opposed to, and distinct from, aesthetic values.  
 What ensures that this guidance will be effective, according to official discourses, 
is the faculty of pemahaman (understanding). A noun form of the verb memahami, 
which means to grasp or comprehend, pemahaman appears frequently in discourses 
about religious textual performance. For example, in the printed version of his 
symposium paper, the prominent Hindu scholar Ketut Wiana urged that “singing 
religious texts cannot be done on the basis of a beautiful voice alone. The 
understanding (pemahaman) and mental attitude that form the background for a 
performance must be our primary focus” (Wiana 2014:11). As with the requirement that 
Hindus understand the meaning of Sanskrit prayers, which I discussed in Chapter 3, the 
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focus on pemahaman in UDG discourses targets the performer’s interior relationship to 
textual meaning as a site of moral evaluation and striving.  
 The idea that understanding religious teachings is fundamental to ethical 
cultivation and conduct is common throughout reformist Hindu discourses in Bali.162 As 
noted in the Introduction, reformers often claim that the average Balinese Hindu is 
insufficiently knowledgeable about the teachings of their own religion. This alleged 
ignorance is blamed for a range of moral failings, including criminality and social 
unrest.163 As a corrective, Hindus are admonished to practice introspeksi diri (self-
reflection).164 As explained to me by an IHDN faculty member, this practice involves 
reflecting on one’s own actions and conduct and determining which are good and which 
are bad in order to improve one’s moral conduct in the future. In contrast to the usage of 
introspeksi diri that we encountered in Chapter 1, which relied on direct communication 
between human and invisible beings, the form of self-reflection promoted in reformist 
discourses is a kind of personal moral accounting that aims to bring individual conduct 
                                                        
162 Helen Creese has shown that the Indonesian government’s concern with promoting comprehension of 
religious teachings is not limited to Hinduism but extends to all religions (2014: 301-2).   
163 To give just one example of this argument, in an article describing a 2011 riot between two banjar, in 
which one man was killed, the author cites the following response from Dr. Made Titib, then-rector of 
IHDN. “Prof. Made Titib menilai munculnya kebringasan di kalangan masyarakat disebabkan karena 
internalisasi ajaran agama belum maksimal. Rektor IHDN ini mengharapkan. . .tokoh agama. . .tak henti-
hentinya turun ke tengah-tengah masyarakat untuk melakukan pembinaan tentang nilai-nilai moral 
agama (Prof. Made Titib believes the emergence of this kind of communal violence happens because the 
internalization of religious teachings is not yet maximal. This rector of IHDN hopes that religious figures 
will ceaselessly descend into communities and offer guidance about religious moral values).” “Warga Bali 
Mulai Beringas: Hilang, Sikap Toleransi Krama Bali” (The People of Bali Are Becoming Violent: The 
Tolerant Attitude of the Balinese People is Disappearing), Bali Post, July 20, 2011.  
164 During the sermons broadcast on Bali TV, the Balinese version of this phrase (mulat sarira) often 
appears in the titles at the bottom of the screen. One common statement used in these titles is semua 
umat harus mulat sarira (the entire religious community must engage in self-reflection).  
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into line with the teachings contained in religious texts. Understanding these teachings 
is a crucial part of this ethical project.  
 Not surprisingly, official representations of the UDG also foreground the moral 
effects of understanding religious texts. For example, the first of the eight official goals 
of the UDG states that the competition aims to “increase religious feeling as an outcome 
of understanding religious teachings.” Given the important role often attributed to 
aesthetic performance in cultivating shared sentiments—including religious sentiment—
it is particularly striking that this statement attributes the development of religious feeling 
(rasa keagamaan), a term that implies emotional attachment, not to the unique powers 
of music and oratory, but, rather, to the seemingly cognitive process of understanding 
religious teachings.165 If understanding is the key to what the UDG hopes to achieve, 
then the question arises as to why the texts are performed at all. What role if any does 
oral performance play in the UDG’s ethical project? Or, to put it somewhat differently, 
what are the ethical affordances of singing?  
 The chair of the organizing committee for the National UDG provided a partial 
answer to this question in his speech at the opening ceremony of the Jakarta 
competition. He stated that the texts are realized artistically so that they can be “easily 
understood and internalized” (muda difahami dan dihayati). How the act of singing 
contributes to this accomplishment was further elaborated in interviews I conducted with 
a man I’ll call Pak Sujana, a professor at the National Hindu Theological Institute who 
                                                        
165 Examples of works that explore the role of musical and/or oratorical performance in cultivating shared 
sentiments include Feld 1990, Fox 2004, and Hirschkind 2006. 
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has been involved with the UDG for decades. As an expert in Sanskrit and an 
accomplished pepaosan performer, Pak Sujana is flown all over Indonesia to train UDG 
competitors in preparation for national competitions. Comparing singing to ordinary 
speaking, he said that when you sing, “all of the senses are involved.” Singing, unlike 
speaking, produces a “vibration” (vibrasi), he said. In bringing up the senses and this 
idea of vibration, Pak Sujana seems to gesture toward the cultivation of a pious 
sensorium, a process akin to that which Charles Hirschkind’s informants in Egypt 
attributed to sermon audition. According to Hirschkind, practitioners of the pious 
listening practices he studied believed that a pious self was achieved not simply through 
processing linguistic information, but through regular immersion in the kinds of 
emotional and bodily sensations experienced in listening to powerful oratory (Hirschkind 
2006:70-6). According to his informants (as he represents them), cassette sermons 
make people more likely to follow Quranic teachings by training the body to feel in 
appropriate ways, creating what Hirschkind calls the “affective conditions of virtuous 
conduct” (ibid.:74). However, whereas pious listening transforms the self by tuning the 
senses, Pak Sujana went on to frame singing’s effect on the senses as merely an aid to 
the process of internalizing information. Later in our conversation he compared the 
singing of religious texts to the singing of the days of the week in kindergarten class. 
Just as young children can quickly learn the days of the week through song, he argued, 
so religious teachings can more easily be learned through the practice of singing 
religious texts. Pak Sujana thus likens the process of ethical cultivation to the process of 
memorizing information. According to this view, it is this information (the meaningful 
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content of the texts), rather than the aesthetic, sensory, or karmic effects of singing, 
which plays the most significant role in forming the virtuous Hindu self. Vocal 
performance, understood in this way, is merely an especially effective means of 
delivering and absorbing information.  
 Pak Sujana’s arguments exemplify a particular semiotic ideology, characteristic 
of reformist discourse, which sees the referential contents of texts as ethical 
affordances that provide opportunities for individuals to engage in the ethical practice of 
introspeksi diri, evaluating their own conduct in light of divine moral guidance. This 
semiotic ideology is linked to an interiorized and cognitive conception of ethical 
selfhood, which is quite different from the embodied, affective self described by 
Hirschkind. With regard to the ethical affordances of singing, Pak Sujana seems to 
equivocate. While he ultimately privileges the cognitive dimension—singing as a means 
of internalizing information—his reference to “vibration” also gestures toward the 
possibility that the body and the senses may play a role in ethical development. This 
suggests a more complicated view of ethical selfhood than the one typically promoted 
by the Hindu Reform. Whatever Pak Sujana’s personal beliefs about the ethical benefits 
of singing may be, by turning our conversation back to the topic of information he 
replicates the reformist view of religious ethics, which he, as an IHDN professor, is 
expected to teach and defend.    
 As evidenced in the belief that religious teachings ought to be “not merely sung,” 
but also “understood,” and “turned into action,” UDG speeches define the goal of the 
UDG in relation to virtues that exceed and are distinct from aesthetic value. And yet, the 
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practice of evaluating competitors on the merits of their performances seems to 
encourage the cultivation of artistic ability rather than ethical virtue. This apparent 
inconsistency—between the values that the competition wishes to promote and the 
criteria it uses to reward competitors—was not lost on those in attendance at the 
Jakarta symposium. During the lively question-and-answer session that followed the 
formal presentations, a male audience member made the following sardonic remark 
about the UDG’s champions: “Whether they buy coffee in the morning I don’t know sir. 
But if they’re buying bubuk coffee in the evening, then what’s the connection between 
these prizes and day-to-day implementation?” Cleverly addressed to the third presenter, 
Dewa Komang Tantra, whose talk made repeated reference to coffee, the joke is a 
speculation about what might happen after the winners return to their home provinces. 
Exploiting the double entendre of the term bubuk, which in Indonesian means ground or 
powdered, but in Balinese can be a slang term for sex, the joke asks sarcastically 
whether they might spend their evenings with prostitutes, and if so, what does winning 
have to do with Vedic values? This man’s remark questions the correspondence, 
presumed in much of the discourse about the UDG, between successful performance in 
the competition and the successful cultivation of Hindu virtues.  
 To explore this question, it will be useful to consider the problem of adjudicating 
these competitions. How do officials suture the divide between vocal performance and 
virtuous conduct that this man’s question reveals? That is, how do they substantiate the 
claim that what these competitions are ultimately rewarding, is ethical, and not merely 
aesthetic, cultivation? In a speech at the UDG competition I attended at RRI Denpasar 
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in June 2014, an assistant to the mayor of that city, Anak Agung Ngurah Iswara, stated 
that in order to ensure that what is sung “has meaning in life” he would urge juries and 
coaches not to focus exclusively on the voice. “If only [the voice] is trained, then we’re 
only at the level of form (bentuk), the function (fungsi) isn’t there yet.” He said that in 
addition to training the voice, trainers must stress the meaning of the texts. This, he 
said, would contribute to the UDG’s goal of “making Indonesia more harmonious” 
(meningkatkan harmoni Indonesia). Iswara’s distinction between the form and function 
of pepaosan performance can be usefully analyzed using Goffman’s concept of 
participation roles. If trainers and juries focus narrowly on form, then they encourage 
competitors to be mere animators of the texts they perform. However, in order for the 
ethical affordances of these texts to bear fruit, competitors must also take on the role of 
principal. That is to say, they must identify with, and take responsibility for, the 
messages these texts contain. Juries, for their part, must find a way of evaluating 
competitors with respect to both of these roles.  
 That these assumptions and priorities actually inform the practices of UDG juries 
and coaches was revealed in my interviews with Pak Sujana, who, in addition to his role 
in training UDG competitors, also developed the scorecard used by juries, and regularly 
serves as a jury member himself.166 In our conversations, Pak Sujana stressed that 
                                                        
166 Both readers and translators receive points for four aspects of their performance: appearance 
(including posture, facial expression, and gesture), voice (timbre, ornamentation, and intonation), 
pronunciation (including prosodic correctness), and expression. In addition, translators are evaluated on 
the accuracy of their translation. These categories are differently weighted, with appearance and 
expression counting for less than voice, pronunciation, and translation. Competitors are scored as a pair 
(reader-translator), but the reader’s performance is weighted more heavily, accounting for 60 percent of 
the total score. This weighting arguably contradicts Pak Sujana’s claim that juries’ primary concern is with 
competitors’ ability to express a text’s meaning. Interestingly, Creese claims that for UDG competitions in 
Bali “contestants are judged against 17 expressive modes (raras) drawn from the traditional Balinese 
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having a beautiful voice does not score many points in UDG competitions. Instead, he 
said that a competitor’s success depends first and foremost on her ability to maknai or 
express the meaning of the text she’s performing. This, he claimed, means that a 
successful performer must mendalami or internalize the text’s message. When I asked 
how juries evaluate this he said “we focus on their expression when they’re singing a 
particular phrase. When the expression isn’t correct, it’s apparent.” According to Pak 
Sujana, the expressive inflections of a performer’s voice, face, and body must correctly 
correspond to the meaning of the text; when they do not, this is seen as a deficiency in 
the performers’ comprehension and internalization of that meaning—a failure to move 
beyond simply being an animator.167 In explaining juries’ evaluative practices, he frames 
these expressive elements as visible and audible indexes of the effect the performed 
text has had on the performer. He posits these indexes as ethical affordances, which 
allow him to, in a sense, judge the performer’s moral character. (Thus, while religious 
texts afford opportunities for practitioners to cultivate knowledge and understanding that 
will enable them to live ethically, oral performances of these texts afford opportunities 
for UDG juries to evaluate the extent to which these texts have actually had a 
meaningful moral impact on the performer). In this idealized scenario, a competitor’s 
score is a direct reflection of the degree to which he or she has internalized Vedic 
                                                        
dance form of gambuh [while] in the national competition expression is reduced to a single criterion 
(ekspresi)” (2014: 314-15). This raises interesting questions about Pak Sujana’s statements.  
167 In discussing expression, Pak Sujana used the words ekspresi and menjiwai. These terms are often 
used interchangeably to denote the subtleties of a performance that make it exceptionally beautiful or 
affecting. In our interviews, he stressed that if a performer is able to successfully menjiwai a text it means 
she has full mastery over it, including mastery of its meaning, because only then could she have both the 
accuracy and the confident demeanor essential to a powerful performance. 
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teachings. In such cases, the form that the text takes in performance stands as proof 
that its ethical function has been achieved. This rationalization of the UDG adjudication 
process seeks to coordinate the aesthetic and ethical dimensions of pepaosan without 
collapsing the distinctions between them. According to Pak Sujana, a successful 
performance is not in itself a form of virtue, but it can serve as evidence of the 
seriousness of the performer’s engagement with the ethical content of texts.  
 Taken together, the discourses of UDG officials present a particular conception 
of the devout Hindu self as constituted through the study and performance of pepaosan. 
First and foremost, it is a self formed through coming to understand and internalize 
religious teachings. Importantly, although this transformation may be aided by oral 
performance, it does not (according to these ideologies) depend on it. Rather, what 
effects ethical change within the performer is not the specific form in which the text is 
encountered, but the information that the text contains—its function, in Mr. Iswara’s 
terms. In other words, the devout Hindu self, as understood and promoted through the 
UDG, is defined by an interior relationship to the teachings contained in religious texts, 
and the sensuous, aesthetic aspects of textual performance merely index this 
relationship. According to this view, the sonorous and bodily materiality of pepaosan 
performance is an external representation of Hindu virtue, not a constitutive part of it. By 
drawing this distinction between the ethical and aesthetic value of pepaosan 
performance, the UDG contributes to the circulation of a conception of ethical selfhood 
that accords with modern (and national) religious ideals. By rewarding certain values 
and qualities over others (ethical over aesthetic, textual content over sound, 
  233 
understanding over beauty, etc.) the UDG directly encourages pepaosan performers to 
imagine and work on themselves in relation to these ideals.  
 
Embodying Ethics: Pepaosan Pedagogy in Practice  
 As was just described, UDG juries view the performances they evaluate as a 
window through which a competitor’s inner relationship to religious teachings can be 
seen, heard, and evaluated. According to Pak Sujana, the expressive aspects of 
performance index this relationship. My experience participating in and observing 
pepaosan training, however, suggests that pepaosan pedagogy does not always 
support Pak Sujana’s interpretation. In my own lessons, for instance, discussion of 
penjiwaan (the ability to menjiwai or perform expressively) was never linked to the 
meanings of texts.168 In fact, although my teachers would occasionally translate a 
particular word or phrase, they did not expect or require me to understand the meaning 
of the texts I studied with them. At most, a teacher might indicate that a particular text 
was sad and should thus be sung in a sad manner. More commonly however, such 
affective terms were linked not to texts, but to melodies, which can be used to sing any 
number of texts. Derived from the root word jiwa or soul, menjiwai implies imbuing one’s 
performance with the proper spirit. In attempting to explain how to menjiwai, my 
teachers said things like “you have to feel [it] in [your] heart,” or simply “you have to feel 
                                                        
168 While I don’t presume that my lessons reflect common pedagogical practice, I do believe they provide 
insight into my teachers’ understanding of the relationship between expression and textual meaning. 
Whether or not these teachers discuss meaning with their Balinese students, their interactions with me 
suggest that they believe it is at least possible to learn to menjiwai a text without understanding its 
meaning.   
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[it],” without specifying what it was that I was supposed to feel. In demonstrating 
menjiwai they sometimes closed their eyes or gestured toward the heart. Often their 
singing would become slower and more legato, the volume swelling and diminishing 
with each breath. These observations suggest that, for my teachers at least, performing 
a text in an expressive way is a matter of producing a particular affective experience, 
which doesn’t necessarily require understanding its meaning.169  
 Likewise, even when I observed training sessions in which students were 
preparing for UDG competitions, teachers invariably focused on sound and gesture 
rather than text and meaning. Generally, the teachers sat directly in front of their 
students, singing and performing the appropriate inflections and gestures as the 
students imitated their sounds and movements. Sometimes teachers would grip their 
students’ arms and heads with their hands, molding their bodies into the correct 
posture. In this mimetic form of training, the ability to menjiwai a text is transferred to the 
student through the teacher’s voice and bodily movements, without reference to the 
text’s content. The focus on mimetic techniques in the training sessions I observed 
suggests that although the expressive aspects of pepaosan performance may derive in 
part from students’ engagement with textual content, this isn’t their only or even their 
primary source. There thus seems to be a disjuncture between official ideologies about 
the process pepaosan performers must go through in order to learn how to successfully 
                                                        
169 My interlocutors in Bali often described a powerful performance as one which caused them to 
experience chills (merinding), a sensation which is also believed to be an indication of spiritual and divine 
presence. It’s possible, therefore, that when teachers ask their students to “feel it,” the goal is not to feel 
and express the text’s meaning, but to engage in a kind of mystical connection through vocally sounding 
the text, which, as I discuss in the final section of this chapter, is a different kind of ethical project. 
 
  235 
menjiwai a text and the actual training they receive. Whereas Pak Sujana assumes a 
causal, indexical link between correct penjiwaan and inner understanding, the teachers 
with whom I worked cultivated penjiwaan by working directly on outer form and inner 
sensation, without reference to textual meaning. 
 This disjuncture raises questions concerning the effectiveness of the UDG’s 
ethical program. If we assume, following official UDG discourses, that pepaosan 
achieves its ethical purpose when performers’ “understanding” and “mental attitude” are 
changed by the texts they perform, then these teachers’ engagements with their 
students’ bodies and voices would seem to be overly concerned with aesthetic values 
and unlikely to bring about a meaningful ethical transformation. This is because, within 
the ethical framework promoted at the UDG, the material dimensions of pepaosan 
performance are not, in and of themselves, believed to have ethical value. In fact, this 
separation of the ethical domain from the material world is central to the UDG’s 
reformist project and, as we saw in Chapter 3, it is characteristic of the Hindu Reform 
more broadly. In the next section of this chapter, however, I argue that, for some 
practitioners at least, the sensuous, embodied aspects of pepaosan performance do 
have ethical significance. This claim raises the possibility that, rather than representing 
a general disregard for pepaosan’s ethical potential, the pepaosan training practices I 
observed were enacting a different ethical project. 
 
Pepaosan in Context: Sekaa Santi 
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Most pepaosan activity in Bali takes place not in connection with the UDG, but in 
the context of what are known as sekaa santi, clubs that gather semi-regularly to study 
pepaosan-style literary performance under the guidance of a master performer. During 
my research in Bali, I studied and performed with three sekaa santi over a period of 
approximately eighteen months. In the clubs I worked with, all members were middle-
aged or older, and women slightly outnumbered men. While all three clubs performed 
actively, only two of them met to practice together; the third gathered only for 
performances. During the sekaa santi rehearsals I attended, members practiced singing 
through texts, either individually or as a group, as the teacher provided corrections and 
guidance. Translation was not done during these rehearsals. Instead, the focus was on 
"reading," which in this context denotes the technique of correctly vocalizing the text’s 
syllables, a complex skill that requires honing the appropriate vocal timbre, memorizing 
numerous melodies, mastering the complex rules that govern how texts are set to these 
melodies, and also (for those practitioners who chose to do so) developing fluency 
singing from aksara script.170 In addition, rehearsal time was sometimes spent making 
audio recordings of the material under study.171 
Nearly all of these clubs’ performances took place in the context of religious 
ceremonies, wherein they functioned as a form of ritual service. To give a sense of what 
                                                        
170 Most of the older texts read in pepaosan performances were originally written in a syllabic script known 
colloquially as aksara Bali. Modern print editions of these texts include versions in aksara, Latin print, or a 
combination of both. Although rudimentary training in reading aksara script forms part of the Balinese 
public school curriculum, performing pepaosan from aksara is considered quite difficult and only a 
minority of the practitioners I observed were comfortable performing without the aid of a Latin 
transcription. 
171 Members would record the teacher’s singing on their mobile phone so that they could practice along 
with the recording between rehearsals. 
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ceremonial sekaa santi performances are like, I will discuss one group’s participation in 
a large odalan ceremony, which took place at Gunung Lebah temple in Ubud over the 
course of several weeks in the fall of 2014. The group was given a slot to perform every 
evening for the duration of the ceremony.  
Each night the club’s members would trickle in one by one, pushing their way up 
the crowded steps to a semi-enclosed space near the top of the temple structure, which 
served as a performance area. Small doorways along the staircase afforded views of 
the temple’s main sanctuary, a large open space lined with massive stone shrines, 
where throngs of worshippers took turns praying and presenting offerings to visiting 
deities. Compared to the outer areas of the temple, which were richly decorated with 
brightly colored fabrics and gold leaf, the space where our performances took place was 
unadorned and rather cluttered, giving it the quality of a backstage area.  
Like all ceremonial pepaosan activities I observed during my fieldwork, these 
performances were quite informal, often attracting almost no immediate audience 
beyond the members of the club, and they involved at least as much socializing as they 
did focused engagement with texts. Upon arriving, each member was served coffee or 
tea and a small basket of sweets. Then, after drinking and relaxing for a while, he or she 
would be invited up to the microphone to perform. Between turns at the microphone, 
performers passed the time chatting and casually listening to the others take their turns, 
slipping off to the main sanctuary to pray, or watching the television set that had been 
set up a few yards away from the performance area.172 At the end of each performance 
                                                        
172 It may seem unusual that there would be a television playing right next to a pepaosan performance, 
but in the context of a Balinese temple ceremony this arrangement is perfectly logical. When a ceremony 
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the club was served a meal, which was either eaten together at the temple or distributed 
in boxes for the members to take home. 
During a typical performance, each member would take the mic for about five to 
ten minutes to read a passage of his or her choosing. Since the club studied together, 
and many members had only limited experience, it often happened that the same few 
passages were performed repeatedly over the course of an evening. Within the three 
sekaa santi with whom I worked, the vast majority of the members were only trained in 
the technique of reading (i.e., singing) texts.173 This meant that a small minority of more 
experienced (and almost exclusively male) performers bore the responsibility of 
translating for the others. Thus, while each reader would perform only a single passage, 
the translators would take much longer turns, accompanying several readers in 
succession. 
When I first started observing and performing with sekaa santi in Bali, I assumed 
that these groups’ raison d’etre was to study and interpret the religious teachings 
contained in kakawin and other texts. What I found as I spent time participating in these 
clubs’ activities, however, was that verbal engagement with textual meaning rarely 
extended beyond the formal act of translation during the moment of performance. 
Although the performers I worked with would occasionally comment upon the meaning 
of a particularly beautiful or didactically significant passage, this was not a topic that 
                                                        
lasts multiple days it is customary for a group of men to makemit, or guard the temple overnight. Both 
pepaosan and television are common ways of passing the time while fulfilling this duty. 
173 Only a few members of these clubs had much familiarity with Kawi vocabulary, which meant that, in 
the two clubs that performed kakawin literature, most members did not understand the meaning of the 
words they were reading. 
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aroused much conversational interest among the clubs’ members. Nor was textual 
content discussed during the sekaa santi rehearsals I observed, which, as noted above, 
focused exclusively on teaching members to vocalize texts correctly. Over time I 
became convinced that understanding and interpreting religious teachings was not in 
fact the driving force behind sekaa santi activities, at least not for the majority of the 
practitioners I was observing.  
Based on these observations, we might be tempted to conclude that sekaa santi 
do not concern themselves with pepaosan’s ethical potential, focusing instead on 
aesthetic matters. By extension, we might suggest that the UDG, with its emphasis on 
understanding, serves to elevate the ethical dimension of pepaosan practice. However, 
these claims are inaccurate for several reasons. For one thing, the most advanced 
sekaa santi members do engage with texts at the level of meaning, and they do revere 
their contents as a source of ethical teachings. This was apparent in my private lessons 
with Gusti Wedana, an elderly sekaa santi club leader with whom I studied the 
technique of mawirama, the singing of Kakawin poetry. Mawirama is a semi-
improvisatory technique for setting Kakawin texts to melody, which involves elaborate 
rules (uger-uger) regarding when and how the singer may make use of melisma in his 
or her vocalization.174 Most of the time I spent with Gusti Wedana was taken up with 
learning to vocalize texts in accordance with these rules. The text that formed the basis 
for our lessons was the Kakawin Ramayana, a 9th Century Kawi-language version of the 
                                                        
174 Kakawin texts are organized in accordance with fixed metrical patterns consisting of long syllables 
(guru) and short syllables (laghu), which are called wirama. Only long syllables may be sung with 
melisma; short syllables must be sung on a single pitch. For a detailed discussion of the musical aspects 
of mawirama, see Schumacher 1995 and Wallis 1980.   
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Indian epic, which covers a rich variety of wirama (metrical patterns). Our focus was 
almost exclusively directed to how the text should sound in performance, in terms of 
melodic contour, pronunciation, phrasing, and timbre. Only occasionally would my 
teacher turn his attention to the narrative content of the text, which was entirely opaque 
to me since I was unfamiliar with the Kawi language. Sometimes he would, in passing, 
note the meaning of a single word. Other times he would pause to discuss a particular 
phrase, contextualizing it within the overarching narrative. These discussions could 
become quite lengthy, leading into tangents about Balinese religious beliefs or other 
matters. I always enjoyed these discussions; Gusti, however, would usually apologize 
for diverting time away from what he considered to be the appropriate focus of our 
lessons: practicing mawirama. These digressions into the terrain of textual content 
revealed Gusti Wedana’s detailed knowledge of Kakawin literature and his deep interest 
in the moral complexities of the Ramayana story. Yet, unlike our engagement with the 
sonic aspects of performance, which we covered in a systematic and detailed way, 
mastering one wirama before moving onto another, our discussion into meaning was 
intermittent and infrequent, providing only a fragmented understanding of the story and 
its broader philosophical and ethical significance. Only after many years, or even 
decades, of such study could I possibly reach a point where I would able to interpret the 
text on my own.  
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Within sekaa santi, the role of interpreting texts is reserved for advanced 
practitioners, a very small minority within the membership of the clubs I studied.175 
Thus, it’s not that sekaa santi focus only on the voice while ignoring the meaningful 
content of texts, as Mr. Iswara seemed to suggest in his speech at the RRI Denpasar 
competition. Rather, these groups believe that vocal technique must be mastered first, 
while interpretation should be reserved for a much more advanced stage of learning (a 
stage that many practitioners never reach). The UDG promotes a kind of short-cut, 
replacing decades of slow absorption with a more direct approach: rather than listening 
to the Kawi or Sanskrit and producing a translation on the spot, UDG competitors 
memorize their translations, which are, in my observation, provided for them by their 
teachers. This obviates the need to master an archaic language, enabling novice 
practitioners to take on the role of interpreter. In their effort to instrumentalize religious 
texts for political ends, proponents and spokespersons for the UDG treat these texts’ 
complex contents as though they amounted to a kind of catechism—a straightforward 
set of instructions for how to live a virtuous Hindu life. Meanwhile, sekaa santi members, 
adhering to an older set of beliefs about the obscure and esoteric nature of religious 
knowledge, treat these contents as something too ambiguous and obscure for any but 
the most advanced practitioners to properly comprehend.  
The tendency among sekaa santi members to treat Kawi and Sanskrit religious 
texts as demanding objects of study, rather than transparent containers for moral 
                                                        
175 This is especially true for groups that study Kawi texts. I worked with one group that studied Balinese-
language geguritan literature. In their case, the meaning of the texts was clear to everyone in the group, 
but nevertheless, the role of translator was performed by a small minority of more advanced performers.  
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teachings, stems from a broader set of beliefs about the nature of literary texts. This 
alternative textual ontology underpins a form of ethical-textual practice that differs from 
the one promoted at the UDG. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the texts read in 
pepaosan are believed to be material embodiments of Dewi Saraswati, and the act of 
sounding a text is a means of partaking in the goddess's divine power. A text, in this 
sense, is not a passive object waiting to be interpreted and understood, but a lively and 
dynamic medium linking human and divine agency.176 According to the sekaa santi 
members with whom I worked, it is Saraswati who enables pepaosan performance to 
happen, and she can also prevent it from happening. This means that successful 
pepaosan performance requires a certain amount of divine participation  
One way pepaosan practitioners locate divine agency within their artistic practice 
is through the stories they tell about Saraswati. Like the acts of myth-making discussed 
in Chapter 1 and 2, these stories narrate, and thus enact, an intimate and dynamic 
relationship between the sekala and niskala realms, and they also activate and circulate 
particular forms of sensory attunement whereby pepaosan practitioners attend to 
Saraswati’s active presence. As revealed in sekaa santi members’ stories, this 
presence can be sensed in various ways. For example, practitioners often attribute 
performance ability to Saraswati’s guidance. In October 2014 one of the clubs I studied 
with was invited to perform at a lakeside temple located over an hour’s drive from the 
Ubud area where they lived. I rode along in one of the cars that took the group to the 
temple. During the drive one of the club’s members, a beginner, complained that he was 
                                                        
176 For more on Balinese beliefs about the efficacy of written texts, see Fox and Hornbacher 2016, 
Lansing 1983:75-92, and Zurbuchen 1987: 41-81.   
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struggling to get the hang of pepaosan technique. A more advanced member 
encouraged him to perform as often as possible; whenever there’s a ceremony, go to 
the temple and perform. The beginner then said that he prefers to practice at home, to 
which the more advanced performer replied that he would learn faster performing at 
temple. “If you sing at the temple, there’s something that will help you; you can feel it,” 
he explained. Sekaa santi groups perform as an act of devotion to god (ngayah). Like 
the material offerings that accompany them, these performances are a medium of ritual 
exchange between the performers, the ceremony’s hosts, and divine beings, whether 
the latter are understood to be Saraswati, the supreme god Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa, or 
the deities being honored at a specific ceremony. Although the advanced practitioner in 
this conversation did not mention Saraswati by name, it was clear that the “something” 
to which he referred was a divine being whose presence could be sensed in the 
enhanced performance ability which, he contended, could be achieved by performing 
pepaosan as ngayah. A few weeks later, I attended a social event with one of my 
teachers, Dayu Widya. She introduced me to an acquaintance of hers, telling him that I 
performed pepaosan and extolling my singing and how quickly I was learning. 
Embarrassed by her flattery and anxious to direct attention away from myself, I told the 
man that she was my teacher. Dayu Widya skillfully deflected this comment, saying 
gurunya Sang Hyang Aji Saraswati (Saraswati is her teacher). In both of these 
conversations, Saraswati is identified as the source of pepaosan skill, her presence 
made known in moments of improved ability.  
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Sekaa santi members also evoke Saraswati’s presence to explain difficulties or 
mishaps that happen in reading literary texts. At a temple performance in Ubud, for 
example, after I finished reading my passage an elderly male member of Gusti 
Wedana’s sekaa santi group complimented me on my accurate rendering of aksara 
script. He confessed that he himself was unable to perform from aksara, despite having 
studied for many years. “Mungkin tidak dikasih (maybe it’s not allowed),” he suggested. 
When I looked puzzled he clarified: “tidak dikasih sama yang diatas” (it’s not allowed by 
god [literally, the one above]). During a sekaa santi rehearsal I attended in Denpasar, 
Dayu Widya told some of the women she trains a story about a male member of their 
group whose voice had suddenly frozen at the beginning of a performance. “He couldn’t 
make a sound,” she said seriously, her voice hushed as the others listened with rapt 
attention, “his voice was katos (stiff). Then he prayed to Sang Hyang Aji Saraswati,” she 
continued, “and his voice immediately returned to normal. She [the goddess Saraswati] 
must have been giving him a test,” she concluded. In this case the bodily sensation of 
having one’s voice freeze is taken as a sign of breakdown in the relationship between 
the performer and the goddess who animates his performance. A simple prayer is 
sufficient to repair the relationship, allowing the performance to proceed.  
A few weeks later, at an evening temple performance with an Ubud-based club, 
the topic of tests came up again. After my turn at the microphone, the group’s teacher, 
Nyoman Budi, came and sat next to me. Speaking through a wad of tobacco tucked in 
his lower lip, he advised me politely that I needed to sing a bit louder. Having received 
this comment before I gave him my usual excuse, explaining that I never practiced with 
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a full voice because I didn’t want my Balinese housemates to hear me. He nodded 
sympathetically and then said: “It’s a test, a test of will to see if you’re really going to 
devote yourself to the vocal art in this literature. But it’s not [your housemates] who are 
testing you,” he added. “The one who’s testing you is the goddess who’s manifested in 
this literature.” I asked what he meant. “According to our beliefs there is a God,” he said, 
“and the God who resides in and animates (bersemayam) this literature is, this 
manifestation of God, is Sang Hyang Aji Saraswati, the goddess of skill and intelligence 
(kepintaran). She’s materialized in the form of this literature that we’re studying, and she 
tests us.” He then explained that Dewi Saraswati’s tests can take many forms. “We may 
be laughed at or someone may insult us,” he said, “but ultimately it’s she who is testing 
us.” Acting both through the challenges literary texts present in the context of oral 
performance, and through the people who critique, mock, and insult performers’ efforts 
to render those texts orally, in these stories Dewi Saraswati actively intervenes in 
pepaosan practice. Although her interventions may appear to be designed to obstruct or 
hamper, ultimately the purpose of her tests is to help performers advance, as Nyoman 
Budi explained. “We have to gain the strength to confront these tests,” he said. “The 
more we’re able to do this, the more we will progress.”  
Through these stories, sekaa santi members represent pepaosan performance 
as an example of what Karen Strassler has called “auratic indexicality” (2014). Strassler 
uses this term to distinguish between two semiotic ideologies pertaining to the 
indexicality of photography, one which sees the photograph as “a trace of a past but 
now absent presence,” and another which sees the photograph as “a medium for 
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transmitting an ongoing but otherwise invisible presence” (2014: 123, emphasis in 
original). Auratic images, such as the “authentic photographs” of spirits that Strassler 
analyzes, are images that bridge the ontological gap between visible and invisible 
realms, “acting as a conduit across the line of the supernatural and the worldly” (ibid.). 
Extending Strassler’s idea of the auratic image, I propose that these sekaa santi 
members enact what we might think of as an auratic voice. This is distinct from the 
indexicality of the voice as imagined in the UDG speeches quoted earlier. Within the 
semiotic ideology espoused by Pak Sujana, the voices of UDG competitors index their 
engagement with the knowledge and moral teachings contained in religious texts. 
Because these texts are believed to be products of divine revelation, these voices carry 
the traces of that revelation into the present. The auratic indexicality described in sekaa 
santi members’ stories is of a different order. Here, the sounding of a text acts as a 
direct conduit between two worlds, allowing those worlds to intermingle in the present.  
For sekaa santi members, the ethical project of pepaosan practice is not simply 
about coming to “understand” the referential content of religious texts. Rather, it 
requires the practitioner to cultivate a relationship with Saraswati. In this sense, it 
resonates with the ethics of divine blessing discussed in Chapter 2. In their practices of 
myth-making about Saraswati, sekaa santi members highlight the role of divine agency 
in making pepaosan performance possible. In doing so, the narrators of these stories 
represent their artistic ability as a kind of divine blessing: a material manifestation of 
their relationship with Saraswati.  
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To put it in Goffman’s terms, we might say that the auratic indexicality attributed 
to sekaa santi performances confers ethical value on the act of animating the text, 
whether or not the performer understands and internalizes the text’s message (i.e. takes 
on the role of principal). Instead of signaling a narrow concern with the aesthetic 
aspects of pepaosan, as UDG spokespersons suggest, sekaa santi members’ concerns 
over correct vocalization are part of the ethical project of seeking Saraswatis’ blessings.   
 The high value attributed to these blessings was evident in the sense of 
accomplishment that accompanied many stories about Saraswati. For many of the 
pepaosan practitioners with whom I worked, the ability to forge mystical connections 
with Saraswati was a source of profound fascination and pride. Alongside the 
opportunities for ritual service and social interaction that participation in a sekaa santi 
provides, I believe these connections are among the primary motivations for 
practitioners’ involvement in these clubs. In my conversation with Nyoman Budi, for 
example, he told me of all the ridicule he’d had to endure when he was first learning to 
sing. Over time, he assured me, he was able to overcome these “tests” and, with the 
goddess’s guidance, become a respected pepaosan master. I encountered a similar 
narrative of accomplishment during one of the evening performances at the odalan 
ceremony described above. While I was awaiting my turn at the microphone, one of the 
male members of the group told me about an unusual experience he had had during a 
late-night performance at Pura Lempuyang, a large mountainside temple in the forests 
of Eastern Bali known to be especially spiritually potent. As he sat in the dark temple, 
singing a passage from a kakawin text, he was approached by two demons in the form 
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of monkeys. Although this would have terrified him under normal circumstances, on this 
occasion he was emboldened. The reason for his unusual bravery, he explained, was 
that he could feel Saraswati’s presence in the text as he was vocalizing it. Knowing that 
he was within the goddess’s protection, he struck the two demons with his arms, 
whereupon they immediately fled. This image of Saraswati as a source of both 
protection and enhanced ability resonates with some of the moral discourses we 
encountered in Chapter 2, in which members of the Dangin family attributed their 
prosperity, ability, and good fortune to the participation of divine agents in their lives. In 
both contexts, accomplishments are especially valued when they are the result of divine 
intervention. Thus, both among sekaa santi members and in the Dangin household, my 
interlocutors play up the role of divine agency in enabling their achievements. In 
Chapter 2, I argued that this kind of myth-making reflects positively on the recipient of 
divine aid, whose accomplishments and wellbeing are represented as manifestations of 
divine blessing, and thus as a form of virtue. A similar dynamic seems to be at play 
among sekaa santi members, whose musical and literary abilities are likewise a form of 
divine blessing.  
 Pepaosan performers actively seek out such blessings by making obeisances to 
Saraswati. Indeed, compared to other Balinese performing arts, the art of pepaosan is 
surrounded by a particularly conspicuous amount of prayer and ritual. Even during 
private lessons, my teachers nearly always instructed me to state two brief mantras—
om swastiastu and om awignamastu—before beginning to sing, and another mantra—
om santi santi santi om—before ending the lesson. At the sekaa santi rehearsals I 
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attended, the members always recited these prayers in unison at the beginning and end 
of the meeting, and during on-air interactive programs, callers invariably do the same at 
the beginning and end of each call. During the numerous ceremonial pepaosan 
performances I participated in, each performer prayed silently before picking up the 
microphone at the beginning of his or her turn reading or interpreting and again before 
moving away from the reading table at the end of the turn.  
 Pepaosan practitioners also interact with Saraswati through physical offerings of 
various kinds: a large basket of offerings is always placed on the reading table during 
ceremonial performances, and during group rehearsals, a single small offering is often 
presented. In addition, pepaosan clubs occasionally organize rituals to ask for blessings 
from Saraswati. Often these are simple and last only a few minutes, but they can also 
be elaborate ceremonies lasting a couple of hours and involving numerous offerings.  
As I was generally presumed to be unfamiliar with the prayers and rituals that 
accompany pepaosan performance, I received instructions and explanations from 
various practitioners throughout my fieldwork. Often, I was simply told to berdoa dulu 
(pray first) before beginning to sing, but on other occasions my interlocutors were more 
specific. As I was about to pick up the microphone at a cremation ceremony at one of 
Ubud’s palaces, for example, a male performer stopped me: “Ask for tuntunan here 
first,” he said, as he tapped the basket of offerings on the reading table in front of me. At 
my first rehearsal with the Denpasar sekaa santi mentioned above, Dayu Widya 
performed a brief ceremony for the members of the club and as she was reciting 
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mantras one of the men in the group quietly explained what was going on: “We’re 
asking for tuntunan,” he said, “so that we’ll quickly become capable [performers].”  
It should be clear from these examples that what is meant by tuntunan in these 
statements is something quite different from the moral lessons that are the focus of the 
UDG. In asking for tuntunan, pepaosan performers are asking Saraswati to guide them 
as they sing and interpret a text, to offer them spiritual protection, and to inspire and 
animate their performance, making it affecting and beautiful.177 What is being guided in 
this case is the performance itself, not the performer’s moral character. However, this 
guidance is not merely aesthetic; as a form of divine blessing, it also has ethical value. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, members of the Dangin household engage in a form of ethical 
cultivation that centers not on a person’s inner character, but on their relationship with 
god, a relationship that takes the material form of divine blessings. Although wealth is 
the most typical form such blessings take, I argue that the divinely guided performances 
that emerge through Saraswati’s tuntunan are also manifestations of this same ethically 
significant relationship. Within the discursive context of sekaa santi then, pepaosan is 
enacted as a form of ethical self-cultivation that differs from the one promoted at the 
UDG. As described above, the performances imagined in UDG speeches index virtues 
believed to reside elsewhere: not in the sounds and gestures of the performance, but in 
the immaterial space of an interiorized self. Sekaa santi participants, by contrast, 
adhere to a different semiotic ideology. For them, the materiality of pepaosan 
                                                        
177 Saraswati’s guidance is related to the Balinese concept of taksu, the divinely bestowed charisma 
attributed to great musicians, puppet masters, and dancers. Interestingly, however, my interlocutors in 
Bali rarely used the word taksu in reference to pepaosan performance. 
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performance possesses an auratic idexicality. As an index and conduit of divine agency, 
the embodied act of sounding a text is a manifestation of virtue in its own right. 
Understood in this way, virtue is constituted not individually (as personal character), but 
relationally, through the material forms that mediate human relationships with the divine; 
it is a product of both human and divine agency, at once material and immaterial, 
aesthetic and ethical. The self that is imagined and inhabited through the pursuit of 
Saraswati’s blessings thus represents an alternative to the interiorized version of ethical 
selfhood promoted by the UDG and the ongoing Hindu reform effort in Bali and 
Indonesia more generally. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have shown how the Balinese art of pepaosan is at the center of 
two distinct religious pedagogies of voice. In its guise as an event at state-sponsored 
UDG competitions, pepaosan serves as a way of training practitioners to internalize the 
moral teachings contained in religious texts.  According to UDG spokespersons, the 
pedagogy surrounding these competitions should foreground comprehension and 
expression over and above the narrowly aesthetic aspects of vocal performance, 
though, as we saw, UDG trainers do not always adhere to this expectation. In the 
context of sekaa santi, by contrast, slow mastery of vocal technique precedes deep 
engagement with textual meaning. Particularly because the clubs I studied included 
many novice practitioners, the pedagogy enacted in these clubs focused primarily on 
learning the rules for correctly rendering texts as vocal sound (uger-uger), while 
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engagement with textual content and meaning was postponed for a more advanced 
phase of study.  
 In addition to teaching practitioners to use their voices in particular ways, 
religious pedagogies of voice also provide practical means by which particular 
conceptions of selfhood are imagined, inhabited, and rendered socially meaningful. 
While the UDG circulates a conception and practice of the self that emphasizes 
interiority, individuality, and human autonomy vis-à-vis the material world, sekaa santi 
members are engaged in an ethical project rooted in a very different way of imagining 
and working on the self, which embraces materiality and the distribution of agency 
beyond the human. The case of pepaosan thus reveals how the affordances of vocal 
traditions can be taken up in different ways toward different paths of ethical striving, and 
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CHAPTER 5 
SINGING ROHANI AND THE ETHICS OF SENSORY PURIFICATION 
 
Noise 
 In February of 2014 Wayan invited me to perform with him in a shadow puppet 
play at a temple ceremony in Nyuhkuning, a village just a few kilometers from Tegal. It 
was raining that day, so a member of the committee responsible for organizing the 
performance picked us up in his jeep. I climbed into the back seat with Wayan, while his 
brother Kadek, the puppet master, sat up front. “Ilang carike” (the rice fields are gone), 
Kadek said wistfully as we passed one of the few rice fields that remained visible along 
Ubud’s roadways, which had recently been labelled with a sign advertising a 
forthcoming housing development.    
 Among my Tegal friends, the village of Nyuhkuning was known for implementing 
a somewhat more modernized approach to traditional ritual. While Tegal villagers might 
spend weeks preparing the offerings for a ceremony, Nyuhkuning residents would 
quickly throw things together in a day or two, or so it seemed. The Nyuhkuning area, 
home to several ashram, meditation centers, and alternative healers, also had a 
reputation as a hotbed for new religious and spiritual movements, catering to both local 
residents and foreign tourists.178 Jostling along the road between the two villages, we 
                                                        
178 Throughout the Ubud area, centers and organizations that offer alternative forms of spirituality 
primarily to local residents exist alongside, and to some extent overlap with, spiritual tourism activities, 
which cater primarily to Western tourists.   
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passed billboards advertising Meditasi Tertawa (Laughing Meditation) and Olahraga 
Hidup Baru (New Life Exercise), a combination of meditation, prayer, and aerobics.  
 As we pulled into the muddy parking lot beside the temple, I could hear the 
slightly distorted sound of a male voice emanating from a speaker somewhere inside 
the temple walls. My ears were immediately captivated by the chanting, the melodic 
contour of which was unlike anything I had ever heard at a Balinese temple ceremony. 
For a brief moment I thought I was hearing Quranic recitation, but I quickly realized that 
the sequence of pitches more closely resembled an Indian scale, familiar to Balinese 
listeners through imported recordings of Gayatri Mantra and other forms of Indian 
devotional singing, but highly unusual in the context of a traditional temple ceremony. I 
continued listening. I noticed that the chanting followed the call and response format 
typical of pepaosan, but the responses were in Indonesian rather than Balinese. As we 
walked through the stone gate and into the temple’s outer courtyard, the amplified voice 
was submerged among the sounds of gamelan music and the chatter of the crowds who 
had gathered to pray. Once inside the temple, I spotted the chanters, two middle aged 
men in Balinese temple dress seated in a small bale to the left of the temple gate. We 
set up in a larger bale about a dozen yards away and were quickly surrounded by a 
tightly packed group of worshippers, who crowded onto the bale to avoid the rain. 
Although the ceremony was just beginning, the chanters wrapped up their performance 
shortly after we arrived.  
 Once the ceremony was over we piled back into the jeep for the ride home. The 
moment the car doors slammed shut, our driver started complaining angrily about the 
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unusual chanting. He imitated the Indian-sounding melody and muttered something 
about Sai Baba, an Indian devotional movement that has been gaining adherents in 
Bali. Speaking in a mix of high Balinese and Indonesian, he told us that he’d done some 
investigating during the ceremony and found out that the chanters had not been invited, 
whereupon he had informed the village head and suggested they be removed. This 
plan, however, never materialized. He said he didn’t think such singing belonged in a 
Balinese temple. He felt it clashed with the other sounds. “If people sing kidung, I’ll give 
them rice,” he said emphatically, implying that the chanters did not deserve the same 
level of respect as performers of traditional Balinese songs. “Indeed, it all comes from 
the Vedas,” he admitted, but he was worried that people were becoming “confused” 
(bingung). “There are all sorts of aliran (sects) here now, and everything’s starting to get 
mixed up,” he said.179  
 Devotional religious movements occupy a marginal position in contemporary 
Balinese religious life, vastly overshadowed by indigenous forms of religiosity. But like 
an occasional off-key note in an otherwise comfortably familiar tonal field, their subtle 
dissonance with mainstream religious practice is making itself felt, in moments like the 
one just described. For many of my friends in Bali, the singing associated with groups 
like Sai Baba, ISKCON, and their localized variants, prompted laughter and ridicule. For 
others, like our driver, such singing inspired revulsion and anxiety about the loss of a 
traditional social order, to which many Balinese Hindus are deeply committed. As I will 
                                                        
179 The word aliran has a negative connotation that is not quite captured by the words ‘sect’ or ‘cult.’ To 
call something an aliran is to suggest that it is not a legitimate religion.  
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discuss later on, however, for many participants in these movements, devotional singing 
is a source of intense pleasure and profound religious feeling.  
 As these descriptions demonstrate, music affects us in visceral and embodied 
ways. Perhaps to a greater degree than any other art form, it insinuates itself into the 
body, affecting our heart rate and breathing, making us feel comfortable, moved, or 
irritated, leaving our mood lifted or dampened. Following Patrick Eisenlohr (2018) and 
Charles Hirschkind (2006), I understand these affects to be dependent on innate bodily 
capacities as well as personal and social histories of listening and the cultivated 
sensibilities to which they give rise.180 To borrow a phrase from anthropologist William 
Mazzarella, we might say that music, like other publicly circulating mediatory forms, 
“solicits us as embodied members of a sensuous social order” (Mazzarella 2009: 299-
300). By the same token, music also contributes to producing and transforming the 
sensuous social orders within which it is experienced.   
 Scholars across the humanities and social sciences have recently begun to hone 
in on affect as an important dimension of people’s sense of the world and its 
possibilities. In light of this work, this chapter considers the self- and world-making 
potential of musically-mediated affect, focusing in particular on vocal performance and 
vocal sound. Although I admit that music’s strange power often seems to operate 
independently of thought and interpretation, my interest is not in affects as external to 
                                                        
180 Eisenlohr argues against affect as a concept, citing the problematic ways the term has been used in some recent 
sound studies scholarship; he advocates ‘atmosphere’ as an alternative framework for thinking about the ways 
music acts on what he calls the “felt-body” (the body as experienced phenomenologically). While I agree with most 
of Eisenlohr’s argument, I think the concept of affect remains valuable for thinking about sound’s effects on 
bodies, partly because of the productive ways affect is being conceptualized and used outside sound and music 
studies. See Eisenlohr 2018: 48-51.  
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symbolic mediation (Massumi 1995). Instead, following Eisenlohr, Mazzarella, Navaro-
Yashin, and others, I am interested in how affect and signification feed into one another, 
generating and sustaining people’s aspirations, anxieties, desires, and values. Taking 
inspiration from Mazzarella’s claim that a social project “must be affective to be 
effective,” I consider how music might operate within this nexus of the meaningful and 
the feelingful to open up new social possibilities (Mazzarella 2009: 299).  
 I consider this question by examining fieldwork I conducted at an ISKCON temple 
on the outskirts of the city of Gianyar in central Bali. The International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness, or ISKCON, is a devotional movement based on the teachings 
of the Bhagavad Gita, and popularly known as ‘the Hare Krishnas.’ Founded in New 
York city in 1966 by a Bengali Vaisnava renunciate named Srila Prabhupada, the 
movement now has adherents throughout the globe, with especially large numbers in 
India and the former Soviet Union. Though banned in Indonesia until 1998, ISKCON 
has had a following in Bali since the late 1970s (Howe 2001: 184).  
 Like other proselytizing religious movements with global aspirations, ISKCON 
centers around a set of highly mobile practices and media, including texts, iconography, 
liturgical and devotional practices. Perhaps the most iconic among these is a form of 
devotional singing known as sankirtana yajna, or simply kirtan. Both among my 
interlocutors in Bali, and in ISKCON’s global online sphere, kirtan is widely represented 
as a musical practice that affords ecstatic spiritual experiences. We might therefore 
claim that kirtan circulates affect on a global scale. This accomplishment, however, 
cannot be attributed to music alone. The specific forms of kirtan that I discuss here 
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circulate within a structured assemblage of other practices and forms, which mutually 
inform and reinforce one another. Furthermore, as ISKCON communities work their way 
into a population, their music and other mediatory practices collide with existing sensory 
orders (sets of embodied sensibilities, which may, for example, make people more likely 
to be repelled than attracted). Looking at music as it operates within the ready-made 
package of a mobile religious movement highlights the ways that music’s affective and 
social efficacy depend on its embedding within assemblages of discourses, practices, 
and other mediatory forms.  
  This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I briefly outline the history of the 
ISKCON movement. Next, I discuss some of the inherent tensions between ISKCON 
and Balinese adat. In the third section, I explore the set of practices that Balinese 
ISKCON devotees call singing rohani, particularly the singing of kirtan. I show how 
ISKCON’s religious pedagogy of voice tethers musical affect to a specific ethical project, 
one which diverges from both the ethics of divine blessing and the reformist Hindu 
ethics discussed in earlier chapters. In the final section, I consider the personal 
conversion narratives of two accomplished singers and show that musical feelings are 
central to how they understand, value, and become attached to ISKCON. In conclusion, 
I suggest that if ISKCON provides a compelling basis for new religious subjectivities in 
Bali, this is due in no small part to the efficacy of its music.  
 
A Brief History of ISKCON  
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 Due in part to George Harrison’s well-known involvement with the movement, 
ISKCON is often associated with the historical moment of the 1960s and the youth 
counterculture movement of that period. Indeed, the first ISKCON temple, founded on 
Manhattan’s Lower East Side in 1966, was very much a product of this cultural milieu. It 
is important to recognize, however, that the movement has its roots in a much longer 
history of cross-cultural exchange dating back to the colonial period in India, and even 
earlier.  
 ISKCON’s basic teachings and practices grew out of the tradition of Bengali 
Vaisnavism in which the movement’s founder, Srila Prabhupada, had been trained. 
ISKCON’s earliest direct antecedent is a 15th century devotional movement known as 
the Caitanya Movement, named for its founder Sri Krsna Caitanya Mahaprabhu (1486-
1533), who promoted sankirtana yajna, the singing of Krishna’s names, as the means of 
salvation during the Kali Yuga (the present age).  
 In the late 19th century a Bengali religious reformer and former colonial 
magistrate named Srila Bhaktivinode Thakur (1838-1914) sought to revitalize the 
Caitanya Movement, founding the Gaudiya Math sampradaya (school) for this purpose 
(Haddon 2014: 145-46). Bhaktivinode prophesied that Caitanya’s message would 
appeal to “people of all nations,” and that printed texts would serve as the medium for 
circulating it (ibid.: 146). Bhaktivinode’s son, Bhaktisiddhanta Saraswati, went on to 
become a prominent figure in the Gaudiya Math school, and he later bequeathed his 
father’s mission to his disciple Srila Prabhupada by assigning him the task of translating 
the Srimad Bhagavatam into English and spreading its message to the Western world. 
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Prabhupada travelled to America for this purpose in 1965 and founded the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness in 1966.  
 While figures within ISKCON tend to trace its origins back to ancient times, it also 
has roots in a more recent historical moment when Hindu “tradition” was being revived 
in the search for national identity in India’s struggle against colonial rule. At the time 
when Bhaktivinode was preaching Caitanya’s message, a number of other religious 
reformers in India were developing their own outward-looking versions of Hindu doctrine 
and practice.181 Though these reformers took different approaches, they shared the 
common aim of revitalizing and reforming specific Indian religious traditions to create a 
properly modern form of spirituality that would appeal to Westerners and Western-
educated Indians alike (Van der Veer 2009: 1107-08). These same reformist strands of 
Hinduism impacted the development of the Hindu Reform in Bali through the influence 
of Pandit Shastri as well as Balinese religious reformers who studied in India in the 
1950s.182 Thus, although ISKCON did not arrive in Indonesia until the 1970s, elements 
of the broader reformist movement out of which ISKCON ultimately developed had 
                                                        
181 These include Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), who was originally associated with the Brahmo 
Samaj movement (one of the first Hindu reform movements in India) and then went on to found the 
Vedanta Movement. Also among the early religious reformers in India were Keshabchandra Sen and Sri 
Ramakrishna. According to Partha Chatterjee, they rejected the “rationalist ideal” of the Brahmo Samaj 
and looked instead to popular religious practices, including collective singing, as a more authentic source 
for a modern Indian religion, and a way out of the “inherently oppressive” discourse of reason, which 
posited colonized subjects as dependent on colonizers to raise them out of unreason (Chatterjee 1993: 
35-75). Another Indian religious reformer was Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1833), founder of the 
Arya Samaj movement with which Pandit Shastri—a religious reformer who took up residence in Bali in 
the mid-20th century—was allegedly associated. 
182 During the mid-1950s several Balinese intellectuals accepted scholarships from the Indian government 
to study in India (Bakker 1993:36, 102, 198, 227-228, Ramstedt 2004: 10, Somvir 2004: 257). 
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arrived much earlier. To this day there is significant overlap between reformist Hinduism 
in Indonesia and the basic teachings of ISKCON.183  
 While Indians were reorganizing and modernizing Hindu traditions in the 
subcontinent, European and American orientalists were becoming interested in 
‘Eastern’ religious ideas and practices. In 1875 Helena Blavatsky and Henry Olcott 
created the Theosophical Society, a movement which combined elements of Hinduism, 
Buddhism, and other ancient religious and philosophical traditions. Though founded in 
New York City, the movement eventually relocated to India and went on to influence 
religious reform movements in both India and Indonesia.184 During the 1950s and 60s, 
youth interest in alternative spirituality expanded, giving rise to an efflorescence of New 
Religious Movements and alternative spiritualities that came to be known as the New 
Age. Although many New Age spiritualities began as Western appropriations of religious 
traditions from Asia, some were later exported back to Asia where they found a 
congenial home among people who had been raised in the traditions on which they 
were based. ISKCON, which now has its largest following in India as well as substantial 
numbers in Indonesia, Singapore, and elsewhere in Asia, is one example of this 
pattern.185 In the case of Bali, the doctrinal affinity between ISKCON and the Hindu 
Reform provide devotees with a strong basis on which to defend the movement against 
its critics. However, Balinese adat poses significant obstacles to more widespread 
acceptance of ISKCON.  
                                                        
183 For example, the “Five Beliefs” (Panca Sraddha) of Agama Hindu generally align with ISKCON 
doctrine.   
184 On the role of the Theosophical Society in the Dutch East Indies, see Tollenaere 1999.  
185 On ISKCON in Singapore, see Sebastian 2010. On ISKCON in India, see Fahy 2017.  
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ISKCON in Bali 
 As discussed in the Introduction, social and political life in Bali is characterized by 
an unresolved tension between the secular state and the religious authority of the desa 
adat. This means that although Balinese Hindus are citizens of a secular nation, they 
are nonetheless required to uphold their religious obligations or face harsh sanctions.186 
This situation poses unique obstacles to a movement like ISKCON, which represents an 
alternative source of Hindu doctrine, practice, and affiliation.187 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the desa adat’s power stems from the social 
bonds that unite its members, bonds which are established, in large part, through the 
shared experience of participating in communal ritual. The solidarity uniting a desa 
adat’s members takes the form of a shared aesthetic sensibility as well as affectively 
charged social bonds, the latter of which is manifest both in the strong sense of mutual 
obligation that members share, and in the collective outrage that sometimes erupts 
when an individual, family, or other segment of the community is seen as having 
offended the sanctity of the desa adat.  
 Predictably, these shared aesthetic and social bonds sometimes take the form of 
strongly negative perceptions toward groups like ISKCON, which represents an 
                                                        
186 Following Talal Asad (2003:4–5), I define secularism as the condition in which the state bases its 
authority to regulate religious life not on the tenets of a particular religion, but on a supposedly universal 
set of values that transcends and overrides those of individual religions. One example of this overriding 
authority can be seen in the Indonesian state philosophy of Pancasila, which requires belief in Tuhan 
Yang Maha Esa (the Almighty God), a designation that simultaneously transcends and encompasses the 
particular theologies of the six officially recognized religions.  
187 While ISKCON does not officially consider itself to be a branch of “Hinduism” or a “religion,” Balinese 
devotees tend to see it as such.   
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alternative religious community with its own very distinct aesthetic. We saw one 
example of this in the Nyuhkuning man’s viscerally negative response to the sound of 
devotional chant at his village temple. I encountered a similarly derisive attitude toward 
devotional movements in the Dangin household. Wayan and Kadek had played music 
for a meditation group in Nyuhkuning, and Kadek would often entertain family and 
friends by mimicking the group’s leader. He would chant in a vaguely Indian-sounding 
way and sway from side to side with his eyes closed, his head loosely lolling back and 
forth as though he was intoxicated. His movements, albeit exaggerated, were 
reminiscent of the ways Balinese ISKCON devotees would sway while singing kirtan at 
the ashram, and they differed dramatically from those of traditional Balinese religious 
arts, such as the energized poses of Balinese dance and the highly refined gestures of 
Balinese priests. These impersonations never failed to provoke hearty laughter from 
Kadek’s audience. The loosely choreographed, emotional appearance of devotional 
song and dance struck Wayan and Kadek as ridiculous, and they described participants 
as looking like crazy people (seperti orang gila). The sensibilities and attachments that 
make ISKCON’s aesthetic ridiculous and even repugnant to many Balinese Hindus are, 
therefore, an obstacle that ISKCON has to overcome when attracting adherents in Bali. 
I argue that it is by instilling new aesthetic sensibilities and feelings that ISKCON is able 
to pose a significant challenge to traditional ways of life.   
 New religious movements like ISKCON provide a way of organizing religious 
practice that diverges significantly from the system of communal institutions that 
organizes religious practice in the adat sphere. Unlike village and descent group 
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temples, to which people are bound through birth and marriage, ISKCON temples or 
“ashram” are voluntary associations to which people can attach and detach themselves 
at will. Furthermore, while village temples impose mandatory contributions of labor and 
money, ashram survive on voluntary contributions. At the ashram I attended in Bali, 
donations were collected in a donation box in the main prayer room. Contributions of 
labor (e.g. cooking prasad, caring for the temple grounds, decorating for ceremonies, 
etc.)  seemed to primarily fall to a core group of especially active devotees; a larger 
group of peripheral devotees would only show up for worship. In this sense the ashram 
was closer to a modern church than a traditional Balinese temple congregation.188  
 Due in part to the voluntary nature of ISKCON worship, ISKCON ashram create 
social networks that cut across family and village ties. Many of the ISKCON members I 
met had close family members who were not part of the movement. Sometimes a wife 
would attend but not her husband, young adults would join but not their parents, or a 
nuclear family would participate without the support of their extended family. In addition, 
                                                        
188 In an article about the rise of modern spirituality in India and China, Peter Van der Veer has noted that 
the periods of economic liberalization in these two countries have witnessed an increase in specific forms 
of “spiritual” activity (2009). In India, for example, spirituality was initially linked to the anti-colonial 
struggle, but in recent decades, spiritual practices have become commodified and tied to efforts to 
produce more productive and competitive laborers. Addressing middle class anxieties about globalization, 
these emerging spiritual movements serve to accommodate people to the disciplinary regimes of late 
capitalism. According to Van der Veer, “it is really the liberalization of the Indian and Chinese economies 
under the impact of global capitalism that frees the energies of spiritual movements to organize civil 
society” (2009: 1116). Indonesia’s period of economic liberalization did not get underway until the late 
1990s, whereas the country’s first Sai Baba and ISKCON centers were founded by the early 1980s. 
Nonetheless, it is still interesting to speculate about the possible affinities between these movements’ 
teachings—which focus on the individual, inviting him or her to cultivate and desire a direct experience of, 
and an intimate relationship with, the divine or spiritual power, however conceived—and the demands of 
a liberalizing economy, which, as noted in the Introduction, are often understood to be in tension with the 
demands of adat religiosity in Bali, which center around collective religious obligations. For a similar 
argument about Sai Baba’s affinity with the needs of Indonesia’s middle class and state development 
agendas, and more broadly, with Weber’s “spirit of capitalism,” see Howe 2001: 143, 172, 180-81.    
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many devotees lived more than an hour’s drive from the ashram, so unlike much of 
traditional Balinese worship, where people walk to their village temple with family and 
neighbors, devotees arrive at the ashram by motorbike, alone or in small groups, and 
many are, at least initially, strangers to one another.  
 Many New Religious Movements that have taken root in Bali, such as Sai Baba, 
present themselves as complementing, rather than supplanting, traditional forms of 
worship (Howe 2001: 176-178). ISKCON, however, takes a somewhat more 
oppositional stance. Sermons at the ashram often highlighted the “errors” of traditional 
Balinese beliefs and practices, which the speakers saw as being overly-focused on 
material rather than spiritual matters, and, for this reason, ethically and spiritually 
ineffective. One particularly contentious matter is the killing of animals. Whereas 
ISKCON requires strict vegetarianism, nearly all Balinese rituals involve the slaughter of 
animals as well as the ceremonial sharing of cooked meat, practices which ISKCON 
doctrine sees as highly offensive to god.  
 Despite these tensions, adherents at the ashram still identified as Balinese 
Hindus, and, with few exceptions, they remained active members of a desa adat. Yet, in 
conversation, Balinese devotees often expressed ambivalence about participating in 
adat activities. I first encountered this sentiment while chatting with a female devotee 
named Malini.189 Malini struck me as one of the more studious women at the ashram, 
always deeply attentive during the sermons and especially skilled at chanting in 
                                                        
189 Upon initiation, ISKCON devotees adopt a new name. At the ashram in Bali, these initiated names 
were often of Indian origin (e.g. the names of rivers in India or characters from the Mahabharata or 
Ramayana). I have tried to replicate this in choosing pseudonyms.  
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Sanskrit. As I would discover later, she was the sister of one of the ashram’s most 
respected teachers, a brahmacari (celibate monk) who had studied in India and was a 
frequent guest at ISKCON communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. I asked her if 
she’d been coming to the ashram for a long time. “Yes,” she said, “but I’m still ignorant 
(masih bodoh). I told her that it didn’t seem that way, and I suggested that perhaps the 
learning process was unavoidably long.  “It’s because I live in the desa,” she countered, 
explaining that this left her with little time for ISKCON-related activities. I asked her if 
she “ikut adat” (participated in the activities of her desa adat). “We have to tolerate,” she 
said.  
 This phrase “we have to tolerate,” (kita harus toleransi) was a common refrain in 
devotee’s discussions of their relationship to Balinese adat. In order to remain on good 
terms with their desa adat, while still upholding ISKCON teachings, devotees must be 
cautious and avoid causing offense. Thus, although proselytizing is strongly encouraged 
within ISKCON generally, devotees at the ashram I attended were discouraged from 
being too forthright in discussing their beliefs with non-devotees. This caution was 
apparently warranted: Malini told me that she and her brother had almost been 
banished from their village over their involvement with ISKCON. It was common for 
devotees to conceal or downplay their affiliation with ISKCON when interacting with 
outsiders to the movement. One female devotee told me how she would aluskan (refine) 
her language when declining to eat meat in her village: instead of admitting to being 
vegetarian, she would tell her fellow villagers that eating meat made her ill. Many 
devotees would drive to the ashram dressed in street clothes and change into their 
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worship attire on the ashram grounds. They would change back into street clothes and 
wipe their tilak (mark made of sacred soil) off their foreheads before driving home. Not 
wanting his fellow villagers to suspect my involvement with the movement, Wayan 
suggested I change into my long skirt after exiting the village, a request I initially fulfilled 
by changing in a gas station bathroom and later by dressing in the ashram’s guest 
bedroom.  
 Sermons at the ashram would sometimes drift into utopian images of a life 
beyond these kinds of struggles and compromises. In some of these narratives, the 
entire island of Bali had become followers of ISKCON. Or, more modestly, the speaker 
might express the aspiration that the ashram would one day establish its own desa 
adat, which would operate in accordance with ISKCON teachings. At the time of my 
fieldwork, however, even this latter option seemed like a distant fantasy, as establishing 
a new desa adat is an extremely contentious matter in Bali today. Thus, although 
several families had constructed homes on the ashram grounds, they continued to 
maintain ties with their desa adat, returning regularly to fulfill their religious obligations. 
Using the same epithet he attached to the ‘separatist’ contingent in his own desa (a 
group of Tegal residents trying to establish a new desa adat), Wayan compared 
ISKCON devotees to GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, a separatist group in western 
Indonesia). “Why can’t they just follow everyone else?” he asked. “Why do they have to 
take the difficult way (jalan yang susah)?”  
 As can be seen from these examples, ISKCON proposes a radical reform of 
Balinese society and religious subjectivity. Given the powerful bonds that link Balinese 
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Hindus to their desa adat, how is it that ISKCON devotees come to desire an alternate 
mode of organizing religious and social life? Why do they choose “the difficult way,” as 
Wayan asked? In this chapter I investigate the intimate processes by which people 
become attached to this movement, focusing in particular on the ways singing 
contributes to these processes. I argue that the devotional singing practiced at the 
ashram plays a crucial role in training devotees to feel in a new way, and that this new 
way of feeling underpins an alternative ethical project and strengthens individuals’ 
attachment to the movement.  
 
Singing and Chanting in ISKCON Practice 
My encounter with ISKCON was linked, by a circuitous route, to the strange 
chanting I described at the beginning of this chapter. By the time I performed at the 
ceremony in Nyuhkuning, I was already taking lessons in several traditional Balinese 
vocal arts, and I had also begun to become aware of other less common forms of 
religious chant on the island. A month earlier I had attended an event at the National 
Hindu Theological Institute, which included a brief performance of what they called 
“Vedic chant.” Like the chanting at the Nyuhkuning ceremony, it followed the format of 
traditional Balinese pepaosan performance, but the melody was distinct from anything I 
had heard during traditional performances. My curiosity was piqued. What was this 
chanting? Where was it coming from? How and why were people learning it? And most 
importantly, why did the man from Nyuhkuning have such a viscerally negative 
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response to it? I soon began attending classes at the Institute and looking around for 
answers to these questions.  
One sunny morning I was chatting with some students at the Institute’s Bangli 
campus, located in the relatively cool foothills of Bali’s eastern mountains. I told them I 
was doing research on religious uses of sound in Bali and asked them if there were any 
classes on Vedic chanting at the institute. As I said the word “suara,” which means 
“sound” or “voice,” one female student became visibly excited. She told me she 
attended an ashram where people practiced Sanskrit chanting every night, and she 
invited me to visit and perhaps do research there. This place, it turned out, was an 
ISKCON temple, and I soon became an occasional participant at its weekly meetings 
and ceremonies.  
As I would come to learn over the next few months, singing and chanting are not only 
central to ISKCON worship, but also constitute the primary form of bhakti, or devotion, 
that devotees engage in. A practice called kirtan, the collective singing of Krishna’s 
names, is the centerpiece of all ISKCON gatherings. Among Balinese ISKCON 
devotees, kirtan is understood to belong to a broader category of activity, which they 
call singing rohani (spiritual singing). As used by devotees, this term served as a way of 
distinguishing ordinary singing from the devotional forms of singing practiced at the 
ashram. “Here, we sing rohani,” I was often told. As I spent more time with devotees, it 
became clear that what distinguished rohani singing was both its feelingful and its 
ethical dimensions.   
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 Another form of singing rohani, apparently unique to Indonesian ISKCON, 
involves singing the Bhagavad Gita in pepaosan style. As in traditional pepaosan, one 
performer sings a line from the original text while another provides an impromptu 
spoken translation in Balinese or Indonesian. The singing of the original text can be 
done using Balinese melodies (such as the sronca melody used in the reading of 
kakawin poetry, or reng sruti, as used in membaca sloka competitions at the UDG). It 
can also be done using Indian or other melodies. Only a few of the ashram’s 
congregants were skilled in this practice, and it was rarely performed in the ashram 
context. More commonly, devotees would perform this style of chant at traditional 
Balinese ceremonies, including temple and cremation ceremonies. Because it uses the 
pepaosan format, this practice was seen by devotees as an aesthetically appropriate 
way to bring the karmic benefits of the Bhagavad Gita to a broader Balinese public. I 
believe it was a performance of this kind that I heard at the Nyuhkuning ceremony 
described earlier.190  
The other forms of chant practiced at the ashram form part of the global ISKCON 
liturgy. A typical weekly service at the ashram involves at least three distinct forms of 
chant. These meetings begin with an hour or two of kirtan as the devotees arrive.191 
Next, the congregation conducts a reading from the Bhagavad Gita Menurut Aslinya, 
                                                        
190 I inquired about the Nyuhkuning chanters among devotees at the ashram and none of them were 
familiar with them. This leads me to believe that they were not ISKCON devotees. Most likely, they were 
affiliated with another devotional movement, such as Sai Baba or one of the local new religious 
movements that center on the Bhagavad Gita, such as Nyoman Dharmayasa’s Paramadhama Center in 
Denpasar or Ashram Anas in Ubud.  
191 Prior to the reading from the Bhagavad Gita, the congregants would recite a lengthy Sanskrit text in 
unison following a simple, repetitive melody. Most congregants had the text memorized; those who did 
not would read from a small photocopied book called the Buku Saku, which is discussed later in this 
chapter. I do know the title or original source for this recited text.  
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the official Indonesian translation of The Bhagavad Gita as It Is, ISKCON’s primary 
sacred text. The Bhagavad Gita As It Is includes the original Sanskrit verses of the 
Bhagavad Gita, as well as an English translation and extensive English-language 
commentary for each verse, both prepared by the movement’s founder Srila 
Prabhupada. This commentary outlines the core beliefs of the ISKCON movement. The 
Bhagavad Gita Menurut Aslinya, or BGMA, follows this same format but with all of the 
English material translated into Indonesian.  Readings from the BGMA generally 
focused on a single verse. First, the congregation would sing through the verse in call 
and response format. A designated leader would sing through one line and then the 
congregants would repeat it; then individual congregants would take turns serving as 
the leader, reading through the verse line by line, alone, while the other congregants 
repeated the lines back. These readings always followed the same simple melody. After 
completing the process of chanting the text, the leader would read through the 
“synonyms” (the Sanskrit words of the text paired with their Indonesian equivalents) and 
the translation of the verse, and the congregation would repeat these. Finally, the leader 
would read through Prabhupada’s commentary on the verse (penjelasan) and then give 
a sermon related to the verse. Not uncommonly, devotees would pass the time during 
the sermon engaging in a fourth form of chant, a meditative practice known as japa. 
Here, Krishna’s names are spoken or whispered repeatedly in cycles of 108 repetitions 
using a string of tulsi beads to aid with counting. Each devotee is expected to do at least 
16 cycles of japa every day. While not otherwise engaged, devotees at the ashram 
would often seize the moment to do a few rounds of japa.  
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Kirtan is perhaps best known in its guise as a public form of evangelizing. Many 
readers have probably seen bands of Hare Krishnas dressed in pale orange dhotis 
walking down the streets of Berkeley, New York, or other American cities, singing to the 
accompaniment of drums and cymbals. My focus in this chapter, however, will be on 
kirtan as performed within the ashram where it forms a central component of liturgical 
practice. As noted above, regular services at the ashram generally begin with an hour or 
so of kirtan. On holy days, the congregation often performs kirtan for much longer 
stretches of time, and the celebration commonly ends with a highly energetic kirtan 
session.  
In the temple context, kirtan is often done in conjunction with another practice 
called darshan, in which devotees gaze at statues of deities, known as arca. As 
described in more detail below, both kirtan and darshan are modes of connecting with 
Krishna and “purifying the senses.” 
The core text used in kirtan is known as the Mahamantra.192 It reads as follows:  
Hare Krishna, Hare Krishna, Krishna Krishna, Hare Hare, Hare Rama, Hare Rama, 
Rama Rama, Hare Hare. According to ISCKON’s interpretation of the text, Krishna and 
Rama are names for the supreme deity (most commonly known as Krishna), and Hare 
refers to Krishna’s divine energy.  
 Kirtan follows a call-and-response format, in which a solo singer and a group of 
percussionists set the melody and tempo, and the congregation follows their lead. 
Congregants at the ashram in Bali would sing kirtan with a seemingly endless variety of 
                                                        
192 This is the same text used in japa.  
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melodies, including Balinese melodies as well as melodies that sounded distinctly 
Indian or Western.  
 
Feeling, Ethics, and Devotion 
During the collective meal after one of the weekly services at the ashram, I got to 
chatting with the elderly man who’d delivered the sermon and another middle-aged 
male devotee, whom I shall call Prabu Abhimanyu. I told them I enjoyed participating in 
the singing they did at the ashram, and that I was interested to learn more about it. “And 
you feel something?” (dan merasakan sesuatu?) Prabu Abhimanyu asked. Upon 
hearing this question other devotees sitting nearby leaned in and looked at me, waiting 
to hear my answer.  
 The field notes I wrote after visits to the ashram were indeed sprinkled with 
descriptions of mysterious bodily sensations and unexpected emotional stirrings. For 
example, on one early visit, a female devotee invited me to accompany her as she did 
darshan a few feet in front of the arca. I followed her to the front of the prayer room, 
doing my best to mimic her posture as she clasped her hands together in front of her 
heart and fixed her gaze on the elaborately dressed figures on display. As we stood 
together quietly, while a small group of devotees were singing kirtan behind us, I felt a 
vibration traverse my body. I experienced this sensation with greater levels of intensity 
on subsequent visits to the ashram. For example, at one of the group’s regular Sunday 
services, the congregation did a workshop on japa recitation, reciting 108 repetitions of 
the chant in unison while seated on the temple floor. Gazing at the arca during the 
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recitation, I felt the same vibratory sensation, but stronger, and accompanied by an 
involuntary quickening of my breath and a slight pressure behind my eyes. Although 
these sensations were almost overwhelming at times, I found I could easily control 
them, because if I averted my attention or gaze from the arca, the sensations quickly 
diminished.    
 These pleasurable vibrations were not part of my initial visits to the ashram. At 
first, I felt uneasy and slightly embarrassed, unsure of how to act in this unfamiliar 
context. When Santi, the IHDN student, first told me about the ashram, I was unaware 
that it was an ISKCON organization. All I knew was that it was a place where people 
practiced Sanskrit chant. A few days after we met at IHDN, Santi invited me to an acara 
(event) at the ashram. I followed her text-messaged directions to an area on the 
outskirts of the city of Gianyar. As I was circling around on my motorbike, trying to 
locate the ashram among strips of recently-constructed homes, shops, and warehouses 
scattered between rice fields, I was imagining I would soon find myself sitting in a chair 
and listening to a sermon, as in the many ‘modern’ Hindu gatherings I had seen on TV.  
 After a few wrong turns I finally found the unmarked driveway that led to the 
ashram. It was a narrow dusty road lined on one side by a cluster of buildings and on 
the other by a row of coconut trees and a rice field. About a hundred meters from the 
main road I encountered a group of small children dressed in long skirts or pants made 
of bright yellow, pink, and green fabric. One of the girls had two pale lines painted down 
the center of her forehead. I asked them if they knew where find the ashram. The girl 
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with the mark on her forehead, who was probably about 8 or 9 years old, directed me in 
perfect Indonesian.  
 As I approached the building I suddenly became viscerally aware that this was 
not the kind of event I had been imagining. A handful of adults were milling around 
casually, as though nothing much was happening. Many had marks on their foreheads 
like the little girl. Their clothing looked distinctly Indian; the women wore saris and some 
of the men wore dhotis. They look like Hare Krishnas, I thought to myself. Having no 
intention of studying this group, and not wanting to be subjected to proselytization, my 
first impulse was to turn around and drive away. After hesitating for a moment, I heard 
an amplified voice coming from inside the building. Reassured that there was in fact 
some sort of ‘event’ taking place, I approached one of the women and asked if she 
could help me find Santi.  
 A moment later Santi came running toward me dressed in a silk sari of brilliant 
green, gold, and pink. She told me that at the ashram people call her Lalita. We chatted 
for a few minutes, then she asked me if I would like to do research or simply enjoy the 
evening’s event. When I chose the latter she looked pleased and suggested I change 
into more appropriate clothing. Unsure how I wanted to define myself vis-à-vis the other 
attendees, I resisted, but she assured me that I would be more comfortable if I dressed 
like them. I was skeptical, but I eventually relented, whereupon she laughed giddily and 
then whisked me off to a small fluorescent-lit bedroom where she and a female friend 
wrapped and pinned me into a bright yellow cotton sari. I then spent the next several 
hours doing my best to follow along as the people around me sang, danced, shouted, 
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gazed, and prostrated themselves before a collection of doll-like figures with gold skin, 
which they called arca.  
 This and other early visits to the ashram were shot through with uncomfortable 
sensations. This was due in part to my perception of ISKCON as a proselytizing 
movement and my anxiety about becoming the object of that kind of attention and 
pressure. However, my uneasy feelings were linked not only to these kinds of thoughts, 
but also to specific bodily gestures. Performing sujud (prostration), for example, was 
deeply embarrassing to me at first. I would like to suggest, therefore, that my initial 
discomfort also had to do with the ways that ISKCON practices clash with the bodily 
habits and affective sensibilities not only of my own upbringing, but also of other 
spheres of Balinese religious practice. In this sense, my own initial encounter with 
ISKCON may shed light on some of the things Balinese Hindus experience as they 
observe, or begin participating in, ISKCON activities.    
 Much of my initial discomfort in the ashram setting stemmed from a sense of 
dissonance between my bodily performances and my internal ‘piety.’  Interestingly, I do 
not recall experiencing this tension to the same degree when I first began participating 
in traditional Balinese Hindu ceremonies. Whether I was helping to construct the 
intricate offerings for an upcoming ceremony or kneeling on the ground in a temple’s 
inner courtyard to pray, my internal thoughts and feelings about god never seemed to 
become an object of other worshippers’ attention or concern. The fact that I reproduced 
the appropriate external signs of obeisance always seemed sufficient in itself. This 
apparent nonchalance regarding personal belief resonates with a description by Clifford 
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Geertz. He writes that within Balinese religion: ““You can believe virtually anything you 
want to actually, including that the whole thing is rather a bore, and even say so. But if 
you do not perform the ritual duties for which you are responsible you will be totally 
ostracized, not just from the temple congregation, but from the community as a whole” 
(Geertz 1973a: 177). This attitude was echoed in a conversation I had with a friend from 
Buleleng during one of my first trips to Bali. He told me about a time when a Muslim 
tourist visited a Hindu temple in his village. During the collective prayer, the Muslim man 
sat motionless. My friend was deeply offended by this and described the man as a 
“fanatic.” In explaining his anger, he stressed that it was fine for the man to hold 
different beliefs about god, and to pray in accordance with those beliefs. The man’s 
internal relationship to Balinese Hindu deities was not at issue; rather, it was his failure 
to engage in the outward gestures of prayer that my friend perceived as disrespectful. 
Conversations like this led me to believe that my Balinese Hindu acquaintances did not 
hold a strong expectation that embodied religious practice must index a particular 
interior religious orientation: the two do not need to align in any particular way in order 
to be considered morally acceptable.  
  At the ashram, by contrast, I had the distinct sense that my outward gestures of 
piety ought to spring from a more fundamental inward piety. This sense was fueled in 
part by my interactions with Prabhu Abhimanyu, who, in addition to asking about the 
feelings I experienced while singing at the ashram, would also sometimes question me 
about my eating habits and other matters relating to my personal commitment to 
ISKCON teachings. However, I had this sense even before Prabhu Abhimanyu put 
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these questions to me, simply because of the ways people comported themselves in the 
ashram context, and specifically how they wove individualized gestures of devotion into 
their repertoire of bodily performances. During Balinese Hindu temple ceremonies, 
worshippers generally pray in unison, following the amplified instructions of the 
penginter (M.C.). When I first began participating in these prayers I was instructed to 
simply ikut (follow along). I have often been complimented for properly replicating the 
actions of receiving tirta and bija (holy water and rice grains placed on the forehead 
after prayer); very rarely did anyone question or comment upon my interior relationship 
to these gestures. In fact, people typically assumed that I was Christian, based on my 
race, even if they were aware of my participation in Balinese Hindu rituals and prayer. 
Engaging in these acts thus felt less like a personal expression of religious piety than a 
willingness to go along with the group, and a gesture of respect for Balinese culture. To 
‘follow along’ at the ashram, however, was different, because ISKCON devotees display 
devotion in individualized ways. Sujud, for example, was often performed individually. 
Ordinarily this act involves kneeling down and leaning forward, placing one’s head and 
forearms on the ground. Sometimes male devotees would go a step further, 
straightening their legs so that their entire body lay flat on the floor. These gestures 
initially appeared to me to be purely spontaneous displays of religious feeling. I later 
learned that this is only sometimes the case. When people perform sujud individually, 
they typically do so upon entering and exiting the prayer room; only occasionally does 
the act arise from a spontaneous impulse. Nevertheless, the simple fact of having to 
perform this gesture alone (not in unison with other devotees) made me feel self-
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conscious about its significance. The gesture seemed to stand for ‘me’ in a way that 
differed from the gestures of traditional Balinese prayer. Moreover, like other gestures of 
devotion performed at the ashram, sujud can be performed with varying degrees of 
intensity: the posture can be held for longer or shorter periods of time and for male 
devotees, as noted above, the body can be bent forward or fully lowered to the floor. 
These degrees afford a more personalized form of religious expression than what is 
available in muspa and other traditional Balinese forms of worship.193 Another 
individualized display of devotion performed at the ashram was japa. As noted above, 
devotees would often do japa during sermons and during spare moments between other 
activities. Sometimes they would even do japa while chatting with me or with other 
devotees, quietly whispering the words of the mahamantra between turns in the 
conversation. Of all the ISKCON devotional practices, japa is probably the most 
individualized, given that each devotee is individually responsible for reciting 16 rounds 
each day. The prominence of individual gestures of devotion at the ashram meant that, 
in order to convincingly ‘follow along,’ I had to participate in personalized forms of 
religious expression, practices which felt radically different from the Balinese forms of 
worship to which I was accustomed.     
 As I continued to visit the ashram, however, engaging in the requisite displays of 
piety became habitual and ceased to arouse as much anxiety.194 As I became less self-
                                                        
193 This is not to say that Balinese Hindu ritual does not allow for any individual variation. There are, of 
course, variations in how people dress, what offerings they present, whether they mutter words during 
prayer or pray silently, and so on. 
194 I never became accustomed to doing japa at the ashram. I tried a couple of times but did not feel 
comfortable. When I did do japa, I did it at home, but I kept the practice secret from the Dangin family, 
who did not approve of ISKCON. I did not do it every day, and I certainly did not do the full sixteen 
rounds, which takes around four hours.  
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conscious in the ashram context I began to experience the more enjoyable affective 
sensations mentioned above. My interlocutors at the ashram never spoke to me in detail 
about the specific bodily or emotional sensations they experienced while engaging in 
kirtan or other devotional practices. However, Prabu Abhimanyu’s question about 
‘feeling something,’ alongside the other devotees’ apparent interest in my answer, 
suggests that “feeling” (rasa) is an acknowledged, and valued feature of their 
experiences. Other things I saw and heard at the ashram further support this 
conclusion. One phrase I heard repeatedly while spending time with devotees was 
“When you sing, you will surely feel happy.” Stated in sermons, circulated in pamphlets, 
and quoted in informal conversations, this claim was ubiquitous in ashram discourse. 
The particular kind of happiness associated with singing is called kebahagiaan rohani 
(spiritual ecstasy). Both in sermons at the ashram and in Prabhupada’s commentary in 
the BGMA, the kebahagiaan rohani experienced while singing kirtan is described as far 
exceeding the sensual pleasures of eating and sex. This spiritual ecstasy was 
particularly palpable during the longer kirtan sessions that often took place on holy 
days. On such occasions, the music would sometimes become frenzied, at which point 
the more energetic members of the congregation would often dance wildly, laughing 
and shouting, male and female bodies intermingling in ways I never saw elsewhere in 
Bali. Other devotees preferred to enjoy these moments in a more reserved, but no less 
intense way. Standing near the front of the prayer room, in close proximity to the arca, 
they would sway gently from side to side, or stand immobilized, singing and gazing at 
the deities with an expression that can only be described as rapture. Sometimes 
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devotees would spontaneously prostrate themselves or throw their arms in the air and 
scream “Hare Krishna.” It was not unusual to see tears in their eyes. While participating 
in these more energetic kirtan sessions, I experienced a kind of sensory contagion as 
the visible feelings of the people around me resonated in my own body. These feelings 
seemed to grow particularly strong if I focused on the people closest to the arca; at 
moments when their feelings appeared to intensify, a wave of feeling would swell up 
within me.   
 As defined by anthropologist Danilyn Rutherford, affect is “a bodily capacity that 
is generalizable. As what passes between participants in scenes of interaction,” she 
continues, “affect is the stuff of new forms of life, new ways of being in the world” 
(Rutherford 2016: 288). In the context of an ISKCON temple, music works in tandem 
with other material forms, such as iconography and the organization and movement of 
bodies in space, to create intense and structured sensations. However, the movement’s 
transformative potential stems not only from these sensory experiences. Equally 
important, I would argue, is the way ISKCON doctrine harnesses these sensations to a 
particular ethical project, one in which singing and other forms of bhakti play a key role.  
 
The Ethics of Sensory Purification 
 Central to ISKCON’s ethical project is a representation of human-divine 
relationships as mediated, predominantly, by feeling. This image of the devout self as 
‘feelingful’ is represented in the Bhagavad Gita through the character of Arjuna. Two 
iconic scenes in the narrative portray Arjuna overcome with feeling. In Chapter 1, Arjuna 
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is described as trembling and weeping, his hair standing on end, as he surveys the 
Pandawa and Kurawa armies arranged on the battlefield (Prabhupada 2000: 54-55). A 
parallel scene occurs in Chapter 11, when Krishna reveals his true form to Arjuna; 
again, Arjuna is described as experiencing trembling and chills, but this time, we are 
told, he is seeing the world with “spiritual eyes” (ibid.: 555-560). In his commentary, 
Prabhupada explains that sensations of trembling and hair standing on end have two 
causes: fear (rooted in worldly attachment) and spiritual ecstasy (which occurs when 
one sees beyond the illusory material world) (ibid.: 55). He stresses that these feelings 
are not a sign of weakness; on the contrary, they show that Arjuna has the character of 
a true devotee of Krishna (ibid.: 54). Indeed, throughout Prabhupada’s commentary, 
Arjuna is held up as a model of the ideal ISKCON devotee, whose progress from fearful 
attachment to spiritual consciousness mirrors the devotee’s own ethical development. 
When Arjuna is overcome with feeling in the climactic scene of the text, this is also the 
turning point in his spiritual journey. Through seeing the cosmos as it really is, in a 
moment of profound feeling, Arjuna is able to move past his worldly attachment and 
fulfill his duty as a warrior (ibid.: 849-851). Feeling, then, marks both the beginning and 
the culmination of Arjuna’s spiritual journey.  
 Within ISKCON, ethical practice centers on teaching the soul to feel in an 
appropriate manner. ISKCON devotees believe that the human soul is a fragment of the 
divine soul, which has become entangled in an illusory material world. Forms of bhakti, 
such as kirtan and japa, are a way to reconnect the soul with its divine origins. The goal 
of these techniques, and of ISKCON as a whole, is to liberate the soul from the cycle of 
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death and rebirth, allowing it to be reunited with Krishna. To achieve this goal, the 
devotee must release herself from earthly attachments, which is accomplished by 
learning to experience ethical forms of pleasure.  
As explained in the BGMA, the basic purpose of kirtan is to bring pleasure to 
Krishna, to “satisfy the divine sensorium,” to approximate the text’s own wording. 
Because the human soul is part of the divine soul, Krishna’s pleasure creates a kind of 
resonance within the singer’s body. As stated in the BGMA, “Kalau kita berusaha 
memuaskan indria-indria Sri Govinda, maka dengan sendirinya indria-indria kita 
dipuaskan” (when we work to satisfy Govinda’s senses, our own senses are 
automatically satisfied) (Prabhupada 2000: 59).195 To experience pleasure while singing 
kirtan is thus, in a sense, to feel Krishna’s sensorium inside oneself, a sensation which 
provides a foretaste of the soul’s liberation from material desires.  
This idea is elaborated in a discussion of kirtan in the Buku Saku (pocket book), 
a small photocopied prayer book sold at the ashram and owned by most devotees. 
Here, kirtan is described as “an ocean of spiritual ecstasy, which enables us to taste the 
sweetness of the nectar (amrita) that we are always seeking” (Buku Saku: 15-16). 
Kirtan, the text claims, has the power to “extinguish the flame of the life of attachment,” 
thereby releasing the soul from the cycle of death and rebirth (ibid.: 15). In other words, 
the pleasure experienced while engaging in kirtan marks the shift from worldly 
attachment to other-worldly or spiritual attachment, a process which devotees 
sometimes referred to as “purifying the senses” (sucikan indria). To taste the 
                                                        
195 In the BGMA Krisna is referred to by many names, of which Govinda is one.  
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“sweetness” to which the text refers, is to glimpse the world that lies beyond the 
suffering of earthly life, and the very practice that affords these glimpses—the singing of 
kirtan—also brings the soul closer to its goal. If the practice is successful, the devotee 
will come to desire nothing except to serve Krishna.  
 In a slightly later passage in the Buku Saku, the quality of these pleasurable 
feelings is described. The text reads: “Oh Lord, when will my eyes be adorned with 
tears of love, which flow eternally if I say your sacred name? When will my voice falter 
and my hair stand on end each time I say your sacred name?” (ibid.: 17). In this 
passage, the same language used to describe Arjuna’s feelings when he sees Krishna’s 
true form is used to describe the desired experience and ethical status of the devotee: 
to be full of feeling while vocalizing Krishna’s names, and thus, to be purified of harmful 
material attachments.  
 
Singing, Feeling, and Conversion 
I would like to end this chapter by taking a closer look at how my interlocutors 
spoke about singing. As noted earlier, Balinese devotees describe the distinctive forms 
of singing they do at the ashram as being “rohani.” Derived from the Arabic word roh,  
which means soul, this Indonesian term is roughly equivalent to the English words 
“spiritual,” or “sacred.” Thus, to say “we sing rohani” is roughly to say “we sing in a 
spiritual way.” Among the ashram’s members, however, the term had a somewhat more 
specific meaning. Rohani is one of the most common words in the BGMA, appearing 
over 400 times in the first 300 pages of the text. It is used as a translation for the 
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English words spiritual and transcendental, and it is listed as a synonym for numerous 
Sanskrit terms. Rohani is most commonly used to describe knowledge (pengetahuan 
rohani), ecstasy or pleasure (kebahagiaan rohani, kenikmatan rohani), and actions 
(kegiatan rohani), and in the noun form it is often used describe a spiritual master (guru 
kerohanian). It is used as an antonym for material (material, earthly), as in the phrases 
dunia rohani (spiritual world) and dunia material (material world). To sing “rohani,” then, 
is to produce effects—including feelings—that are in the spiritual rather than the 
material realm.  
The contrast between singing “rohani” and other kinds of singing was clarified in 
a conversation I had with Prabu Abhimanyu, the man who first asked me if I “felt 
something” while singing kirtan. Prabu Abhimanyu was known as the ashram’s most 
accomplished performer of pepaosan. When I told him that I studied pepaosan as well, 
he warned me to be careful about choosing a singing teacher in Bali, hinting that many 
Balinese vocalists have incorrect religious beliefs. “I studied for twenty years, but I still 
didn’t understand anything,” he said, prompting a laugh from the other devotees sitting 
around us. He then explained that it was only after coming to the ashram that he began 
to learn. He said that many Balinese pepaosan performers are only concerned with 
sounding good. “All they talk about is uger-uger,” he said, referring to the complex rules 
governing how literary texts are set to melody in Balinese oral literary performance. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, for many pepaosan practitioners, concerns over the correctness 
and beauty of a performance are not superficial matters, but are linked to the ethical 
pursuit of divine guidance. According to Prabu Abhimanyu, however, this focus on the 
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aesthetic aspects of vocal performance, as codified in the uger-uger, revealed an 
excessive concern with material form, which made their singing ineffective for achieving 
ethical progress. By contrast, he described the singing at the ashram as being “rohani.” 
To some extent, Prabu Abhimanyu’s comments echo those of UDG spokespersons 
discussed in Chapter 4. Like them, Prabu Abhimanyu sees traditional pepaosan 
performers as missing the ethical point of religious textual performance. However, 
whereas people like Pak Sujana and Ketut Wiana emphasize mental transformation 
through pemahaman (understanding), the purpose and goal of singing rohani is to purify 
the senses and, in doing so, to transform the soul. Understanding and internalizing 
meaning, while not without value in ISKCON, is nonetheless peripheral to devotees’ 
primary ethical goal.  
 Lalita, the IHDN student who first invited me to the ashram, was also a pepaosan 
performer and I took a few lessons from her during my research. We would sit on the 
floor in a small cement room that served as the ashram’s female dressing room and 
occasional guest bedroom, which was perpetually strewn with saris, veils, and long 
skirts in brightly colored fabrics. During our first lesson Lalita described how she sings 
with feeling. “When I sing, I feel it in my heart,” she said, narrowing her eyes and 
tapping a hand to her chest. Then suddenly growing more animated, she picked up a 
worn copy of the Bhagavad Gita in one hand, a photocopied book of Balinese gaguritan 
literature in the other and announced: “I’m going to reveal the secret to you. The 
essence of all this,” she said, pointing to the gaguritan book as well as other Balinese 
books scattered around us on the floor, “is here.” She held up the BGMA. “You 
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understand right?” she said, laughing. I shook my head. She then opened the gaguritan 
book. “People who study this, they just learn this only,” she said, pointing to a line of 
text. Her point echoed what Prabu Abhimanyu had said: that when people study 
traditional pepaosan they just learn the text, the melody, and how to follow the uger-
uger.  “But when we study the Bhagavad Gita,” she continued “whether we’re conscious 
of it or not, we gain energy (energi) or spiritual radiance (pancaran spiritual).” She told 
me that when she’d first started studying pepaosan she focused only on the method for 
correctly singing the text, but when she started studying at the ashram something 
changed. She could feel a kind of energy entering her body, which then came out in all 
of her singing. “This is called taksu,” she said, using a Balinese term for divinely 
bestowed charisma. In this narrative of personal transformation, Lalita draws a 
connection between musical feeling and divine efficacy. Like the sekaa santi members 
described in Chapter 4, who feel Saraswati’s guidance as they sing, Lalita experiences 
her voice as an auratic index of her relationship with Krishna. As she begins to cultivate 
this relationship, by participating in activities at the ashram, she becomes a better 
singer, and also begins to feel differently when singing. Lalita attributes these changes 
to Krishna’s agency; it could also be the case that the sermons and readings that she 
hears at the ashram made her attuned to her voice in a new way, introducing her to a 
new semiotic ideology and altering how she interprets the sensations she experiences 
while singing.    
 Later in our conversation she explained how the feelingful effects of singing 
improved other aspects of her life and deepened her attachment to ISKCON. 
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“Sometimes our thoughts get lost and this makes us suffer,” she said. “If I have a 
problem, especially a problem at home, a money problem, because my parents are 
farmers, you know, I get confused and don’t know what to do.” Expressing a sentiment I 
heard frequently among Balinese ISKCON devotees, she said everyday life in Bali, 
including religious life, raises all sorts of questions without providing answers. The 
Bhagavad Gita, by contrast, gave her “instructions on how to live,” and by following 
these instructions, she was able to get past her bad thoughts. “If I feel bad, I know I 
have to sing,” she said, “and if my bad feelings come back, I know I have to sing again.” 
Giggling, she confessed that that was why she spent so much time at the ashram. “I’ve 
seen many positive changes in my life since I started coming here,” she said.  
 For Lalita, the feelings she experiences while singing at the ashram are a 
rationale for her involvement in the movement and a motivation for her to continue. 
They provide solace during difficult times and reassure her that she’s following a proper 
religious and ethical path. Prabu Abhimanyu made similar claims about his own 
experiences singing the Bhagavad Gita. One afternoon following a ceremony at the 
ashram, I was in the dressing room and heard a sound like pepaosan coming from 
somewhere nearby. I followed the sound to the prayer room where I found Prabu 
Abhimanyu and another male devotee seated on the floor in front of the arca. They 
were singing from a thin, photocopied book. It was a version of the Bhagavad Gita 
formatted for pepaosan with the original text interspersed with a provisional translation. I 
sat listening for a few minutes. Prabu Abhimanyu pointed to the place in the text so I 
could follow along. “Now I’m going to sing sronca,” he said, referencing a melody used 
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in the singing of Kakawin, which he knew was familiar to me. Although I recognized the 
basic contour of the melody, I could not figure out how he was placing the long and 
short syllables. When Prabu Abhimanyu asked me if I would like to try, I told him I didn’t 
know how to fit the melody to the text because I couldn’t determine which were long and 
which were short syllables. He said this didn’t matter, which seemed to imply that his 
style of singing did not adhere to a system of uger-uger like kakawin singing does. We 
then got to chatting about performing at traditional Balinese ceremonies. He urged me 
to try singing the Bhagavad Gita, instead of traditional Balinese literature. “You can sing 
the Bhagavad Gita in pepaosan style,” he said, “it’s better [than using other texts.] 
“Radiusnya lebih tinggi” (roughly: its radius is higher). I asked what this meant. “It’s 
more powerful,” he said, explaining that it could purify the senses of the worshippers 
who hear it, whether or not they are active devotees of Krishna. He then told me how he 
used to be a drinker and gambler. “But since I started singing the Bhagavad Gita, I’ve 
been able to overcome all of that,” he said. Like Lalita, Prabu Abhimanyu attributes 
positive changes in his life to singing “rohani.” His statement echoes the central 
ISKCON tenet that devotional practice can weaken one’s sensuous desires by offering 
an infinitely more attractive form of pleasure. Through their involvement with ISKCON, 
these two singers come to link affect with ethical progress, progress which then leads to 
concrete improvements in their everyday lives. The affective pleasure of singing is 
crucial to how they come to understand themselves and their place in a social and 
cosmic order.  
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Conclusion 
 ISKCON presents Balinese Hindus with a way of being in the world that diverges 
significantly from that of Balinese adat. Organizing religion around voluntary bonds of 
affinity, rather than kinship and communal obligation, it pushes toward a more secular 
social and political order. My interest in this chapter, however, is less in the new 
institutions and structures that ISKCON introduces, and more in the intimate, sensuous 
processes by which people become attached to this movement, processes which I 
believe are an equally crucial component of the movement’s social efficacy.  
 Focusing on the practice of singing rohani, I have shown how devotional singing 
provides Balinese Hindus with novel sensory experiences as well as new ways of 
imagining the world and their place within it. By analyzing the narratives of two 
accomplished vocalists who are also ISKCON devotees, I’ve shown how singing 
informs their experience of personal transformation. As revealed in their allusions to 
“energy” and “feeling,” affective sensations are central to how these singers understand 
and value their attachment to ISKCON. These feelings, and the positive changes that 
come in their wake, mark their transition into the movement and serve to deepen their 
attachment to it. Musically-mediated affect, then, would seem to have substantial power, 
power which operates in intimate and personal ways, to at least make possible the more 
widespread forms of social change to which ISKCON, as a proselytizing movement, 
aspires.   
 My purpose in highlighting ISKCON’s transformative potential in this chapter is 
not to predict the demise of traditional Balinese Hinduism, but rather, to explore the 
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ever-emergent sensuous social orders taking shape in Bali today, and to consider the 
role that music plays within them. While I see musical affect as one of the sources of 
ISKCON’s allure, music’s capacity to insinuate itself into the body is also its weakness. 
The very same sensory qualities that make the movement, and its music, so attractive 
and profoundly transformative for some, prompt discomfort, anxiety, and laughter in 
others.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In this dissertation I have brought ethnographic attention to the ethical 
dimensions of religious life in contemporary Bali. By analyzing three religious 
pedagogies of voice alongside the everyday religious practices of the Dangin family, I 
have shown how Balinese Hindus seek to live ethically by interacting with invisible 
beings, and how the mediatory practices that make invisible beings present in human 
lives inform and shape ethical practice. Over the course of this ethnography, I have 
discussed three distinct forms of ethical striving that take shape through vocal 
performance: an ethics of sincerity, which is materialized through state religious 
pedagogies like the Puja Tri Sandhya and the UDG; an ethics of divine guidance, which 
emerges in the activities of sekaa santi, and an ethics of sensory purification, which is 
embodied through singing rohani. By comparing several religious pedagogies of voice 
that circulate in Bali today, this ethnography reveals that people’s creative engagements 
with the ethical affordances of vocal expression—including linguistic form, vocal sound, 
and embodied feeling—are a key site in which ethical subjectivities are imagined and 
constituted.    
 In this conclusion I seek to bring together the independent case studies 
presented in the forgoing chapters in order to draw out and clarify some of my 
overarching arguments and their contributions to relevant bodies of scholarship across 
the fields of Balinese religion, anthropology, and ethnomusicology. In closing, I briefly 
mention some possible directions for future research.   
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 This dissertation proposes a conceptual reframing of contemporary Balinese 
religiosity. Whereas previous scholars have suggested that ethics is something that 
enters Balinese religious life by way of the Hindu Reform, the case study of the Dangin 
family illustrates that ethical values and concerns are an integral part of adat religious 
practices, which are rooted in bodies of religious knowledge other than those that were 
brought in with the Hindu Reform. I argue, therefore, that state efforts to reform and 
modernize Balinese religiosity, which have been characterized as creating a clash 
between a ‘ritual’ and an ‘ethical’ orientation to religion, can be more usefully and more 
accurately conceptualized as a struggle between two competing forms of Balinese 
Hindu ethics: between an ethics of divine blessing—which attaches ethical value to the 
semiotic forms that mediate divine agency—and an ethics of sincerity—which posits the 
interior aspects of the self as the proper locus of ethical value.  
 This conceptual reframing brings attention to two aspects of Balinese religiosity 
that have been overlooked in previous scholarship. First, it points to the often subtle and 
indirect ways that reformist interventions shape religious subjectivity and practice in 
Bali, which have been underappreciated in prior research. While many scholars have 
acknowledged the state’s role in promoting ‘ethicized’ reinterpretations of Balinese 
religious traditions, less attention has been paid to how Balinese people strive to 
navigate and negotiate competing ethical ideals and demands. This has led scholars to 
overlook some of the subtler ways that reformist discourses influence contemporary 
religiosity. While scholars have often looked at the continuity of Balinese adat 
institutions and rituals as evidence that the Hindu Reform has had only a superficial 
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impact on Balinese religious life, attention to the various paths of ethical striving that 
Balinese Hindus pursue suggests that reformist ideologies may be transformative 
without necessarily being fully adopted or implemented. For example, although people 
may not recite the Puja Tri Sandhya in the way that state religious doctrine 
recommends, my interviews reveal that the prayer nonetheless makes certain forms of 
religious expression and selfhood imaginable and inhabitable in everyday life. It is my 
contention that the semiotic work of making particular conceptions of selfhood available 
to reflection and experience in this way plays a crucial role in the processes by which 
new subjectivities emerge and gain currency and legitimacy, a point to which I will return 
shortly. 
 Second, this reconceptualization also highlights the forms of ethical striving that 
take shape through adat traditions of ritual exchange, revealing that these traditions 
have reproductive as well as transformative potential. Rather than simply being an 
obligation that people must fulfill in order to maintain the existing social order, the need 
to manage human-niskala relationships creates spaces of possibility for personal and 
social change. The creative, world-making potential of Balinese adat ritual is vividly 
illustrated in the Dangin family’s efforts to maintain their position of moral and social 
superiority vis-à-vis the Dauh family. Traditions of ritual exchange similarly inform and 
enable sekaa santi members’ practices of ethical and aesthetic self-fashioning through 
the pursuit of Saraswati’s tuntunan.  In these and other examples, Balinese adat 
provides semiotic resources through which individuals’ moral agency is constituted and 
expressed.   
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 This dissertation’s inquiry into religious agency in Bali responds to ongoing 
anthropological debates about the place of agency in ethical life. Scholars such as Saba 
Mahmood, James Faubion, and James Laidlaw have adopted a Foucauldian approach 
to the study of ethics, which highlights the ways that people create and govern 
themselves in the process of striving to live an ethical life. Cheryl Mattingly claims that 
this approach places too much emphasis on the ethical process of assimilating models, 
and she has argued for greater attention to the kinds of experimentation and creativity 
that emerge when such models fall short. While this dissertation has employed a 
broadly pedagogical approach to the study of ethics, which is deeply indebted to the 
work of Mahmood and Laidlaw, I have sought to reconcile this with Mattingly’s call to 
attend to the “situated character” of ethical life (Mattingly 2014b: 479). Mattingly’s image 
of models falling short resonates especially well with my own research on the Hindu 
Reform. While reformers claim that religious texts provide a comprehensive guide for 
living an ethical life as a Hindu in Bali, it is not to texts that members of the Dangin 
family would turn when called upon to make and justify moral judgments. The ethical 
models furnished by the Hindu Reform apparently ‘fall short’ of providing them with 
compelling answers to the questions and dilemmas they face, pushing them to look 
elsewhere. Drawing on Mattingly’s work, this dissertation suggests that we need to 
attend to what happens when ethical models are only intermittently, partially, or half-
heartedly ‘actualized,’ as is the case with some of the religious pedagogies of voice that 
I have examined here. However, whereas Mattingly’s approach seems to sidestep the 
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issue of mediation, I am especially interested in how moral consciousness and agency 
take shape through mediatory practices.   
 Taking inspiration from the work of Webb Keane, I propose that one way to move 
this conversation forward is by bringing attention to the representational economies that 
underpin forms of ethical life, and specifically, to the role that affordances play in ethical 
practice.  While the representational economies that I explore in this dissertation are 
linked to, and serve to underwrite, particular ethical orientations, they do not function as 
ethical models. Rather, they provide semiotic resources through which such models 
take shape and become available for reflection and circulation, and inhabitable in 
everyday life. This is clearly illustrated in my study of the Dangin family. In the everyday 
activity of striving to be a worthy person, members of the Dangin family make use of a 
range of semiotic forms. Rather than being oriented around an explicit moral code or 
exemplar, their ethical practices are creative struggles at self-making that draw from 
and are rooted in the signifying practices that make the invisible world present in social 
life, and in the semiotic ideologies that give those practices moral significance and 
weight. While this dependence on semiotic form may be particularly apparent within the 
ethics of divine blessing, since the latter revolves around people’s inherently mediated 
relationships with invisible beings, I would argue that all forms of ethical life take shape 
within representational economies. 
 As a consequence of their materiality, the affordances of semiotic forms can be 
engaged in different ways toward a variety of different ends. This means that practices 
associated with one form of ethical striving may end up being incorporated into other 
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sorts of ethical projects. This was illustrated in my investigation of pepaosan. While 
state programs like the UDG and its associated training programs have resulted in a 
significant increase in the number of people who participate in pepaosan, this has not 
necessarily resulted in wider adoption of the ethical models that the state is seeking to 
promote by way of these programs. I show instead how sekaa santi members take up 
the affordances of pepaosan practice to pursue forms of ethical striving that run counter 
to reformist ideals. This example suggests that while religious pedagogies of voice may 
be geared toward promoting a particular model of ethical selfhood, they may also afford 
other possibilities for self-making.  
 However, even if pepaosan’s ethical affordances are being taken up in divergent 
ways, this does not necessarily mean that the state’s ethical pedagogy is simply 
ineffective. In Chapter 4, I argued that the ethical practices of sekaa santi members 
resonate with the ethics of divine blessing. Here I would like to complicate that claim by 
noting that although the ethical pursuit of Saraswati’s guidance, as practiced by sekaa 
santi members, is similar to the kinds of ethical practices I described in Chapter 2, it is 
also much more individualized than those practices. This may be because the 
embodied experience of singing—particularly solo singing—affords a more personalized 
encounter with the divine than do the kinds of material exchanges I discussed in 
Chapter 2. This example suggests that the material properties of particular practices—
vocal or otherwise—may subtly guide people toward certain ethical possibilities more 
than others. Solo singing, for example, may be particularly coherent with an 
individualized conception of ethical selfhood. To be clear, I am not claiming that 
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mediatory forms play a determinative or predictable role in these processes; my point, 
rather, is that their material properties actively contribute to shaping ethical life. Thus, 
rather than being incorporated into vastly divergent ethical projects, it may be more 
likely that the semiotic affordances of religious pedagogies of voice will be taken up in 
forms of self-making that share at least some common ground with the model of 
selfhood being directly promoted through the pedagogy. 
 While mediatory practices like pepaosan are able to take on a range of different 
meanings, by virtue of their material properties as well as the semiotic ideologies that 
regulate their capacity to take on meaning, their affordances are not limitless. This 
suggests that in the process of incorporating semiotic forms into the day-to-day activity 
of ethical life, people end up adopting the possibilities for selfhood that these forms 
make available. As we saw in the case of pepaosan, this does not mean that they 
necessarily ‘actualize’ the ethical model that these forms happen to be attached to. Yet, 
since semiotic forms make certain ethical possibilities available and not others, they 
may contribute to forming ethical subjectivities in ways that a straightforward 
pedagogical model is unable to capture. Wayan’s engagement with the Puja Tri 
Sandhya provided the clearest illustration of this. While Wayan does not perform the Tri 
Sandhya in the prescribed manner, the prayer’s sensory and semiotic properties allow 
him to experience prayer in a particular way, and he draws on these affordances in 
justifying his personalized approach to prayer. The Tri Sandhya’s existence as a 
religious pedagogy of voice promoted by the state created a space of possibility for 
Wayan to imagine and, to some extent, legitimize a form of prayer that diverged from 
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the norms of his community. His practice resonates with, without completely 
‘actualizing,’ state religious ideologies.   
 Looking at how the affordances provided by representational economies both 
enable and constrain people’s efforts to fashion themselves as moral persons may 
provide a new way of approaching questions about how ethical subjectivity takes shape 
in and through engagements with the ethical pedagogies that are furnished by a 
particular cultural or social environment, a way that gets beyond some of the 
shortcomings of a narrowly pedagogical analysis while at the same time keeping 
mediatory practices (and the disciplinary work they make possible) as a central object of 
analysis and an active player in ethical life. Such an approach, which I have tried to 
model here, attends closely to the ways people use the resources of material forms in 
their practices of ethical self-making, thus allowing for a more complex and nuanced 
view of the role of agency in ethical life.   
 My argument about ethical affordances has important implications for 
ethnomusicology as it suggests that music, along with other mediatory practices, may 
play a crucial role in the shaping and reshaping of ethical subjectivities. This claim 
resonates with the work of Aaron Fox, who has highlighted music’s ability to put 
particular conceptions of selfhood into circulation, making them available as models 
against which actual selves can be evaluated and cultivated (2004: 107-151). Like Fox’s 
study of country music in rural Texas, my inquiry into religious pedagogies of voice in 
Bali highlights the bodily and sonic materiality of voice, as well as linguistic and textual 
factors, as sites where moral selves are imagined and produced. Across the various 
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religious pedagogies of voice that I have discussed here, vocal expression serves as a 
means by which abstract ideals of selfhood that circulate through religious discourse 
and doctrine are, in a sense, ‘fleshed out’ and imbued with affective resonance.  
 This study builds on Fox’s work by bringing attention to the transformative 
possibilities of these processes. While Fox emphasizes the reproductive capacities of 
musical models of selfhood embedded in country music, crediting them for their role in 
sustaining a distinctive working-class culture, I have tried to show how these kinds of 
models participate in the historical processes by which new subjectivities are 
constituted, taken up, and become widespread. In the case of ISKCON, for example, I 
have argued that feelings experienced through singing rohani serve to establish, 
deepen, and sustain Balinese devotees’ commitment to the movement’s ethical project, 
thus enabling their transition to a new form of religious selfhood. In highlighting the 
transformative potential of vocal expression, this study parallels the work of scholars 
such as Anaar Desai-Stephens (2017) and Nicholas Harkness (2014), who have 
studied vocal performance and training as sites for the coming-into-being of new 
subjectivities amidst changing political and economic conditions. Complementing these 
scholars’ emphasis on the role of power and aspiration in these processes, I bring 
attention to ethics as both a source and site for the creation of new subjectivities, which 
may be entangled with, but is not simply reducible to, power (Lambek 2000: 313).   
 By organizing this dissertation around individual case studies, I was able to 
highlight several ways that religion, ethics, and vocal expression intersect in 
contemporary Bali. However, taking this approach also meant that many interesting and 
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relevant paths of inquiry had to be left unexplored. One fascinating sphere of activity, 
which only receives brief mention here, is the world of dharma wacana (Hindu 
sermons). With its lively presence on television, at UDG competitions, and in Balinese 
communities, dharma wacana could be the subject of an entire ethnography on its own.  
 One advantage of the case study approach was that it allowed for close 
investigation of several Balinese artistic practices that have been understudied in 
existing scholarship. A possible avenue for expanding this research would be to explore 
the ethical questions I have pursued in relation to pepaosan and the Puja Tri Sandhya 
in connection to other, more widely studied, Balinese artistic traditions. The wayang 
tradition, for example, is widely understood as an important source of moral teachings 
that are rooted in Balinese religious literature and beliefs. Like pepaosan, wayang is 
embedded in Balinese ritual practice and also targeted as a tool for circulating state 
religious doctrine. But whereas traditional pepaosan performances tend to be made up 
of textual fragments, presented in no particular order, wayang has a narrative structure, 
which would seem to afford different ethical possibilities. Another Balinese art form that 
would be relevant to consider in this regard is gamelan. What kinds of ethical values 
and commitments come into play in rehearsals and performances of this 
quintessentially collective musical art form? As Balinese are increasingly called upon to 
imagine and work on themselves as individuals, are the demands and affordances of 
the gamelan tradition becoming more or less relevant to social life on the island? How 
are its meanings changing amidst shifting political and economic conditions?  
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 Organizing this dissertation around the voice and vocal expression provided 
valuable insights into the relationship between ethics and mediation. However, the 
portrait of ethical life that emerged from this ethnography is somewhat limited due to 
being compartmentalized around specific vocal practices. A more comprehensive study 
of Balinese Hindu ethics would reveal the central place that collectivist values and 
demands play in Balinese social life. In addition to feeling pressure to pull of lavish 
rituals, as described in Chapter 2, members of the Dangin family also felt a strong 
sense of obligation toward others in their community. Kompiang in particular seemed to 
always be busy helping friends and relatives prepare offerings for their rituals. Wayan 
sometimes complained that Kompiang exhausted herself with this work, and he often 
urged her to turn down her neighbors’ requests. Yet, when he himself was called to 
makemit (stand guard overnight) during temple ceremonies in Tegal, he found these 
calls difficult to turn down, even on nights when he wasn’t technically obligated to be 
present. This struggle to be an active and helpful member of one’s community is aptly 
captured in the Balinese phrase “learning how to die” (melajah mati). This phrase neatly 
encapsulates the sense of mutual obligation shared by members of a single banjar: 
because families require banjar cooperation and assistance in order to complete 
necessary death rituals, learning how to die refers to the steady and ongoing 
contributions of time and labor that individuals must make in support of collective rituals, 
in order to prove themselves worthy of the banjar’s aid when their turn comes to be 
buried and cremated.  
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 The crucial importance of these contributions was clarified for me after I 
performed gender wayang with Wayan and his brother at a mass tooth-filing ceremony 
in Tegal. When we arrived at the ceremony we discovered that another musician from 
the village had made plans to perform with some of his students. When these students 
failed to show up, Wayan, Kadek, and I proceeded to play instead. During the walk 
home after the ceremony, however, it became clear that Wayan and Kadek felt that this 
musician was usurping a role that their own family had traditionally filled. “Dia 
membunuh saya (he’s killing me),” Wayan said angrily. When I asked what he meant by 
this, Wayan explained that this man had stolen what he believed was his own rightful 
opportunity to contribute to his community.  
 How do people navigate between the kinds of ethical striving embedded in 
collective religious activity and the more individualizing ethics that is being promoted 
through state religious ideologies and New Religious Movements like ISKCON? How do 
people reconcile the demands of ‘learning how to die’ with the need to avoid becoming 
‘onlookers on their own island’? Will the ethics of divine blessing, with its focus on 
wealth as a sign of divine approval, create spaces of possibility for greater participation 
in capitalist forms of labor and consumption, or will the practices of ritual exchange in 
which this ethics is grounded continue to sustain the communal bonds and 
commitments that, today, rub uncomfortably against economic pressures to escape the 
‘burden’ of Balinese adat? Whatever the outcome, we can be certain that mediatory 
practices like those I have examined here will play a critical role in materializing the 
ethical possibilities that Balinese Hindus imagine and pursue.  
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